
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WHY IS HISTORY REWRITTEN?

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WHY IS HISTORY REWRITTEN?

BY
LUCY MAYNARD SALMON

With an Introduction by
EDWARD P. CHEYNEY

"History is lengthening and
widening and deepening."
—*Frederick William Maitland*

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PREFACE

THE purpose of this book is to give a partial answer to the question raised by its title. It is written for the general reader and an effort has therefore been made to eliminate, as far as possible, footnotes and citations from authorities. But the general reader with an inquiring mind can readily reconstruct the ultimate grounds for the conclusions deduced. It is not a work on historical method, as this subject has been amply and authoritatively discussed by many writers in English, French, German, and Spanish. It almost ignores what is usually termed "criticism," since it is hoped that this subject may be considered more fully in work long in preparation by the writer on the general subject of historical material. No occult reason for writing the book lies behind it. The only hope of the writer is that it may serve to clarify in some slight degree the confusion that prevails somewhat generally in regard to the nature, function, and history of history.

The writer is under obligation to the editors of *The North American Review* for permission to incorporate part of an article which appeared in that periodical. She has also ventured to plagiarize from herself to the extent of using a few paragraphs from two privately printed pamphlets.

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INTRODUCTION

THIS is the last piece of historical work that Miss Salmon brought to completion. It was finished in the fall of 1926, and was in the hands of the publisher when she died three months later. If she had chosen just which of her works she would leave for posthumous publication she could not have made a more characteristic or more worthy choice. Through this whole work runs her mature, sane, thoughtful conception of history. No one who had not done much research would write with such realization of the difficulties of the task of historical scholarship. Yet no one who was not a teacher would approach the subject in so practical and so appreciative a spirit. Enthusiasm for discovery, approval of rigorous methods of investigation, willingness to accept the truth, whatever it may prove to be, enjoyment of good writing suffuse this work, as they did all Miss Salmon's writing and teaching.

There is no lack in it of condemnation of what is false or ignorant or partisan in historical writing, but she takes for granted that her readers also will condemn it and will accept all her high ideals for her subject. Her book, therefore, notwithstanding the rhetorical question that gives it its title, is not so much an argument as it is an explanation, an explanation of why history should be written and rewritten. Miss Salmon finds a score of reasons why it must be rewritten but she finds a hundred other questions to be answered and criticisms to be made as she goes along. History has progressed from naive tales of personal adventure through its use for partisan purposes to its modern state of a branch of science. In each stage it has used materials, followed standards,

chosen subjects, and clothed itself in a style reflecting the period. Sometimes it has been based on thoughtless tradition, sometimes it has used critically edited manuscripts, sometimes it has sought and utilized only such materials as supported its contentions; increasingly frequently it has drawn upon newly discovered material remains of all kinds.

This thesis with a wealth of discussion and illustration is the argument of Miss Salmon's book. The antithesis between fact and interpretation, history as a borrower of material from other sciences and as a lender to them, history as a pioneer and history in the defensive, history as taught, as written, as discovered from the monuments,—all these and many other matters appear in their logical place in Miss Salmon's book.

So Miss Salmon says with humor and a wealth of happy quotations and apposite references what is in her mind about the worth of history, its growing richness of materials, its increasingly rigorous standards, the sins of those who have written it badly and the ideals of those who search for historical truth with assiduity and write it with grace. She finds abundant justification for the constant rewriting of history and is optimistic concerning its progress. Her book will appeal of course most extensively to students and writers and teachers of history, and they will find in it much of professional interest. But the general reader also will be interested. The position of history in the eyes of the world has never been higher than it is at present. Yet none know better than those who pursue it most closely the inadequacies of its materials and the deficiencies of its presentation. But these come from the innate difficulties of the task. To cause those who are not themselves professed historians to

realize this is to answer Miss Salmon's question, "Why is history rewritten?"

There has been much thinking and writing among historians along these lines in recent years. Many of us have long been dissatisfied with merely adding fact to fact and thus increasing the general sum of historical information, and even with the somewhat higher process of clarifying and systematizing historical knowledge. Nor does the search for a philosophy of history appeal at present to any considerable number of historians. The tendency of curious minds has rather been to turn to an examination of history as itself a subject of thought. What has been its history, its materials, its methods, its object, its relation to other subjects, its requirements from its votaries? This is the field of "The Writing of History," the authoritative report of a carefully chosen committee of the American Historical Association two years ago; such have been the matters dwelt upon in more than one presidential address before that body and in discussion in national and international gatherings, and this is the main subject of the brilliant inaugural address of George M. Trevelyan when he took his seat as Regius Professor of History at Cambridge last year. It is to this class of works that Miss Salmon's book belongs. Interpenetrated as it is with her personality as a thoughtful scholar, a wide reader, and a practical teacher, and representing, as it evidently does, long and careful thought, it is not only the most recent of this group of writings but one of the most valuable and interesting.

EDWARD P. CHEYNEY

University of Pennsylvania, August, 1928.

CHAPTER I

OF MAKING MANY HISTORIES

A YOUNG engineer was talking with a group of persons devoting themselves to the study of history and during the conversation he remarked, "Your work is of course plain sailing; you do not have to contend with such difficult problems as we do." The conception of the task of the historian expressed by a member of a different guild of workers in the field of knowledge probably reflects the opinion held by many intelligent persons everywhere. The problems of history doubtless do appear simple to those not actively engaged in attempting their solution,—do we not all bear with ease the burdens of others, assume with success their responsibilities, expend with wisdom their income, and invest with large profit their capital? But the student of history is not misled by outward appearances,—he knows his task is not an easy one, however much so it may appear to others. Indeed, so far from feeling that he is to be congratulated on the apparent ease with which his work may be accomplished, the student of history may feel that he is to be congratulated on the very number, the variety, and the complexity of the problems presented by his favorite study, and he may experience the exhilaration of the mountain climber in attacking and overcoming the obstacles in his path. He may go even farther and accept with joy the dictum that "the gods are not conceived as making things easy for man, but as making them difficult: their beneficence takes that form. They set him hard tasks, they give him perplexing problems, they match him against superior odds,

they send him forth on long and perilous adventures. . . . They spread the insoluble before him and say 'Solve *that*!' They fling the impossible at his feet and say, 'Do *that*!' They put his body to its mettle, his mind also and his soul. They are the challengers."

This is indeed in very truth the spirit with which the student of history must accept the challenge, not of the gods, but of the doubting Thomases who find in history but a pleasing branch of literature and who question the wisdom of devoting any further time to its study. "Let the dead past bury its dead" seems often their own defiant challenge.

Among all the many problems that confront the historian, none, he himself realizes, is more serious than that of the necessity of constantly rewriting history. Yet to the incredulous this may seem but an imaginary difficulty. Why, they may ask, does the historian feel this pressure to do over again what has once been done? Surely, it may be urged, if history has been once written it ought to stand; history deals with facts, these facts do not change, and the duplication of work already done means wasted, fruitless effort. Moreover, history is an interesting form of literature and anyone who wields a facile pen will have no difficulty in making his contribution to the literature of history. If the facts of history do not change and if they have been presented in attractive literary form, the historian is surely taking upon himself a thankless task. Why then is history rewritten, —does it need to be rewritten?

The question is not unreasonable. That it is rewritten is evident from the long list of histories constantly coming from the press, often in number exceeding any other class of publications except fiction, yet much of this is apparently a duplication of what has already been done.

Within the past few years in America, England, France, and Germany there have appeared various general histories of the world, usually written on the co-operative plan, all practically covering the same field. Still other elaborate histories of the world are projected on a yet more extensive scale. The upheaval of society that resulted from the World War has led to plans for a great series in two hundred volumes on *The Economic and Social History of the World War.* This is but a cross section of the history of a limited field during a limited period. The finite mind can scarcely grasp the extent of the literature that would result were the history of the world since the coming of mankind to be written on the same extensive scale.

What is true of world histories written both longitudinally and latitudinally is true of the histories of individual nations and of special subjects that cut across the histories of several countries. America, so often spoken of as "a new country," has offered the historian a soil scarcely less fertile than has the round world itself. History after history has come from the press, and these histories have been written by the individual historian, or through the co-operation of many historians; they have been published in one volume or in a dozen; they have dealt with the military, or with the political, or with the economic, or with the literary aspects of our past; they have presented the points of view of different geographical sections, or of different political parties, yet fundamentally they may seem much alike.

The situation in England is comparable to that in America. Within recent years the history of England has been written and rewritten, and this not simply to afford a choice between an epitome of English history and an exhaustive description of its past, between a con-

stitutional and an ecclesiastical history, between a history of a limited period and one including the entire field, but in many cases the histories apparently cover practically the same ground, with the same exhaustiveness or the same condensation, and illustrate the same phase of England's past. Lord Mahon's narrative history of England during the eighteenth century fills seven volumes, while W. E. H. Lecky's topical treatment of the same period extends through eight volumes. Sir J. R. Seeley in his *Expansion of England* skips from peak to peak through the same century in a single brief volume, with scarcely a telescopic glance at the work of his predecessors. J. R. Green's *Short History of the English People* was written for the general reader and the work was so well done that, although it was issued more than fifty years ago, it is still in demand and its substantial merits are everywhere recognized. Yet the present year (1926) sees a new general history for the general reader coming from Professor George Trevelyan, whose gifted pen supplements but presumably does not supplant that of his predecessor in the same field.

This same situation is found practically everywhere. Long histories, each the work of a single author, cooperative histories, serial histories, exhaustive histories covering the entire field, exhaustive histories dealing with a limited period, elaborate monographs, comprehensive surveys, all follow each other in rapid succession, and all insistently claim the attention of readers and students.

The conditions are not at all different in the case of a more remote period. From the time of Herodotus and Thucydides, Livy and Tacitus to the current year, historian after historian has found his theme in the age of heroes and their valorous deeds. As far back as the

history of mankind can be traced, men have attempted to tell the story of the past,—from the time of prehistoric man to the efforts of to-day to combine the nations of the earth into a league for peace. Certain great classics that contain the elements of the universal have survived, some of them for centuries, and these are read and studied to-day with scarcely diminished interest, but for the most part all that has been done must be done over again. The countless histories written satisfy now neither the writers nor the readers of the past and "the six best sellers" of last year are not more effectively forgotten than are for the most part the works of the great historians of the past.

But before attempting to give a partial answer to the question, "Why is history rewritten?" it may be asked, "Why is history written at all?" It often seems necessary to justify the very existence of history as a part of the field of knowledge worth cultivating. The mythology of Greece and Rome placed Clio on Mount Olympus, where with her companion muses she dwelt among the major divinities of heaven. But in an age that counts itself above all else a practical one, a long and distinguished lineage and a heavenly place of abode may not seem sufficient reasons for burning incense to the muse of history.

History itself answers no questions as to its origin. This is as shrouded in obscurity as is conscious birth to an individual. The scroll of Clio has never been fully unrolled; and there seems no probability that it ever can be. Only the somewhat crude statement can be given that man has apparently always been interested in his own past. It is perhaps because of this very inability to penetrate to its utmost confines that he is ever fascinated by the pursuit of the inherently impossible. Another

reason may be an even more probable explanation. The future is unknown, but the past affords at least an anchorage. Fear and dread of the unknown compel men to cling to the past as affording a firm foundation. This in turn may explain the intense desire of so many persons to be personally remembered and to keep in mind the memory of friends. Our cemeteries with their monuments bear silent evidence of the all-controlling desire of men to be remembered. Wills with their provisions for memorial gifts attest the same desire. Gifts in memory of those who have died show the inherent, persistent fear that otherwise oblivion will be the fate of those individually dear to their personal friends. Monuments erected to those whose lives men believe should not be forgotten indicate the collective honor paid to conspicuous service in behalf of city, state, or nation by those who could not have known them personally. History in its origin grew out of a desire to rescue from forgetfulness man's personal and collective past.

This in the beginning was a somewhat simple matter. Narrative history was largely biography. Homer sang of the wrath of Achilles, and Virgil of the adventures of Aeneas. But conditions changed. Men ceased to be migratory and built cities for themselves. Thus the field of history was enlarged, and community and court life entered in. Perhaps rivalries led to conflicts, conflicts to concessions, concessions to the renewal and enlargement of conflicts. Perhaps adventure beckoned and there were new worlds to conquer. Perhaps men ventured into the unknown intellectual world. Whatever the change in general human relationships, history long remained a simple narration of these obvious changes. The chronicles of the Old Testament, the travels of Herodotus, the annals of the mediaeval monks, all sug-

gest a simple outlook on life. They have all found a permanent place in the history of the past, but they are the accounts of what men without effort on their part have witnessed from day to day and not the fruits of the inquiring mind pressing ever onward.

It is, therefore, most fitting that history, the subject that describes developments, should itself have a history and that the history of history should show as interesting a development as that which it itself records in other fields.

An important chapter in this history of history concerns the choice of material. The first historians were poets and the events they selected as subjects of their narration were those that appealed to the imagination. The stories of Achilles and Hector, of Ulysses and Penelope, as told by Homer, like those of Antigone and Ajax portrayed by Sophocles, are of thrilling interest and hold the imagination to-day as they did centuries ago. History thus at first occupied itself with the deeds of heroes either traditional or actual, and the historian concerned himself with the picture he was to present rather than with a close analysis of the materials of which it was composed. The question he asked was, "Will this material make a vivid picture?"

But in process of time the historian changed his point of view and he no longer selected his material with the sole object of using it to give a vivid picture of the past. He came to see that the subject matter of history might serve certain political ends both of the State and of the Church, and he therefore selected his material with this in mind. Moreover, in time, the invention of printing focused interest on the printed record and, since the critical faculty was but imperfectly developed, every printed record was accepted at its face value to the neg-

lect of every other form of testimony. When, therefore, the object of writing history came to be largely subjective rather than objective, to be personal rather than general, and to center about State and Church rather than about individual heroes, the historian was governed in the selection of material by the question, "Will this material serve my purpose?" This principle has been the prevailing one almost to the present time. Clarendon was a Cavalier, Burnet an Anglican, Hume a Monarchist, and Grote a Whig, and to all of these historians history seemed quite naturally and honestly a means of exploiting the virtues of one political party and of showing the weaknesses of the opposing party.

But again the historian shifted his position, and with the birth of the science of historical criticism, he placed emphasis on the use of fresh material. His energies were given to the search for long-hidden documents and history came to be considered important if it was based on manuscripts discovered by the author.

But the rapid growth of the science of historical criticism has again brought a change in the aim of the historian. He is no longer the dramatist, intent only on the effect produced by his picture, he is still less the advocate holding a brief for monarchist or democrat, he is even less the pedant with eye fixed at short range on documents not worth the rescue from oblivion. Bryce has shown the historian of to-day that new material must be clothed in literary form, if it is to be worthy of the name of history; Mommsen has shown him that the historian must preserve a sense of proportion and of perspective in his use of new material; Morley has shown him that the historian may deservedly stand high in the confidence of politicians and statesmen and yet keep unswerving his allegiance to truth.

The historian has thus learned that he must be equipped for his work with the gift of literary expression, that his history may be effective; with abundance of material, that he may not generalize from insufficient data; with such experience in practical life as will make him a judge rather than an advocate; but most of all with the compelling force to tell the truth as he sees it.

The great question, therefore, that every historian asks of every other historian concerns authority. "What is the basis of your conclusion?" "What is the authority of your statement?" *"How do you know?"*—this is the challenge that in one form or another meets the historian at every step of his way, and if at any point he fails to meet the challenge his entire work falls to the ground discredited.

Thus as Dissenter and Roman Catholic meet on common ground in opposition to Anglican, so the child who demands "true stories" and the mature historian whose one pursuit is truth are alike in that both, consciously or unconsciously, look with disfavor on history written solely for effect, or to gain specific ends; on slipshod, superficial, inaccurate work; on formless, lifeless, jellyfish histories written to please everybody; on "safe" histories, that like "safe" candidates, are offered, the one to find purchasers and the other to find votes.

The historian, therefore, who brings before the public a new history must be prepared to find his every statement challenged by the question, "What is your authority?" If he cannot show that his authority is unimpeachable, that the evidence he produces is absolutely trustworthy, that those upon whose authority he is forced to rely have had an eye single for the truth, his work justly fails in credibility in the view alike of readers and of scholars.

Thus as history developed from the early annals into a serious form of literature, it was widely cultivated, and it took on a stabilized, conventional character. This is the history that was long called history, in distinction from the older forms of chronicles, or annals. It was narrow and restricted in its scope, uncritical in its method, credulous in its acceptance of the raw materials out of which history is written, and sweeping in the conclusions it drew. It was inevitable that new forms of writing history should be developed, and it is the appearance of these that lies behind the question and gives the answer to it,—Why is history rewritten?

These new forms have been developed both from within and from without. In their development from within, they have established forms for the writing of history, they have prescribed standards and canons to which the historian must rigidly adhere, they have charted the fields of available material, and they have perfected an admirable technique for dealing with this material. This, however, is only one hemisphere, and its discovery and exploration have fully occupied the time and energies of one great group of historians. In the development of the new forms of history from without, they have greatly extended the field from which historical material is to be drawn; they have voyaged the seven seas, not to secure rare or curious specimens to add to its collection, but to find the unifying principles common to other times and other lands; they have looked towards co-operation with other departments of knowledge as an ultimate goal.

These hemispheres have as yet not formed the perfect globe,—there are jagged edges that prevent complete coherence. Indeed, it sometimes seems that those who have played the chief parts in the two fields have become

warring camps, quite unconscious of their mutual interdependence. But as the microscope and the telescope are both essential in extending the boundaries of knowledge and the adherents of neither one are justified in contemptuously rejecting, or in failing to acknowledge, the services of the other, so it has been made necessary to rewrite history through the theories both schools of historians have worked out.

CHAPTER II

IS ANY HISTORY WORTH WHILE?

It has been assumed thus far that the existence of a branch of knowledge known as history has been universally accepted. But this is unhappily far from being the true situation, and it must be conceded that one of the most serious difficulties the historian has to meet is that of justifying the very existence of history and upholding its claim to be heard. The current conception of the nature of history and of its problems is a veritable stone of Sisyphus that the historian seems fated to roll up hill and that adds to his difficulty in rewriting history.

There is widely prevalent the belief that history is a comfortable but somewhat humdrum subject about which every one should know a little something. This view is supported by the authority of the late Alexander Bain. "The fact that history presents no difficulty to minds of ordinary education and experience," he says, "and is moreover an interesting form of literature is a sufficient reason for not spending much time upon it in the curriculum of school or college. When there is any doubt, we may settle the matter by leaving it out." The advice sometimes given by their home friends to freshmen entering college is, "Take history, that's easy."

Another position often held is that history is a subject that once had some popularity, which, however, is disappearing in the development of new interests. "History," says Sir John Robert Seeley, "is the name of a residuum which has been left when one group of facts after another has been taken possession of by some

science; . . . the residuum which now exists must go the way of the rest and . . . the time is not very distant when a science will take possession of the facts which are still the undisputed property of the historian." That this is the view held also by Professor J. W. Burgess is evident from his statement that "when mankind shall have reached that fulness of experience which shall enable it to become completely conscious of itself, it may then be able to turn all of its knowledge into science, and history may then be said to have done its work."

But both Sir John and Professor Burgess had been anticipated by the dictum of Herbert Spencer that "the only history that is of practical value is what may be called descriptive sociology. And the highest office which the historian can discharge is of so narrating the lives of nations as to furnish materials for a comparative sociology." And all these judges had in turn been anticipated by Richard Jefferies who somewhat contemptuously dismisses the whole subject in saying that "history is little beyond the record of migrations, how one race moved on and overcame the race in front of it." Hobbes found in history only "the register of knowledge of facts," requiring for its pursuit only sense and memory, together with the knowledge required in a witness. John Stuart Mill found that history and geography had no educational value.

If history must be rewritten, it is that historians themselves, like Sir John Robert Seeley and Professor J. W. Burgess, have denied the very existence of history; that philosophers like Hobbes have found no place for cause and effect in the writing of history; that its value in education has been denied; that false prophets have predicted its speedy disappearance; that the rank and file evidently still think of history as a branch of literature

within the compass of any one who has a good memory and writes agreeably, but believe that since the chronicle of the past is prone to be dull, it must be enlivened, embellished, and embroidered if it is to find readers. If history needs to be rewritten, it is in part because of the prevailing misconceptions of the nature and function of history. The most depressing feature of the situation is that history has been "wounded in the house of its friends" and that it must justify its very existence in the presence of those who themselves have been of the guild. It has not been the treachery but a lack of understanding of otherwise intelligent persons that may seem to put this needless burden on historians of explaining not only why history is rewritten but also why it is written at all.

If these misconceptions in regard to the nature and function of history have been given currency by those of high estate, it is not surprising that corresponding views are held by those less advantageously situated. It is often stated that it is the primary object of history to inculcate patriotism. But no agreement has ever been reached as to what constitutes patriotism. The definitions that have been given range all the way from Homer's "And for our country 'tis a bliss to die," the mediaeval *"Ubi bene ibi patria,"* and Dr. Johnson's "Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel," to Decatur's challenge to the world, "Our Country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong." If it is the function of history to teach patriotism, there will necessarily be some confusion if all the varieties indicated by these definitions are taught either simultaneously or consecutively.

Again it is urged that it is the function of history to teach good citizenship. State legislators often seem to

vie with each other in zeal for promoting this use of history through prescribing the textbooks to be used in the public schools. But "good citizenship," like patriotism, is susceptible of a variety of contradictions. Sometimes it evidently means to those who press its claims such a citizenship as is beneficial to the individual citizen. This is indicated in the current political phrases, "make hay while the sun shines," "feather your own nest," "to the victor belong the spoils," "Uncle Sam is rich enough to buy us all a farm." History may well despair if it is to be used in the service of good citizenship of this description. Other interpretations of the phrase may flatly contradict this personal and subjective interest in promoting the cause of history, and yet the historian may be unwilling to accept any form of "good citizenship" as an all-sufficient reason for the pursuance of his work.

The moral aspects of history are often urged as its goal. History must be so written and so taught as to warn against wrong and to advocate right. But alas, how troublesome are the questions of right and wrong so persistently urged as the objective point of history! In one way or another, all the cardinal virtues and the seven deadly sins have been put forward as giving the motive for writing history, and yet the historian himself cannot accept any of these moral reasons, however admirable in themselves, as explaining the grounds of his work.

The "causes" that have hoped to find in history a helpful handmaiden for furthering their success are almost countless, and history often seems but as wax in the hands, not of its detractors, but of its over-zealous advocates. Well may it cry out in despair, "Save me from my friends!" For these friends have been oblivious of the real purpose of history and they have at all times,

even if unconsciously, made the worse appear the better reason. They have been unmindful of the real meaning of history. Its one quest is the truth and truth must be single-minded and blind to all else. It matters not what services history in the past has rendered any cause, good or bad,—its motive to-day is to seek the truth, come what will. It is not concerned in handing down a body of ready-made knowledge in the interests of any special individual, group, party, or cause. Its one controlling purpose is to advance the boundaries of knowledge.

History itself cannot accept any of these decisions concerning itself that have been made for it by others, either by opponents or by supporters. It feels that it has now, as it has always had, a legitimate place in the field of knowledge; that its function is not waning but is rather increasing; that this function is not to foster patriotism, or good citizenship, or public or private morals, or any other "cause," however desirable in itself its attainment may be. If the question is put to history, it will say in no uncertain terms that its one quest is the truth, and that therefore it must be single-minded and blind to all else. History will say in equally certain terms, that since its pursuit is truth, history is emphatically worth while. It will add with no less conviction that because history has in the past been consciously used for other purposes than the attainment of truth it becomes necessary to rewrite it to-day.

History will also affirm that it is a lawful dweller in the field of knowledge and that therefore its pursuit is worth while because all history has been a natural development from the history of a previous day. This development it shares with all other branches of knowledge. Out of alchemy has grown chemistry; out of astrology has been developed astronomy; natural history

that once included the whole realm of nature has, amoeba-like, developed into a score of highly technical sciences dealing with the field of nature. By an analogous process, we have to-day a history that has been developed from the mediaeval chronicles and a still earlier hero-biography; a history that to-day asks not what material is new; not what material will uphold friends and vilify foes; not what material will exalt one political or ecclesiastical party and debase its opponents, but a history that asks what material is true; a history with problems, with multifold activities, with a future as well as a past; a history that so far from being absorbed by other branches of knowledge, takes on each year new responsibilities and has an ever widening and deepening sphere of influence. As history becomes more conscious of the possibilities opening out to it, it becomes more and more conscious of its own worthwhileness and more and more impelled to search for the truth, undeterred by the allurement of lending a helping hand to others to the detriment of its own singleness of purpose. Truth must be the ultimate objective point of all research in every field and when found all alike must profit by it. So far from losing its own individuality and being merged into other branches of knowledge, history constantly adds to its stature and increases in strength.

Yet at first sight there may seem some justification for the belief held by scholars like Burgess and Seeley that history has no field and is doomed to disappear. Progressive dissection has taken from the field of history the subjects known collectively as economics, sociology, political science, international law, together with special histories of the church both on its secular and its religious side, histories of art, of literature, of language, of philosophy,—histories of everything great or small that

concerns man or nature. By a parallel progressive dissection, from the parent American Historical Association there has been organized the American Economic Association, the American Association of Political Science, the American Sociological Association, the American Bibliographical Association, the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, the Church History Association, the Catholic Historical Society, the Jewish Historical Association, the American Agricultural Historical Association, and nearly a score of other societies, national or regional in their scope, that have history as their primary object.

If, however, it is said that with this progressive dissection the fate of history as an independent subject is sealed, it must be remembered that this progressive dissection is shared by every other branch of human knowledge. The progressive dissection of English has resulted in its division into the fields of language, literature, rhetoric, philology, argumentation, spoken English, written English, critical writing, journalism, and other branches. The progressive dissection of philosophy has given rise to psychology, ethics, logic, and similar subjects. Again, a single subject like aesthetics may be claimed as an offshoot from philosophy, or art, or literature.

But this progressive dissection of history, so far from eliminating history, or superseding it, has resulted in putting it on a still firmer basis. Through it, the historian is able to avail himself of the research of specialists and to base his work on theirs. If the historian is writing of ancient life, he goes to the archaeologist, the epigraphist, the specialist in classical art, who contribute to his work not only important information in these fields but also their own improved methods of work. If he is

writing of mediaeval life, he avails himself of the research of the economist in regard to the rate of wages and the purchasing power of money; of the studies of the physician into the nature, causes, and physical results of epidemics; of the agriculturalist who has investigated questions of soils and crops. If his chosen field is the modern period, he finds the work of the specialist in international law essential to his own; he takes advantage of the specific studies made in the theories of political relationships as they have been worked out in all ages; he profits by the research into questions of human society that have been made by the sociologist. At every step of the way he has the benefit of the research carried on by specialists in other fields and thus he is enabled to push ever onward and backward his own special work.

And it must not be forgotten that the natural sequence of progressive dissection is progressive combination, that every new analysis of material involves a new synthesis. This has been admirably illustrated by F. J. Turner who points out the new combinations made in the field of natural science, suggested by the terms physical chemistry, electro-chemistry, geo-physics, astro-physics and a variety of other unions of the natural sciences, including to-day anthropogeography, plant physiology, animal psychology, geomorphology, radio telegraphy, aeronautics, and aerodynamics. Progressive combination in other fields gives comparative philology, comparative literature, comparative drama, historical geography, economic geography, commercial geography, and political geography.

Again, if progressive dissection has resulted in the formation of various national organizations from a parent association, progressive combination brings

together these associations for annual meetings, and arranges for joint sessions and common programmes. A significant illustration of this was the joint session arranged by the American Sociological Association and the American Historical Association for considering the question as to how far the writing of history had been influenced by the development of sociological studies during the preceding twenty years.

But not only does progressive combination follow hard on progressive dissection, but it in turn is followed hard by progressive co-operation. If we accept the biblical truth that no man liveth unto himself and no man dieth unto himself, we must accept as equally true the principle that no branch of human knowledge is sufficient unto itself, that no branch of human knowledge has or can have an existence independent of all other fields of knowledge. In this it runs in line with Prince Kropotkin's discussion of the evolution of ethics, which has reached its highest point in the attainment of the principle of mutual aid. If in an early stage of development every man's hand was against every man; if at a later stage, men sought isolation and went into the desert to save their own souls; if still later they crept back into the world and sought salvation by serving others—*non ministrari sed ministrare*—that too became an unworkable guide for human conduct, since those served must in turn be deprived of the opportunity of serving others. This principle that lies at the basis of all work intended to advance the boundaries of knowledge may be called, if stated in terms of economics, "division of labor;" if in terms of ethics, "mutual aid;" but if in more general terms, it may be called "progressive co-operation." History thus is able through mutual aid to take advantage of the advance made in other branches of knowledge.

The new bibliography, the new biography, the new geography, the new laws for determining evidence, the new ethics all come to the aid of the new history and help in determining its character.

History, therefore, so far from disappearing when specialization entered the field of knowledge, has thereby but increased its own strength, enlarged its own vision, multiplied its own effectiveness, and made itself more than ever indispensable to its fellow-workers. In no uncertain terms history is ready to defend its claim to be a co-partner with other branches of knowledge as a seeker after truth.

But if history thus believes that it justifies its existence, it may well be asked what it is doing to maintain the faith. And an answer may well be found in an examination of the various groups of activities it is carrying on. They concern those connected with the investigation, the teaching, and the writing of history, the dissemination of the results of this work, and the conservation of whatever contains records for the use of the historian.

History is justifying its existence through its work along the lines of investigation and research. These include the discovery of new material, the charting of the field, the preparation of material, the selection of material, and the application of the principle of division of labor. Some of these activities will be considered separately, but it is necessary to group them collectively in order to emphasize the fundamental fact that all progress in history takes as its starting point the goal already reached, that investigation concerning what has been already achieved must precede research into untrodden fields.

A second line of activities implied in the development of history concerns the changes that have come in the

teaching of history. One of the first demands in all teaching is for definiteness, and in history especially, for definiteness of facts and of dates. The use of a textbook has been specially helpful in securing this definiteness, but other methods have been added and this has given rise to anxiety. Some have been alarmed, lest history in adding these methods of study is forgetting "the background of facts, the knowledge of dates, names, and events which form the grammar of history and without which one's knowledge is apt to be vague." Yet in this concern is seen a failure to realize that definiteness can be secured in other and probably better ways than by minute attention to a textbook. Definiteness is secured through attention to matters of form, such as punctuation, spelling, and general arrangement; through observation of footnotes, citations, and references; through the study of bibliographies both in regard to content and to form; through the study of the text of important documents, like the Declaration of Independence, and the determination of how far they grew out of concrete conditions, and how far they may have been evolved out of the inner consciousness of those who drew them up. It seems to the teacher of history to-day that it is better to acquire the habit of definiteness than to gain definiteness of information that has been secured through others; to cultivate a habit of mind that can be applied to any subject than to accumulate a mass of facts not necessarily related or co-ordinated. Dr. Johnson once explained to a friend that knowledge is of two kinds. "We know a subject ourselves, or we know where we can find information upon it. When we enquire into any subject, the first thing we have to do is to know what books have treated of it. This leads us to look at catalogues, and the backs of books in libraries."

The historian agrees with Dr. Johnson in believing that knowledge is of two kinds. So far from disregarding facts and maintaining a haughty attitude towards definiteness, the teacher of history devises every possible means of facilitating the acquisition of facts and of promoting the cultivation of definiteness.

But it must be remembered that there has come to be a change of attitude in regard to facts. This assuredly does not imply that facts are held in less respect than formerly,—on the contrary, they may be held in even greater respect than before. "Give us facts, not speculation" is the demand constantly made of writers and speakers. There is evident a growing fearlessness in the use of facts and a willingness to abide by the conclusions deduced from them. But the different attitude towards them comes from an appreciation of our former error in assuming that all facts have always a fixed location and a definite value. Historians were once urged to select only the "important" facts and to discard "unimportant" facts. But no fact is in and of itself either important or unimportant; its importance is due altogether to its association with other facts. Facts are always held in solution, to be precipitated by one or another reagent. One reagent added to a solution may precipitate one substance, another reagent added to the same solution may precipitate an entirely different substance. But a fact contains in itself the elements of the universal,—its importance depends entirely on its relation to other facts. It is, for example, of no apparent concern to know the exact date of the birth of Columbus if the historian is writing a history of agriculture, but the fact is of great importance in writing a history of the discovery of America, since its determination indicates the amount of indebtedness of Columbus to Toscanelli and to pre-

vious discoverers. The late Henry Vignaud practically gave all of his unofficial life to the investigation of this question and the results of his work have immeasurably increased our knowledge of this whole period. But most of all it stands as a significant illustration of the principle that facts have a relative, not an absolute, value.

The teaching activity of history is also concerned with the new chronology,—a new chronology that substitutes a chronology of development for an absolute astronomical chronology. For chronology, like facts, is relative, not fixed and absolute. The sun-dial has given place to the clock that may or may not record sun time. The railway has substituted uniform, standard time for sun time. In cities midway between the fixed boundaries of standard time, two methods of time measurement are often found, sun time and standard time. The church chronology gives a fixed date for commemorating the birth of Christ, but a movable date for celebrating the resurrection. "Daylight saving time" has divided society into hostile camps, one demanding the return to "God's own time," without explanation of the applicableness of the descriptive term chosen, and the other appreciating every respite in the conflict that prolongs the *status quo*.[1]

The term "stone age" is used to designate the earliest age of man because primitive man has everywhere begun his advance with the use of stone. Yet mankind has never ceased to be a worker in stone,—architecture, sculpture, bas-relief, mosaic all attest to-day his growing skill in the use of this most primitive medium. Thus in the use of stone there is continuity of development from the

[1]For the best account of a much larger phase of the subject, see J. T. Shotwell, "The Measuring of Time," *An Introduction to the History of History*, pp. 40–50; also, J. T. Shotwell, "The Discovery of Time," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, April 15, 1915, 12: 197–206; May 13, 1915, 12: 253–269; June 10, 1915, 12: 309–317.

crude stone implements of primitive man to the sculpture of Stone Mountain as a memorial of the Confederate dead.

The bronze age and the iron age succeed the stone age, yet mankind has never ceased to be a worker in bronze and in iron. Our own age is called the age of steel, yet iron and coal date back to the prehistoric period. Mankind never abandons the use of a material once found serviceable but adds constantly new skill in its use. The familiar design we call Grécian we now know belongs not to a specific geographical locality, but to a specific stage of development. The geometric design of a primitive civilization is common to Greece and to Scandinavia at similar stages of development. But to-day the conventional design is everywhere employed as one of the highest forms of expression in art. Thus we are always in "a transitional period,"—no sudden breaks mark the boundary from one age to another, but each develops naturally from the past. The cross-cut section in biology is not an end in itself, but a means to study of growth. Thus the extreme difficulty, even the impossibility, of dividing history into definite fixed periods, makes it, if for no other reason, impossible to give it an exclusively chronological character. This once seemed not only a simple but indeed the only way of teaching history, but it has been found necessary to modify, in some cases to abandon altogether, an arbitrary, fixed chronology for the chronology of human development.

Another activity concerns the question of definition. It must be evident that unless historians can agree upon a generally recognized and intelligible terminology, endless confusion results and efforts to rewrite history in any field where definition is essential must be of the nature of a treadmill. It is this that gives such importance to

the work of scholars like Professor Neilson, who "has tried to provide students of mediaeval antiquities with a basis for classifying and comparing the various rents in kind and payments in money which were imposed on the population [of the manorial period]." Research is therefore putting into the hands of all students a more definite, precise terminology that is doing much to clarify our ideas of an obscure past.

Other activities with which history is now concerning itself will be considered in connection with other phases of the subject. But the agencies through which these manifold activities are carried on must be denoted. Some of these agencies are national and even international in their scope. The Carnegie Institution through its Department of Historical Research has sent its emissaries hither and yon to many parts of the world to discover in foreign archives material bearing on the history of America, as is illustrated in Frances G. Davenport's *European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies to 1648.* The American Historical Association through its numerous and large commissions and committees has covered the country with a network of activities pertaining to bibliography, national archives, manuscripts, historical societies, and kindred subjects. The Association has taken a leading part in the organization of the American Council of Learned Societies devoted to Humanistic Studies, its committees have reported on American scientific and educational interests in the Ottoman Empire, on the recommendations of the International Committee on Historical Monuments and Antiquities; it maintained for some years headquarters in London, and it has for thirty years shown a lively interest in the teaching of history throughout the schools based on extensive study of the

conditions in this country and also in England, France, and Germany. The *American Historical Review* is the official organ of the Association and this, together with the Annual Report of the Association, gives opportunity for the publication of the results of historical research.

Parallel to the work of the national association is that carried on by state historical associations. Practically every state in the Union has its own historical society, and some of these, notably those of Massachusetts, Virginia, and Wisconsin, have carried on distinguished work. Wheels within wheels have led to the frequent organization of county historical societies and these in turn have done much to open up new opportunities of research along local and regional lines. Church organizations, patriotic societies, fraternal bodies all have their historians and historical societies. Groups of private individuals have organized to promote historical interests and these have sometimes overshadowed in importance the larger society in whose field they are included. In all of these associations for the promotion of historical interests, the tendency has apparently been to pass from private to public control, in keeping with the general tendencies of the time to form new combinations from small units and thus to gather force.

What has been the object of all these agencies in promoting historical activities? The primary object may be said to be to push back the outposts of our knowledge of the past. If in architecture the height of a building depends upon the depth of its foundation, if in physics action is equal to reaction, if in agriculture intensive work is made possible by previous extensive work, if the natural eye gains power to see in the dark, so history gains in its understanding and its appreciation of the present as it deepens its foundations, acquires a wider

outlook and establishes a stronger vision. Thus in a very real sense, prehistoric man affords to-day the most fruitful field for the historian. It is the newest form of the newest history and the human mind cannot yet grasp the vision that will yet be unfolded through the exploration of man's most remote past. It is not to be anticipated that this knowledge will be ever perfectly acquired, but the farther back the limits of our present knowledge are pushed, the more definite and sure will be our understanding of the world of to-day.

History finds another object for its work in its efforts to eliminate the confusion existing even among historians themselves between history and what is often mistaken for it. History, a method of work, is often identified with the subject matter with which history deals; the record, or the raw material with which the historian deals, is often confused with history or the finished product; the sources of history are confused with the narrative derived from them or with the facilities for deciphering them; generalizations are mistaken for laws; testimony is confused with the "transliteration of testimony"; the assumption is made that a subject becomes a science when it is studied by the scientific method; the term *science* is limited to the study of nature, when it comprises the whole world of knowledge; the scientific method by which materials are collected is confused with the manner in which the historian deals with this material. It is assuredly one of the objects of history to clarify the thinking and the language used by historians themselves in regard to their own work.

History has as one of its objects the study of developments, it constantly asks how have conditions developed from previous conditions, how has the present come to be as it is. The historian to-day arranges his material

and then writes and rewrites with reference to the question of origin, development, and growth. The late William Roscoe Thayer has pointed out the impossibility of seeing how this principle can be superseded; its discovery and acceptance have brought a feeling of confidence in having placed our feet on solid ground, of keenest joy and exhilaration in seeing the goal in sight.

History again recognizes that there has been progression in the object of writing history. But the object has varied; history at first was occupied with the concrete individual who was a hero, and history was then largely biography—a study of the isolated individual. It was later that history concerned itself with man in the abstract. The rights of man and treatises like Hegel's *Philosophy of History* seemed the highest form of history.

But interest both in the concrete hero and in the abstract man has been superseded by an interest in the study of man considered collectively,—in his relation to other men, in his ability to do "team work," in the mutual aid that to-day represents the most remote goal attainable. Progress in the object of writing history depends not on whether we select one class of facts or another, whether the historian writes political, military, ecclesiastical, literary, economic, or social history. Progress does depend on the degree in which we adopt the inductive method of work and develop the principle of evolution.

Thus happily there has come to be a subordination of the time-honored, speculative questions as to whether history is a science or not, whether history is an art or a science, whether history can be considered a branch of literature or not, and to what extent the theological doctrine of freedom of the will has conditioned the develop-

ment of history. The very statement of these obsolescent questions is another illustration of the confusion of thought that has so long hindered the progress of historical research and also the teaching of history. It is to-day recognized that history is a derived product; that it is the resultant of multitudes of records; that these records must be collected with infinite care and submitted to every possible test to determine their authenticity and their authoritativeness; that down to this point history is at one with all other sciences that collectively make up the sum total of human knowledge; that the object of one and all sciences is to ascertain the truth; that when the truth has been found, it is then optional with the historian to choose both the medium and the manner in which he gives to others the results of his research into the secrets of the past.

Is the pursuit of truth by the historian worth while, is the rewriting of history worth while? To the student of history there is but one answer to the double question. History must always be rewritten because we can only approximate to absolute truth, never hope to attain it; history must be written because the story of the past is the protoplasm that keeps alive the past and shows its unity of development; the pursuit of truth must be its goal because truth must be the objective point of all knowledge.

CHAPTER III

EXTENSION OF METHOD THROUGH DIVISION OF LABOR

All workers in the field of knowledge presumably agree that the search for truth is the objective point of all research. It must therefore follow that each and all profit by the improvements in methods of work that have come through the advance made in every special line of investigation or research. History has thus had the benefit of all the progress made by other sciences. These include not only improvements in technique, but the fundamental ones that are involved in methods of research, those that grow out of the application of the principle of division of labor, and others that come through the development of other branches of knowledge. Increasing precision and growing refinements of classification have affected for the better the methods of the historian, as these have also been affected by the realization of the important part played both by the constructive imagination and by the development of the science of historical criticism, and most of all by the change in emphasis from the inductive to the deductive method.

The activities that are involved in methods of research concern first of all the discovery and location of historical material. As one of the great works of the astronomer of to-day is charting the heavens, so one of the tasks of the historian of the day is charting the location of historical material. Sixty thousand new worlds are reported to have been discovered as a result of the observations of one department of the Carnegie Institution; and the net

results of this one department bid fair to be rivaled by the amount of important historical material located through different agencies. In more than one country is found to-day a great center of activity charged with the task of finding out what material exists for the study of definite periods of history. In America, the Department of Historical Research connected with the Carnegie Institution has already sent its representatives to England, France, Italy, Spain, Mexico, and Cuba, to investigate the location and the condition of the manuscript material available for the study of American history in its international relations. In England, workers in the Public Record Office are making the treasures of the Office available for historians. Conferences of archivists discuss the relative advantages of keeping and of making serviceable the documentary material of every country.

But the locating of material implies the succeeding step of preparing it for the use of the historian and this involves first of all, as far as it has to do with literary material, the question of editing manuscripts. "History cannot be written from manuscripts," is an oft-quoted statement attributed to Mark Pattison, as well as to various other scholars, and historians to-day accept it without question. It seems equally clear to-day that the work of editing manuscripts belongs to the expert. Yet the time is not beyond the reach of memory when any writer, or teacher, or clergyman, who was broken in health or had made a partial failure in his profession was believed to be abundantly qualified to act as an editor. Happily for historical research these days are past. The principles of correct, reasonable editing have been worked out both from theory and experience, and they have been incorporated in such perfect illustrations of ideal editing as is seen in Stevens' *Facsimilies of Man-*

uscripts in European Archives Relating to America, in Thwaites' *Jesuit Relations,* and his *Original Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition,* in the editorial work of W. C. Ford and of P. L. Ford, and in Paltsits' *Minutes of the Executive Council.* The editor no longer corrects the spelling, the grammar, the phraseology, and the moral sentiments of the authority he is editing in order to make them conform to the standards of his own day, but he gives the original manuscript or printed page in precisely the same form as when it came from the hands of the author. It is a far call from Jared Sparks with his pious emendations of the language and morals of Washington to the later edition of Washington's *Works* as given by Worthington C. Ford. The work of the editor has been facilitated, as well as in a sense made more difficult, by the increasing demands made upon the copyist and the transcriber. Formerly anyone could act as a copyist. Now so exacting are the demands made by editors on the copyists that copying and transcribing are professions in themselves. With the increasing demands made by historians on the editor, and by the editor on the transcriber, a perfection wellnigh impossible to attain has come to be expected. The aid of photography has been evoked and the editor is often content with nothing short of the facsimile of the manuscript, or the rare printed page, to put before his readers as the test for his editorial work. International congresses, like that at Liège in 1905, are called to consider the question of the best methods of reproducing manuscripts, coins, and seals so as to make them generally available for scholars. The work of representatives of the Department of Historical Research connected with the Carnegie Institution in connection with photographing manuscripts in European archives shows how rapid has been the prog-

ress in meeting the demand for the absolutely perfect reproduction of historical material. The recognition of the indebtedness of the historian to the editor and of the fundamental relationship between the two was seen in the selection in 1916 of Worthington C. Ford as president of the American Historical Association and was illustrated in his presidential address on *The Editorial Function in United States History*.

But beyond the locating and the editing of manuscript material lies the question of the selection of material from the standpoint both of authenticity and of authoritativeness. Time was when everything that was in print "went," but in recent years the reputation of more than one so-called history has been shipwrecked on the rock of taking everything in print at its face value. The work of every historian is to-day discredited unless it carries with it indisputable proof of the reliability of the sources on which it is based, and it is because of ignorance of this fundamental principle, indifference to it, or disregard of it in the past that the burden is now laid on the historian of doing over again a large part of the work once considered final.

This is an impossible task for the historian if he works single-handed and alone; if he attempts it, the result is that his work must be done over after him. History needs to be rewritten because into the work of the historian, as into every other field of human activity, has entered the principle of division of labor. Once the historian was like the man who decides to build a house, and then himself digs the cellar, lays the foundation walls, does the carpenter work, and decorates the interior. Oliver Wendell Holmes comments on a house which its owner boasted he had built entirely by his own hands, "It is better to be built in that way than not to be

built at all." The historian was long forced to be "jack of all trades,"—he collected his material, he examined its authenticity, passed upon its authoritativeness, and combined the results of his work into an historical narrative. To the result not even Dr. Holmes' phrase could be applied,—the history was written, but it had better not have been written at all, since it has been necessary to do over again the work, beginning at the very foundation. If a history is tainted with inherent inaccuracy, if its conclusions rest on insecure premises, if its foundations are on shifting sands, then it must be rewritten, and it is inevitable that this must be the case when the historian attempts to perform the work of the historical architect, builder, mason, plumber, and decorator. But to-day division of labor comes to his relief. Great editors, as has been seen, have mastered the art, the science, and the technique of editing manuscript material and the historian can avail himself of the expert knowledge of the editor.

The bibliographer, as well as the editor, has also relieved the historian of a part of his necessary work. A science of bibliography has been developed through the classification of its activities and the differentiation of the various services it may render. Bibliography no longer comprises mere lists of books, though it may, as does a comprehensive bibliography, list all books on a given subject, good, bad, and indifferent, in order to indicate the amount of material available as well as the general interest aroused in a question. The historian, however, avails himself most of the classified, the selective, and the annotated bibliography. The classified bibliography points the way to primary and to secondary material, to manuscript, printed, or monumental sources, to contemporary or later works. The selective bibliogra-

phy lists the most authoritative material on a field. The annotated bibliography attempts to appraise at its true value whatever is important to the consideration of a subject either by way of help or of warning.

The great work done for the historian of England by the late Charles Gross, for France by Charles Langlois, and for America by the group of scholars whose evaluations of the literature of American history have been edited by J. N. Larned has all been of important assistance to the historian. Equal assistance must be anticipated from the *Guide to Historical Literature* soon to be published. This has been compiled by the Committee on Bibliography of the American Historical Association, under the chairmanship of Professor George Matthew Dutcher, with the co-operation of numerous specialists.

The historian also shares in the advantages that come to all from the extraordinary development of the library. It is the age of great libraries and of great librarians, and their stores of knowledge and their facilities for placing this knowledge at the service of all have smoothed the path of the historian. "The historian cannot collect his own material," recently said the president of a great historical society; "this must be done for him by the library." It is rare to-day to read the preface of any recent history without finding in it an acknowledgment of the service rendered to the author by libraries and librarians. They are the custodians of all the manuscript and printed material used by the historian. The enormous development of libraries within the past fifty years, especially in America and Europe, represents in large part the development of the growing interest in historical records. It has been estimated that about one-fourth of the material in some of our great libraries

concerns the subject of history, and this may be regarded as an authoritative index of the growing importance attached to great collections of historical sources.

This library service is not confined to great academic and public libraries. Private libraries are everywhere most generous in opening their treasures to seekers after truth. The collector of rare books consults the length of his personal bank account and spends accordingly. But the librarians of public, college, and university libraries can command only restricted resources. It must therefore be to the library of the private collector that the historian turns in the last resort and there is reason to believe that his appeal seldom fails. The unrivalled collection of material relating to the World War in the Leland Stanford Junior University was the gift of Herbert C. Hoover. Historical scholars thus have the advantage of the interest of a distinguished scholar in another field who provided the means for acquiring it, of specialists in history who assembled it, and of a great university that has given it a permanent home.

Other improvements in methods of work have made it necessary as well as possible to rewrite history. A special improvement grows out of the refinements of classification that are being developed. The different ways of classifying the subject matter of a novel are quickly discerned,—its plot, descriptions, dialogue, analysis of character, development of character, local color, language, treatment of ethical questions all appeal to different classes of readers. But the composite nature of the material with which the historian deals and the consequent necessity of determining with precision its classification are less apparent. The historian finds an important record in inscriptions, and to him the inscription means its subject matter. But the geologist is

concerned solely with the nature and probable original location of the stone on which it is carved, the philologist studies its language, the artist is interested in the form of the letters, the archaeologist considers mainly its age, while to the epigraphist "epigraphy is just epigraphy." In the study of coins, the metallurgist considers their substance, the artist their form, the philologist their language, the financier their intrinsic value, the archaeologist their location, and the historian their inscriptions.

Libraries have hitherto classified coins in apparently as many different ways as there are libraries, with corresponding confusion in the minds of all who use coins as historical records. The admirable work of A. R. Hasse in presenting schemes for classifying government publications and all public documents, and for classifying coins[1] and the literature pertaining to them has shown how much has been done for the historian in simplifying and also clarifying the classes of materials with which he works, as it also shows how much still remains to be done. The obscurity and uncertainty of the past that have led to vague classification must disappear as soon as orderly, simple, and natural classifications are developed. Thus every new refinement in the classification of historical material makes it necessary to rewrite history that has been based on an obscure, confused classification.

In law the formulation of the rules of evidence has clarified for the historian many troublesome questions connected with the acceptance of testimony. The impetus given by natural science to the training of the observation has sharpened the eye of the historian and he sees innumerable records of the past that once escaped

[1]A. R. Hasse, "On the Classification of Numismatics," *Library Journal,* September, 1904, 29: 461–468.

him. The increasing study of language and of linguistics has not only opened the doors to new fields of knowledge, but it has given the historian greater precision in the use of historical terminology.

It must be still further said that even more fundamental than the question of locating, editing, and classifying historical material is that of the importance of its preservation when it has been discovered. Unhappily the historian is often not a free agent, and his efforts to locate and collect material are nullified by the negligence of political officials to provide adequately for suitable housing facilities. This has been a situation especially deplorable in America. Congress has as yet failed to heed the warnings given by historians all over the country, speaking individually and collectively, and it has not made appropriations for a building to house the national archives commensurate with their value. "The care which a nation devotes to the preservation of the monuments of its past may serve as a true measure of the degree of civilization to which it has attained" is the statement cited from a Russian report made on the subject in 1898.[1] Accepting this verdict, it may well seem that America, judged by this standard, is to-day in a more backward state of civilization than was Russia in 1898. "The chief monument of the history of a nation," says W. G. Leland, "is its archives, the preservation of which is recognized in all civilized countries as a natural and proper function of government." In spite of the exhaustive reports made on the situation in America, showing that "the present conditions have become intolerable, and that the remedial measures thus far tried

[1]W. G. Leland, "The National Archives: A Programme," *American Historical Review,* October, 1912, 18: 1–28. Subsequent citations on archives have been made from the same authoritative and exhaustive article.

are but makeshifts, aggravating the many evils rather than affording relief," and that "to continue as at present is to perpetuate inefficiency and extravagance and to incur risks for which no government should wish to be responsible to the nation,"—in spite of all this, the situation remains unaltered. While national archives are adequately housed in European countries, historians are, in America, thwarted in their efforts to use to the best advantage our national archives by the inconvenient and scattered location of these archives, the lack of a central administration and consequently conflicting usages among the different departments of government, and the deterioration of such material due to long exposure to "damp and dust, extremes of temperature, lack of ventilation, rough handling, and vandalism." While it is a matter of general knowledge that hundreds of students of history frequent the Public Record Office in London and the Archives Nationales in Paris in the course of a single year, W. G. Leland reports that he cannot recall more than two score of such investigations that have been conducted in Washington archives during the ten years he has been in a position to know of serious historical research undertaken there.

If then certain types of history still remain to be written, the reason must be found in the lamentable neglect of our national archives through the failure of Congress to provide adequate facilities for their use.

A somewhat similar situation exists in regard to the historical museum. It is unhappily true that, while in America the art museum and the museum of natural history have been well developed, especially in the great centers of population, the historical museum is yet in its infancy, and that it is for the most part an adjunct of the art gallery or of the museum of natural history. It is

significant of the general attitude towards museums that as late as 1910 one of the great almanacs of this country classified museums under "amusements." This situation has led to many incongruities of classification, and to the wide dispersal of material important for the use of the historian. Moreover, no school for the training of curators of such museums has yet been founded comparable to that for training librarians which was established as early as 1887.

Special interests of human life have, however, been illustrated through such museums as that of the whaling industry at New Bedford and the shipping industry at Salem, Massachusetts, and the museum of Indian life recently opened in New York City. The time cannot be far distant when everywhere in this country the historical museum will come into its own as it has already done in France and throughout the Scandinavian countries.[1] But until then, the historian of more than one phase of our social, economic, and domestic life is seriously handicapped in his efforts to reconstruct the past through the general failure to recognize the importance of preserving the monumental records of earlier times. The historical museum may justly lay claim to an honorable and dignified place in the field of historical research and become, in Huxley's phrase, "a consultative library of objects." Since these opportunities have not as yet been provided, another explanation is found for the necessity of rewriting history.

Division of labor has therefore made it possible for the historian to turn for co-operation in his own field to the editor, the bibliographer, the photographer, the librarian, the archivist, the curator of the historical

[1] "The Historical Museum," *Educational Review,* February, 1911, 41: 144–160.

museum, who is, however, yet to come, and thus to push farther into the unknown his own research. These are the forces that have been developed from without the immediate domain of history and many of them have been helpful in the pursuit of other subjects of inquiry. Every extension of the field of knowledge and every improvement in methods of work make it inevitable that history should be rewritten.

CHAPTER IV

NEW MATERIAL ALONG OLD LINES AND ITS DIFFICULTIES

SIGNIFICANT reasons that have compelled the rewriting of history have been those that were developed from within and that followed lines already familiar. They all bore a family relationship to each other and they all concerned primarily the somewhat external aspects of history. No new mines were discovered, but the mines already known were quarried more extensively and rich stores found. The most obvious of these "leads" has been the discovery of new material in fields already known and the most obvious form of new material is that of literature. Much that has been deemed lost has been recovered. Much that has been forgotten has been brought to light and found worthy of consideration. New material has been discovered even in fields that had been previously well worked over and deemed exhausted. New material has been found in territory judged to be barren and unpromising. Preserved Smith, for example, states that the number of unpublished documents on the Reformation, though large, is much smaller than that of the printed sources and the value of these unpublished documents is less than that of those published. Yet he is able to list many unpublished important documents he has found in English and American libraries.

Hundreds of illustrations could be cited of discoveries of previously unknown literary documents and of the recovery of much that was supposed to be irretrievably lost. The recovery of *The Constitution of Athens,* at-

tributed to Aristotle, "has rendered obsolete any history of the Athenian constitution that was written before the year 1891." The discovery of a previously unknown contemporaneous account of the death of Martin Luther written on a fly-leaf and a cover of an old book in Philadelphia, and the marginal notes of a sixteenth century Bible in the library of an American university contribute new knowledge of the times of Luther.

The story of the lost fortnight in the life of Charles V was recovered by Alice Bache Gould and with this recovery, every day in the life of the Emperor from its beginning to its end has been accounted for.

Mr. and Mrs. C. W. Wallace examined more than 3,000,000 original records in England and on the Continent and discovered many documents relating to Shakespeare and his times. These have been used in various important works on the drama, the stage, and Shakespeare. The examination of the judicial records of the time led to the discovery that Shakespeare had once appeared as a witness in a law suit, and this fact, unimportant in itself, has added another item to our slender knowledge of Shakespeare the man. Joseph Quincy Adams in his recent *Life of William Shakespeare* has assembled from many sources the disjointed facts long known as well as those recently discovered in regard to Shakespeare's life and by fitting them together in an orderly form has been able to present a new interpretation of that life. Dr. J. L. Hotson has been able to trace step by step the devious road that led to the death of Christopher Marlowe.

The publication of the first and second series of *The Fugger News-Letters* has added immeasurably to our knowledge and understanding of the House of Fugger, and equally to our understanding of the great Elizabeth

of England and her relations with her continental neighbors, friends, and enemies.

The restoration of the manuscript of Bradford's *History of Plymouth Plantation* gave a new interest to the history of the Plymouth Colony. In 1902, A. R. Hasse discovered in the Public Record Office in London the only extant copy known of *A Narrative of an Attempt Made by the French of Canada upon the Mohaques Country,* printed by William Bradford in 1693,—the earliest book known to be printed in New York and therefore an important contribution to the history of printing in this country. *A Journal of the House of Representatives for His Majesty's Province of New York for the First Session of 1695,* also discovered by Miss Hasse, was printed by William Bradford in 1695 and was in turn an important addition to the existing knowledge of the work of the New York colonial assembly.

The recent transfer by purchase of the Clinton Papers and the Greene Papers from private ownership to the William L. Clements Library, founded at the University of Michigan, places important material at the service of historians.

These are but hints of what prolonged, systematic search, or the chance of a day, may add in the way of new literary material to the stores of the historian. Some of these discoveries of new material have been accidental, but often they have been due to the same characteristics that urge on the detective in his pursuit of hidden conditions. To find the causes, reasons, explanations of conditions in the past never as yet disclosed, to seek clues, to pursue baffling hints, to follow through the tortuous passages of the labyrinth, and to find at last the object of the search give the keenest satisfaction to the alert

mind in pursuit of truth. But even though the pursuit fail in the end, "a negative result," in the words of Charles Oman, "is often as valuable as (though less exciting than) a positive one." The real joy may to the historian, as to others, be in the quest rather than in the acquisition.

Yet while the discovery and the recovery of literary material make the rewriting of history from time to time necessary, this is after all but one contribution literature makes to the rewriting of history. Literature is constantly expanding in its own field and material once regarded as distinct from it is now recognized as rightly classed as such. Inscriptions, for example, were once considered to have preeminently an archaeological importance, but to-day it is realized they are one of the very bases of literature. Although they were used by the early historians, they were long unknown or neglected by modern writers. So comparatively recent and so voluminous a work as Grote's *History of Greece* shows little trace of the use of inscriptions as a source of Greek history. To-day the historian of Greece feels that it is almost possible for him to rewrite the history of Greece from its dawn until its twilight, and the history of the individual Greek from the cradle to the grave, from the study of inscriptions alone. While it is true that Herodotus and Thucydides, as other Greek historians, made use of inscriptions, it was not until Boeckh in 1825 began the publication of his monumental *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* that their general use became possible. To-day we have available for the study of Greek history at least 30,000 or 40,000 inscriptions, while Mommsen's great contribution to our knowledge of Rome has not been his own *History of Rome*, but rather his edition of the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latin-*

arum, which with its continuation has placed at the service of historians nearly 200,000 inscriptions bearing on the history of Rome prior to the establishment of the Roman Empire. "The reputation of Mommsen as a man of letters," says J. B. Bury in his Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge, "depends on his Roman History; but his greatness as a historian is to be sought far less in that dazzling work than in the *Corpus* and the *Staatsrecht* and the *Chronicles.*"

This very obvious explanation of the necessity of rewriting history found in the discovery and the use of new literary or semi-literary material has its complement in the growing availability of material known to exist but previously inaccessible. This important change is due to the growing spirit of democracy in the republic of letters. Once the records of history were practically inaccessible to all except the elect. To-day material that was previously available only for the few may now be placed at the disposition of all. The growing demand for publicity in the conduct of business, in the enactment of legislation, in the transactions of courts, in international affairs, has made itself felt in the opening up to all of many state records and of secret archives, the use of which had previously been reserved to a few or even denied to all. If we are able to-day to know much in regard to the origin and conduct of the World War which under similar conditions affecting previous great conflicts was withheld for a hundred years, it is because the great revolutions of Russia, Germany, and Austria, that substituted the authority of the people for the divine right of kings, opened up at once the secret archives of those countries.

Again, private and personal records, such as diaries, journals, memoirs, letters, and correspondence, are from

time to time made available by the expiration of the time limit set for their publication by their authors or original owners. Frequently this material has been considered to have too personal or intimate a character to make its publication advisable during the lifetime of any of the persons mentioned, and its use has by will been prohibited prior to a certain fixed date. The memoirs of Talleyrand were not given to the world until fifty-three years from the date of their author's death. The diary of John Quincy Adams remained in manuscript for nearly thirty years after the death of its author. Frequently important papers remain for an indefinite period in the possession of private families, but they are ultimately deposited in public libraries, or are purchased by the State, and henceforth their usefulness is multiplied. The papers of Andrew Johnson have comparatively recently been acquired by the Library of Congress and are now becoming available to all through their publication. The papers of Lincoln were given to the Federal Government with the stipulation that they were not to be consulted until twenty-one years after the death of the donor, Robert T. Lincoln, and therefore they cannot be used prior to July 26, 1947, unless a modification of the agreement is found possible.

Much material has been unavailable for general use because but a single copy has been known to exist, and the reprinting or duplication of single copies has often made possible new points of view for the historian. Publishers long hesitated to republish works that were out of print, but they are now meeting the recognized demand for inexpensive reprints. Even so indispensable a work for the study of the French Revolution as Arthur Young's *Travels in France* was long to be found only in

great libraries, but to-day it may be in the hands of every reader and student.

But if history must be rewritten because of the discovery of new material and increasing availability of material already known to exist, the story of the past has suffered even more because of the accumulation through the centuries of masses of extraneous, irrelevant material. In letters, as in nature, "tall oaks from little acorns grow." While the historian seizes with eagerness new material that comes to him through its extension in familiar directions, he is often dismayed by the enormous accretion of material that forms a parasitic growth around a single fact. Legends as a class have been peculiarly susceptible to this form of growth,—they develop from the merest germ of truth and flourish like the banyan tree. The historian must therefore reverse his processes and instead of adding new material he must prune away all these excrescences that have grown up around an initial core of fact. This is far from saying that the legend has no value to the historian, but its value is that of a primary record, not that of a finished tale, and as such it cannot be discussed here.

The difficulty encountered by the historian in dealing with the legend is well illustrated by the legend of Roland. Eginhard in writing during the ninth century his life of Charlemagne describes the battle of Roncesvalles and enumerates among those who fell "Roland, Governor of the March of Brittany." This is the only mention known in history of the hero who for more than a thousand years has been a central figure in literature. The Roland legend has grown up in the literature of every nation in Europe west of Russia,—in France, Spain and Italy, in England and Ireland, in Holland and

Belgium, in Scandinavia and Germany, in Hungary and Bohemia. Moreover statues or columns have embodied other phases of the Roland legend and they have become the symbol of free commercial intercourse, of supreme criminal jurisdiction, and the palladium of civic liberty, since these rights were once possessed by the citizens of the towns where Roland statues have been found. These are naturally the towns of Northern Germany where there was a special interest in civic liberty, and elsewhere, as in Verona, where the German influence and spirit was strong. How entirely the statues are the embodiment of legend rather than of history is evident in the wide range of representation and of location. Roland is given a long beard in Erfurt, a short beard in Wedel, and is beardless in Bremen; he sometimes is clad in armor, as in Magdeburg, in a cloak, as in Halle, or in both armor and cloak as in Bremen, while in Nordhausen he is crowned. Usually the statue is upright, but in Haldensleben the figure is on horseback. Still other variations are found, as in Chartres, where his last moments are depicted in one of the stained glass windows of the cathedral and he is accompanied by Oliver, and in Verona where a double statue is erected to Roland and Oliver. The statue sometimes emphasizes the civic idea and is erected in the market place, as in Bremen, or it is placed against the town hall, as in Halberstadt, or the ecclesiastical idea is uppermost, and it is placed in the church, as formerly in Göttingen. The mass of literature connected with the name of Roland apparently had its ultimate source in a single mention of his name by Eginhard. The Roland statues have grown from the Roland columns and these were probably developed from the Rothland-Säule, erected in cities that had the power of life and death over their inhabitants. History must be rewritten

because in so many instances an initial kernel of truth has become so surrounded by legend as to be entirely concealed, and it becomes necessary to separate this kernel from the husks.

The poet also has laid a burden on the historian. The Duke of Marlborough is credited with saying that all the English history he ever knew he had learned from Shakespeare. This source of his knowledge must have left wide lacunae in his stores of historical knowledge; *King John* gives us no hint of Magna Charta or the meeting of the knights, *Henry VIII* cannot be considered an exhaustive account of relations between Church and State, *Richard III* as an individual occupies the foreground,—questions of succession and of rival royal lines rather than statecraft lend themselves to dramatic interest. The purpose of the dramatist and that of the historian are in a sense diametrically opposed to each other, —the good dramatist must almost of necessity be found wanting as an historian, and the historian with dramatic tendencies is in danger of being disqualified as an historian. To expect the dramatist to be at the same time an historian is to expect the impossible. Yet the dramatist and the poet often deal with historical events and not infrequently deal with them in such a manner as to give rise to serious misconceptions that must be corrected by the historian. There is, for example, a somewhat hackneyed phrase to the effect that the sea and the mountains are the natural home of liberty and this is often taught as an historical truth. Yet H. B. George has found its source to be, not in history, which indeed may contradict it, but in a sonnet of Wordsworth's. Macaulay, in his *Lays of Ancient Rome,* has dealt gently with the probabilities of history and has not hesitated to use them in such a manner as will produce the best dramatic effect.

To the poet laureate must be charged many misstatements that make it necessary for the historian to follow in his wake and correct the excesses of his imagination that grow out of his official position,—Dryden's *Cromwell* and *Astræa Redux* may be well interchanged in their eulogies of Cromwell and of Charles II.

It is also necessary to correct the false assumptions frequently made by writers of history. History has often been written along the line of least resistance and thus it has been easier to write history by the deductive than by the inductive method; to assume an hypothesis, either through carelessness, or ignorance, and to make facts, if any are used, conform to these assumed theses. These assumptions, frequently clothed in language that carries conviction, usually deal with large generalizations and are often extremely difficult to disprove. Many of them are the familiar coin of the pseudo-historian, and many of them have passed current even till to-day. Among the favorite assumptions that have gained currency are those that the Western division of the Roman Empire fell in 476; that the belief that the year 1000 was to bring the end of the world was universally accepted; that Peter the Hermit instigated the first crusade; that the fall of Constantinople introduced Greek learning into the West; that taxation without representation caused the American Revolution; that Washington as a boy chopped down his father's cherry tree; that Thomas Jefferson tied his horse to a fence and walked alone to his inauguration; that Marcus Whitman "saved Oregon"; that Jefferson Davis escaped in disguise. These assumptions and their kin, whose numbers are legion, have crowded the pages of early narrative history and their presence there affords one of the most fruitful reasons why history has to be rewritten. But it often seems little less than tragic that

so much time and effort which might otherwise have been devoted to constructive work have had to be given to disproving general statements that have been the merest assumptions.

Next of kin to these false assumptions on the part of writers of history are the false and perverted statements of historians themselves. Perhaps no period of history has afforded a more inviting field for these false statements than has that of the French Revolution. The temptation has been strong to write of it in terms of black and white, and the temptation has not always been resisted. Carlyle may not have been the chief of sinners in his treatment of this period,—Lamartine preceded him in point of time and his *The Girondists* set the example for an impassioned rhapsodical view of the times, while Hillaire Belloc in his "Ten Lines of Taine"[1] has shown, he believes, that the succession has been maintained. But it has been Carlyle who has given us word pictures that have held up to scorn and ridicule the chief actors of the period,—pictures that have clung in the mind and are with difficulty dislodged in spite of the painstaking efforts of accurate historians to set the matter right. H. Morse Stephens has shown that the sole foundation for the phrase "the sea-green Robespierre" was apparently the statement of an English lady that Robespierre wore "greenish spectacles." Carlyle takes an epithet used only once, by one writer, and that to characterize Robespierre's spectacles, and he applies it to Robespierre personally. Marat, whom Carlyle calls

[1]*International Quarterly,* January, 1906, 12: 255–272.

The critic, however, must often find the tables turned against him, and Carl Becker has conclusively shown that this microscopic examination of Taine, as in the case of M. Aulard, may give an incorrect impression of the spirit of his work.—"The Reviewing of Historical Books," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1912,* pp. 127–136.

"a blear-eyed dog-leech," is represented in an entirely different manner by the very authority that Carlyle himself used. Documentary evidence and the study of the route from Paris to Varrennes have shown that "in every single possible detail where a writer could go wrong, Carlyle has gone wrong" in purporting to describe the flight of Louis XVI.[1] The historian of to-day must indeed again feel that "he is wounded in the house of his friends" when his predecessors have apparently been at little pains to ascertain the truth in regard to the past and have preferred to give a picturesque version of imaginary events, rather than a sober, accurate account of what really occurred. It is much to be regretted that the writing of history has always suffered and must always suffer from the inability of historians to know the facts of the past. But it is little less than tragic that so many historians able to reconstruct the past aright are forced to spend a large part of their lives in attempting to correct the errors made by careless, indifferent, ignorant writers who pose as historians, or who are accepted as such.

History must often be rewritten to correct the personal or the national equation. Here the historian has to deal not with new material that he can legitimately use, not with extraneous accumulations of material that must be pruned away, but he is faced by the problem of the conscious or the unconscious suppression of material necessary to his purpose if he is to tell the truth. All histories written during the supremacy of a strong line of kings, or of a powerful political party, or emanating from an influential church organization, are prone to be affected by the personal elements involved. Clarendon's *History*

[1]H. Morse Stephens, "History," in *Counsel upon the Reading of Books*, pp. 23–94.

of the Rebellion with the best of intentions could scarcely fail to be colored by the ultimate success of the Royalist party. For nearly two hundred years after its downfall, all histories of the Commonwealth were written by representatives of the Royalist party. The editing of Cromwell's *Letters* by Carlyle was necessary to correct the personal equation in the work of previous historians, as it has in turn been necessary to correct the work of Carlyle by that of S. C. Lomas. Textbooks used in the schools of the North and of the South are still far apart in their treatment of our own Civil War, yet ultimately they must approach each other as the personal and sectional element in each is eliminated. Readers of French histories and of German histories of the Franco-Prussian War and of the World War must for years to come gain from them diametrically opposing views in regard to the origins and causes of these wars as well as of the justice of the treaties closing them.

History must therefore be rewritten because many questions affect the subject matter with which it deals,—new literary material is constantly being discovered, material previously inaccessible is made available for the use of all, legend must be separated into its component parts, poetry must be regarded as poetry and not interpreted with literal exactness, the unsubstantiated assumptions of historians must be investigated, the false and perverted accounts of pseudo-historians must be set right, and the personal equation of former historians must be corrected. Were no other factors involved in the problem aside from those that affect the material with which history has always dealt, it is not too much to say that the history of every period and of every subject that has ever been written would have to be rewritten.

CHAPTER V

HISTORICAL CRITICISM

THE historian finds it necessary to rewrite history because the material with which he deals has been greatly extended in directions already familiar to him. Myth, legend, tradition have merged into literature, literature itself has been greatly expanded, and it has gained a new and enlarged conception of its own foundation and of its own field. This expansion has been inevitably accompanied by the realization that with it must go a more critical examination of the material already used. Historical investigation and research follow an ever-ascending spiral. If historians have accepted many reports at their face value without adequate inquiry into the source of the statements made; if they have been over-credulous and have believed what has been inherently impossible; if they have been unimaginative and have interpreted poetry as literal prose; if they have accepted myths, legends, and traditions as equal in value with the unimpeachable testimony of contemporaneous witnesses, it must follow that the fundamental inquiry must be that of the source of authority for all material used. This has led to the development of the science of historical criticism, and this more than any other single cause, from the point of method of work, is responsible for the constant necessity of rewriting history.

The one-hundredth anniversary of the call of B. G. Niebuhr to a professorship in the University of Berlin was celebrated in 1910. It is interesting to note how far-reaching have been the results of the new methods of

work that he introduced into historical research. The results cannot perhaps be traced directly to the work of Niebuhr, for newer intellectual processes were in the air. History, through him, set in motion better methods of work, and it in turn profited by the results that were reached in other fields of knowledge. Niebuhr began his professorship in Berlin the year after Darwin was born and he died the year Darwin began his five years' cruise on the *Beagle*. All of his works, except a fragment, had, therefore, been published before Darwin began his own work. There is little, if any, evidence that Darwin even knew of the work of Niebuhr and like many other workers in the field of natural history, he confused the method of work used by historians with the narration of the conclusion reached as a result of that method. After John Morley had reviewed the *Origin of Species* in the *Pall Mall Gazette,* Darwin wrote him: "I believe your criticism is quite just about my deficient historic spirit, for I am aware of my ignorance in this line." But what Darwin lacked was not the historic spirit, but knowledge of the facts of history,—an absolutely different matter. It was pointed out many years ago by the late Charles Kendall Adams that "the contributions of Darwin to natural history are, in a certain large sense, the result of a study of the history of nature carried on in a scientific spirit." All workers in every field must agree that "science is a general name for human knowledge in its most definite and general shape, whatever may be the object of that knowledge." If then Niebuhr worked by the scientific method and if Darwin worked by the historical method, a virtual, if unconscious, unity was attained by the two great leaders of the nineteenth century in the complementary fields of historical science and of natural science.

It is important to notice more in detail the place of Niebuhr in the introduction and the development of these advanced methods of work. It is difficult to realize that within a comparatively brief period of scarcely more than a single century, there has been developed, largely owing to forces set in motion by him, the science of historical criticism, which has almost revolutionized the writing of history; which has brought historians "into contact with a great body of new and unsuspected truth"; and which, through the union of these two complementary forces has made it necessary to reconstruct our views of the past with reference to the principles enunciated by him. Before the time of Niebuhr, there had been little criticism, either external or internal, of the material used by the historian. Universal histories had included narratives of Rome, and not until the early part of the eighteenth century was the history of Rome written separately. Since probably the greater part, if not all, of the original records of the Roman monarchy had been destroyed in the sack of the city in 390 B.C., tradition was apparently all that survived; this became the basis of the accounts of the early city, and its authoritativeness was unquestioningly accepted.

But Niebuhr was born into a questioning age, even though the individual questioners were few. In Germany, F. A. Wolf had used the word "philology" in its original meaning, and he interpreted it as having to do "with both history and language, but primarily as a science of *interpretation,* in which historical facts and linguistic facts take their place in an organic whole." He had himself, however, found its application in his inquiries concerning Homer, and his "*Prolegomena* turned critical inquiry into a new direction, which it has ever since obeyed. They first taught scholars that the re-

sources of Greek and Latin were not exhausted when the languages were learned, but that the languages were but a step to an almost unexplored field of investigation." It has been said of Wolf that his ambition was, not to make his students Latinists but Romans, and it was his enlarged conception of philology as the "knowledge of human nature as exhibited in antiquity" that explains his ideal of a full and harmonious national life. The sources from which this conception of a national life were to be drawn were of three general classes, "written remains, works of art, and other remains, such as buildings, inscriptions, coins, implements, weapons, etc."

This statement of the sources from which the history of a nation is derived seems to anticipate one of Niebuhr's fundamental theses, and Niebuhr has indeed been criticised for not acknowledging more definitely his indebtedness to Wolf. But Wolf did not follow up and apply these ideas and Mark Pattison says of them that "they became at once, with all their consequences, the common property, not of scholars only, but of all the world." Criticism was in the air and the idea was developed that this must be both external and internal. From this Niebuhr developed in turn the thesis that all sources used in writing history must be critically examined as to their authenticity and authoritativeness and that the same inquiry must be extended into the genuineness of those sources that had been lost but on which previous historians had relied. Not until the historian could assure himself on these points and be prepared to defend his position before a hostile army of critics was he justified in using any sources, however much venerated and unquestioningly accepted they had been in time past.

This criticism was the necessary preparation for writing history. But what of the history itself? Under the

searching, even merciless examination of the sources of early Roman history, the seven kings of Rome had disappeared as individuals. But in their disappearance Niebuhr "had grasped the truth that the early history of every nation must be rather of institutions than of events, of classes than of individuals, of customs than of lawgivers." The traditions that had grown up concerning the kings were, as regards their details, thrown into the discard. But Niebuhr compared the relation of tradition and history to a map framed according to reports and calculations. This may deviate, he says, "in every particular from absolute geographical correctness, and yet be substantially sufficient to give a notion of a country, and enable us to follow the events of its history. When contracted to a small scale, its variations from a precisely accurate one may scarcely be perceptible. So it is with many things handed down to us in the history of nations. If they are detached from their dates, and such other points as are most exposed to arbitrary and falsifying alterations; and if we do not suffer ourselves to be disturbed by partial incongruities, where there is no contradiction in the main; the limits of universal history will be greatly enlarged." Thus he explains the legends and traditions he has collected concerning early Rome and Italy, furnishing results which make it possible "to survey the most important nations in their destinies, and which carry us on so far, that, even beyond the Alps, some of the national movements in the west and north of Europe come within our widening horizon."

Inference therefore became from Niebuhr's point of view a legitimate and necessary means to be used in the interpretation not only of the early history of Rome, but also of national movements "even beyond the Alps." Pushing the question still further, one of the main sources

for early Roman history must be ballads, urged Niebuhr, and if no early Roman ballads or even allusions to them were found, inferences could be deduced from them as if they had had a veritable existence. The importance of the controversy, and the gain to the cause of history, lay not in whether or no it was possible to draw conclusions in regard to early Roman history from non-existent Roman ballads, but in showing the value of ballads in general as historical sources. If Niebuhr extended widely the sources of history so as to include not only ballads, but everything that concerned human life, it was because he saw in manners, customs, institutions, forms, and ceremonies, in language and in laws, in the new branches of human knowledge scarcely even named in his time, a vast body of new and unsuspected truths that the historian must make his own before writing history. And if others complained that they could not themselves see the records Niebuhr found in these unconventional sources, Niebuhr himself compared the historian "to a man in a cell whose eyes gradually become so accustomed to the darkness that he can perceive objects which one newly entering not only does not see but declares to be invisible."

The insistence of Niebuhr that all writing of history must be preceded by a searching investigation into the genuineness of the sources used and more than that, into the genuineness of sources that have been lost but on which historians have relied was his first great claim to preeminence in the field of history. "If Niebuhr were weighed in the scales of Livy," says Richard Garnett, "it might be questioned whether he could even claim to rank among historians. . . . An historian should before all things tell a story. Niebuhr is often engaged in proving that there is no story to tell." It was Niebuhr's

own proud boast that "the discovery of no ancient historians would have taught the world so much" as his work had done, and Niebuhr's own verdict on his contribution to the science of historical research is to-day accepted. It was doubtless true, as Sir George Cornewall Lewis pointed out, that the history of Niebuhr opened more questions than it closed, and that it set in motion a large body of combatants whose mutual variances were not likely to be settled by deference to a common authority, or by the recognition of any common principle. But it was even more true that, in the words of Richard Garnett, "if every positive conclusion of Niebuhr's had been refuted, his claim to be considered the first who dealt with the ancient history of Rome in a scientific spirit would remain unimpaired, and the new principles introduced by him into historical research would lose nothing of their importance." To stir the dry leaves, to rouse the docile mind, to inspire the questioning mind, to open up new questions, to discard authority as in and of itself a final court of appeal,—this was indeed one of the great contributions made to the subject. If to these are added the contributions made by Niebuhr in his discovery of new principles to be applied to historical material, in his extension of the field of history, and in his intellectual emancipation from the conventions of the past, they will justly entitle him to be considered the founder of the science of historical criticism.

The application of these principles of criticism has been made to numerous classes of material of varying degrees of importance. At one end of the scale, in literature, may be placed the epigram. It has long been a favorite amusement with historians, though some have made it a serious avocation, to show that Alexander did not weep for more worlds to conquer; that Julius Caesar

did not say "et tu, Brute"; that Galileo did not protest "But it does move, nevertheless"; that Louis XIV did not say "There are no longer any Pyrenees," or "L'état c'est moi"; that Louis XV did not exclaim "Après moi, le déluge"; that Madame Roland did not apostrophize Liberty in the phrase "How many crimes are committed in thy name"; that Wellington did not enjoin his troops at Waterloo, "Up Guards, and at them"; that Marshal MacMahon did not telegraph his chief from the Malakoff the message "sublime in its simplicity, 'J'y suis, j'y reste.' " It matters little to-day, we may well think, whether the persons cited did or did not use the words attributed to them on certain definite appropriate occasions. It seems inherently improbable that they did, since sparkling finished epigrams probably do not naturally occur to anyone in times of crisis, or in the face of great danger. But in every case an epigram, though it may have been formulated long years after the death of the person to whom it is attributed, may fittingly sum up the characteristics of an individual and thus remain inherently possible. All the methods of historical criticism may have been used to disprove the utterance of the epigram, but in the end it may be said in homely phrase "the game isn't worth the candle,"—they might have said it.

Somewhat similar in rank are the statements that have been proved false through the correction of misreadings or mistranslations. If Cinderella did not wear a glass slipper but one of fur, because an early chronicler wrote "vair," meaning fur, and a copyist read "verre," meaning glass, the error seems not vital, though much research may have been involved in setting straight a fairy tale. If Michael Angelo represents Moses with horns on his forehead because he had been misled by trans-

lators who had confused the Hebrew words meaning "light" and "horns," this error too is not vital, though the explanation of it may have required study of the Hebrew language. But when J. B. Carter shows that the tradition giving Romulus and Remus as the twin founders of Rome dated from the fourth century B.C., that it grew out of the confusion arising from the Greek and Roman forms of the same name, and that the twins were invented to account for the inferred presence of two founders, the situation is altered. An error important in the early traditional history of Rome is rectified, and the tradition takes its place with many others like it. It makes little difference whether Rome had a single or a double founder, but the tradition as it acquired authority through constant repetition becomes increasingly difficult to discredit; only through research is its credibility finally undermined. The error of the initial fact is shown, and the importance of the tradition is transferred from that to the incrustations it has accumulated through the succeeding years.

With mistranslations that, in spite of criticism, still are thoroughly ingrained in common thought must be classed the many errors that come into history through all forms of illustration. The original error invariably can be traced to ignorance, not necessarily of a language but of plain facts that could easily have been ascertained. Here again no highly developed criticism is needed to detect the blunders, but they persist because it so seldom occurs to anyone to challenge their accuracy.

Statements inherently impossible, or even probable, are often accepted as proved and through mere repetition come to be considered authoritative. It is well known that during the Civil War the sympathies of Gladstone were with the Confederacy, and it was per-

haps to be expected that this sympathy should, by his enemies, be extended to cover the purchase of Confederate bonds. Gladstone himself denied with all possible emphasis that he had ever subscribed to the Confederate loan and criticism must accept his statement as the final authority.

With statements of this character must be classed the gossip of official and court circles which gains currency under the conventional phrases, "It is reported in high circles," "some one near to the throne reports," "the White House Spokesman says," and so through infinite variations that implicate no one, give no person as definitely responsible for the statements made, yet purport to be authoritative because emanating from sources assuming to be well-informed. Gladstone, like many others, suffered from this tendency in his efforts to form a cabinet. In 1868, he desired to appoint an Englishman of rank to a position in the cabinet that he had previously held, but he feared the Queen had heard rumors to his discredit and would object to the appointment. It led Gladstone to say with evident impatience, "I do not know much of the interior side of court gossip, but I have a very bad opinion of it, and especially on this ground, that while absolutely irresponsible it appears to be uniformly admitted as infallible."

First cousin to these misleading efforts to give a specious authority to statements needing buttressing are the even more troublesome efforts of over-zealous secretaries to add literary glory to their chiefs. In 1900 at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, E. G. Bourne read a paper entitled "The Legend of Marcus Whitman." He showed conclusively that the story long current of a ride over the Rocky Mountains by Marcus Whitman, whereby he had "saved

Oregon," was legend pure and simple. But after the evidence of its legendary character had been common property for nearly twenty-four years, it was used by a secretary to brighten and enliven a speech delivered by President Harding in Portland, Oregon, in 1923, where it undoubtedly gave peace and comfort to the credulous. This is but one illustration of the difficulties that confront high officials in public life who must depend on others for the selection and even for the arrangement of material used by them on public occasions.

Reference has been made to legends that in default of an immediate examination of their authoritativeness come to have the force of tested and proved evidence. The inference may have been drawn that those legends are the product of ancient or mediaeval times and that the modern period is practically exempt from their appearance. Yet nothing could be farther from the real fact than is such an inference. Difficult as it is to separate truth from error in legends that have gathered the appearance of authoritativeness in their passage through the centuries, the situation does not differ when the historian meets the legend of modern times, even the legend of the moment that springs up in a night and assumes gigantic proportions. The period of the World War was prolific in the development of such legends. The story of the passage of Russian troops from Archangel through England is well known, but others not less inherently improbable passed current as indisputable fact. The angel of Mons; concrete foundations built in England by the Germans as bases for their machine guns; postage stamps that on their reverse side conveyed to friends the information that the senders were starving; these and scores of other fabulous tales were eagerly accepted at their face value. They were all inherently

improbable, they could all, as A. F. Pollard points out, have been demolished by anyone who had access to a Whittaker's Almanac, they were all the product of war hysteria and no one troubled either to examine the sources of these tales or to look for substantiating evidence,—"a friend told me he knew it," passed muster with many naturally intelligent persons.

The tricks of memory, a vivid imagination, the products of facile pens seen in the campaign lives of candidates previously inconspicuous for noteworthy achievements, the credulity of the credulous, the immediate necessities of those able to transmute fiction into reality, the deliberate forgeries of the unscrupulous,—all of these but suggest the manifold causes of the discrepancy between fact and fiction. The historian must cope with them all, he must apply to each class of errors the special tests pertinent to it, and when the chaff has been separated from the wheat, then and then only is he ready to consider the beginning of his work.

CHAPTER VI

EXTENSION OF THE BASE ON WHICH HISTORY IS WRITTEN

In this consideration of the development of history along lines already laid down, there has been no desire to evade that side of it which has been most conspicuously in evidence and has overshadowed its less brilliant, though equally important features. The new history[1], as it has been generally interpreted, means something quite different from the conservative changes, improvements, and activities thus far suggested. The new history has been considered to mean a radical extension of the base on which the structure of history has been erected. It has grown out of the greatly enlarged conception of the meaning of history and a corresponding expansion of the sources from which history is derived. The older school of history was, as regards its content, largely biographical, individualistic, descriptive, militaristic, and political. Individuals who had been conspicuous in action and whose activities had largely concerned the state formed the subject matter of the older history. Kings interested in public affairs as a means of increasing their own personal prestige, warriors concerned in overcoming every rival power that their own personal glory might be enhanced, ecclesiastics occupied in the development of the secular organization of the Church at the price of external conformity to a fixed

[1]Probably the best expositions of the new history are found in J. H. Robinson's *The New History* and J. T. Shotwell's *Introduction to the History of History*. The former emphasizes the content of the new history and the latter the basis on which it has been built up. The two discussions of the subject are complementary.

theological dogma,—all these concerned the writers of the older school of historians.

But this narrow individualistic basis has long since ceased to satisfy students of the past. The captains and the kings depart and all human interests advance towards the front. The historian of to-day may rightly claim with Bacon that he has taken all knowledge to be his province, and he may say with Terence that nothing human is alien to him. Nothing is too humble, nothing is apparently too insignificant or too superficial for the trained eye of the historian to see in it an epitome of the past or the present life around him. It has been said of Pasteur that "as he advanced further and further into that domain of the infinitely small which he had discovered, . . . new and unexpected visions rose before his sight." Thus the student of history to-day may find in the engraved gem from Knossos, the broken piece of pottery from the Athenian Acropolis, the fragment of a buried statue, the song of a troubadour, "the fragrance of a legend," the rigid adherence to the trifling conventions of dress, the words used in conversation, the names given household pets, the phrasing of an advertisement, the coin, the postage stamp,—may find in any and all of these the lens through which a section of bygone or of present life is revealed. These "infinitely small" records do not in and of themselves alone constitute the basis of the new history, but they suggest the wide extension and the deepening foundation that distinguishes the new history from that of an earlier day.

But it must be frankly said that "the new history" has thus far, in this discussion of the subject, been accepted at its own valuation. The discussion between the supporters and the opponents of "the new history" seems to many students of history but a war of words between

those upholding the orthodox side and those who find in the heterodox view the only simon-pure history. It must never, however, be forgotten that "brave men were living before Agamemnon" and the history of history shows no special creations, no sudden catastrophic breaks with its past, no periods of "transition," no history either oldest, older, old, new, newer, or newest. But higher planes are reached by an ever-ascending spiral and a new and wider outlook is gained from each high level attained. It is scarcely more than fifty years ago that the controversy over spontaneous generation rocked the foundations of natural science. It was not, however, Pasteur's excited comment on the orthodox belief in spontaneous generation then held—"*Mais, mon Dieu, ce n'est pas possible*—" that won supporters for his new theories, but that "endless capacity for taking pains" that enabled him through his microscope to enter the "domain of the infinitely small." The new history has always been new, and the old history has always been old, both have always existed side by side; but it is true that the proportion of those who read and study history with an understanding mind has greatly increased. It is also true that great leaders have from time to time opened new doors and by so turning the glass as to secure a better focus they have been able to point out new vistas through the avenue of the centuries.

The first great contribution to what is called to-day "the new history" was made by Niebuhr, whose special contribution to historical criticism has been already discussed. But Niebuhr not only challenged the authoritativeness of the foundation records on which history had been written, but projected over a vastly wider field a new conception of the very nature of the record. Thus, through him, as has been said, historians were brought

"into contact with a great body of new and unsuspected truth." If a definite concrete tradition could not be accepted at its face value, the value of abstract tradition as an historical source was by no means thereby impaired. If a literal Hercules did not perform the literal twelve labors attributed to him, if a wooden horse did not disgorge a company of armed warriors on the plain of Troy, if a definite Ulysses did not sail the high seas, if the mathematical latitude and longitude of an ancient Ithaca has even yet not been determined, if two children were not literally nourished by a she-wolf on the plains of Latium, if the finality of the literal legend as a source from which history could be written was justly questioned,—what mattered it? It was possible through myth, legend, and tradition; through language and literature; through art in all its varieties; through every form of monumental record, to reconstruct the life of the past, and this to Niebuhr was the basis of history, rather than the individual deeds of individual heroes. Any examination of Niebuhr's *Lectures on Ancient History* or of his *History of Rome* must show that to him the perfume of the rose rather than its name was the vital concern. He himself may not have been unqualifiedly successful in the application of this principle, but its enunciation has profoundly influenced the writing of history for more than a hundred years.

Thus, very largely through forces that were set in motion by and through Niebuhr, there has been a very wide extension of the base on which the sources of history rest. Niebuhr was rightly skeptical in regard to the use of myths, legends, and traditions as a justifiable source for narrating the history of the Roman kings, but it is possible that even he himself did not always appreciate their value as an indirect source on which the his-

torian must rely, not for narration, but for that more difficult part of his work—understanding.

Niebuhr himself could not foresee the extent to which it has been made possible to push back the confines of knowledge through the enlargement of the basis on which history rests. In the history of mankind, he wrote in 1826, "we can go back only to those times of which traditions have come down to us; for the history of nations and periods previous to the discovery of the art of writing is necessarily buried in impenetrable darkness."

But myths, legends, and traditions have been collected, and while seldom to be accepted literally, they have been recognized as containing elements of truth from which the historian may reconstruct conditions of the past. Long discredited because of their obvious contradictions, inherent improbability, and appeal to childlike credulity, they are found to-day to contain the records of religious beliefs, political ideas, social intercourse, agricultural and industrial methods, interest in art, and general intellectual development of the peoples whose myths are studied. He finds in them how universal among primitive peoples has been the inquiring mind. "The desire to know" has seemed to be instinctive in its application to the world about them,—the origin of the world, the coming of man, the creation of the heavenly bodies, the relation of the earth to other worlds, the recurrence of the seasons, birth and death, have all been questions uppermost in the minds of primitive man. When no explanation of the ordinary processes in the life of man and of nature has been self-evident, men have invented stories to account for them and thus the myth—"the incarnation of the spirit of natural fact"—has had its origin.

The legend—"the embellishment of an historical event"—is often developed from the very slightest mention of a person or an event, as has been noted in the Roland legend, but legends innumerable have come down to us and are being developed in our very midst to-day, as is seen in the frequent reference to the "Washington legend," the "Lincoln legend," and the "Roosevelt legend." The core of many of the earliest legends has often in itself only the slightest importance, but the historian to-day finds in the development of the same germ that has taken place in different countries rich stores of information in regard to these countries and times. The same legend as it has grown up in Germany, France, and England takes on the characteristics of the country where it has matured and from these embellishments of the original fact the historian traces the changes and the differences in the countries themselves.

The legend of Paul Bunyan is in the foreground to-day, and within less than a hundred years it has reached gigantic proportions. No one accepts it at its face value, but it is invaluable as giving an insight into the difficulty of determining the initial fact from which legends have sprung, the way in which they have been evolved, and the conditions they unconsciously reveal. Monotonous work, prolonged through many hours each day, remote from groups of other workers, allowing little or no communication with the larger world; men's minds turned in upon themselves to devise an outlet from these conditions; the need of reaction to be found in excitement, "thrills," and adventure,—all of this explains the grotesque, fantastic stories that form a part of the folklore of every age and every country.

Tradition in its turn makes it necessary for history to be rewritten. Since it is "a body of statements or opin-

ions, or beliefs, that has been handed down from age to age by oral communication," it quickly becomes crystallized, acquires the weight of authority, is recognized as carrying with it the consensus of opinion at the time it takes on its final form, but in this very assumption of finality the seeds of its dissolution are found. Though in itself it gives no solid basis on which narrative history can be based, as Niebuhr showed in discrediting the traditions of the early Roman monarchy, it is true that tradition, like myths and legends, has to-day an important place in the reconstruction of the past. The recognition of the slight present face value of tradition, united with the recognition of its supreme value in transmitting archaic beliefs and superstitions that have not been preserved in literature, explains why history must be rewritten in the light of new insight into traditions and new interpretations of them.

New material is at hand for the historian through the insight he is himself developing into the hidden meaning of institutions and customs, forms and ceremonies, as they have come down through the centuries. The coronation of an English monarch to-day gathers up into itself all the different theories that have prevailed in England in regard to the source of the authority on which the right of the king to rule is based. These theories are mutually contradictory and mutually exclusive, but the historian finds in their preservation in the coronation ceremony new material that explains to him the continued vitality of the British monarchy. The marriage ceremony in turn retains all the different theories that have in past times been accepted in regard to the right to control marriage as an institution,—whether the family, the Church, the State, or the individual. "When the mode of contracting a marriage altered," says Wester-

marck, "the earlier mode, from having been a reality, survived as a ceremony."

Thus everywhere, forms, ceremonies, institutions, customs, are becoming instinct with life and are affording rich treasures for the reconstruction of the past.

Natural science in its turn has pushed back unnumbered millions of years the knowledge of the origin of the world and of life upon it. Geography and geology, anthropography and anthropology, ethnography and ethnology have shown the evolution of the physical world and of all human, plant, and animal life. If once the literal historian could begin his history with the creation of the world at a fixed chronological point, 4006 years B. C., according to Bishop Usher's chronology, he has at hand to-day eons of the past spread out before him through the observation, the experiments, and the imagination of his co-operators in the field of natural science. In the single field of anthropology alone, Frazer has said that "the position of the anthropologist of to-day resembles in some sort the position of classical scholars at the revival of learning. To these men the rediscovery of ancient literature came like a revelation, disclosing to their wondering eyes a splendid vision of the antique world, such as the cloistered student of the Middle Ages never dreamed of under the gloomy shadow of the minster and within the sound of its solemn bells. To us moderns a still wider vista is vouchsafed, a greater panorama is unrolled by the study which aims at bringing home to us the faith and the practice, the hopes and the ideals, not of two highly gifted races only, but of all mankind, and thus enabling us to follow the long march, the slow and toilsome ascent, of humanity from savagery to civilization." The study of nature by natural scientists has everywhere enlarged the

opportunities of the historian by placing at his disposal vast stores of material the very existence of which remaimed for ages unknown alike to the scientist dealing with nature and to the scientist dealing with man.

Except for the challenge it throws down to him to exert his collective powers to the utmost, the historian of to-day might well be both appalled and paralyzed by the mass of new material that natural science alone has furnished him and that makes it imperative for him to rewrite history. But this is only a part of the new material that has been opened out to him.

It is scarcely more than fifty years since the British School of Archaeology was founded in Athens. It had been preceded by only a few years by the German School of Archaeology. To-day groups of archaeologists representing scores of different nations and special interests are all eagerly carrying on excavations in every part of the world. Classical archaeology has reached backward and has made pre-literary archaeology an important basis on which to rest its own work. It is significant that for many years the term "pre-historic" was applied to this field, suggesting as it does the belief long prevalent that all history was derived from the records given by literature. In the field of classical archaeology alone, the sites of towns whose very existence, known only through tradition and literature, had come to be doubted, have been laid bare, and the plains of Mycenae, Olympia, and Knossos, with their rich stores of treasures, have made necessary an entire reconstruction of the history of Greece and its dependencies, allies, and rivals.

The excavation of cities and similar vast archaeological undertakings have naturally been a somewhat recent development as the importance of the whole field of archaeology has come to be recognized. Inscriptions

were the first and most conspicuous form of new material to which archaeologists turned, forming as they do an intermediary connection between literary and monumental sources. But inscriptions form only a very small part of the vast range of new material opened up to the historian through the development of the great field of archaeology. Coins, vases, sculptures, and scores of other classes of material remains have been unearthed by the spade of the archaeologist. In every part of the world to-day the archaeologist has been extending the limits of knowledge and, by opening up vast treasures of new material records, has made it necessary to rewrite history. In Egypt, Asia Minor and Palestine, in Mexico and New Mexico, in Central America and South America, in the Near East and in the Far East, expeditions directed by specialists have been uncovering the buried treasures of forgotten times. Only to-day we are told of another world that lies hidden beneath quiet towns in Mexico,—"the potentialities of a second Pompeii, an American Herculaneum await the picks and spades of explorers." The history of archaeology has yet to be written and it is not possible to suggest here even its beginnings; yet it ought to be noted that it was Sweden that in 1866 was the first country to enact legislation regulating the ownership of the "finds" in barrows,—a question not yet settled in many countries where archaeological excavations are being made. This and other questions that concern the development of archaeology in every part of the world are of vital interest in the consideration of the new history.

The enormous strides made by the subject of psychology have profited the historian and enabled him "to go behind the face of the returns" and often to understand the mental processes of the actors in the drama of the

past. Yet so rapid are the changes in the deductions made by experimental psychologists and so diverse and contradictory are the views of theoretical psychologists that it seems unwise to attempt more than the bald statement made. Many psychological studies have been made of the leading American statesmen of the past, of European monarchs, of prominent writers of different countries, yet these have seemed unsatisfactory and probably none of them can be accepted as final. "Herds," "crowds," and "groups" have fared no better. But nothing seems clearer than that history will be more and more affected by the progress constantly being made in experimental and theoretical psychology. This statement may seem to be dangerously near prophecy,—a rock that has wrecked more than one adventurous historian,—but it is based on progress already made by psychology which indicates no diminution in the future.

The problems presented to history by the new science of sociology are somewhat different. A very real difficulty is found in determining the scope of sociology and its general relation to history. Herbert Spencer, as has been noted, somewhat impatiently found in history only a handmaid of descriptive sociology. Recent sociologists have gone even farther and have found not even help to sociology in the work done by historians. It is pertinent to note that at a joint session of the American Historical Association and the American Economic Association at their annual meetings in New Orleans, 1902, the late Professor A. W. Small read a paper in which he "contended that the historians, in spite of all their rejoicing over a new era, have not as yet found the social viewpoint. They spend all their time in indexing dreary, profitless details about inconsequential folk, in developing their technical skill for the discovery of insignificant

objects, in learning so much how to investigate that they have forgotten what is worth investigation." To-day the evident tendency among sociologists is to class history as one of the "social sciences" and thus to merge its identity with that of other groups of knowledge. Historians on their part have been prone to see in sociology only an unorganized mass of facts unrelated to each other as well as collectively unrelated to any other branch of knowledge. It is obvious that no progress can be made through mutual criminations and recriminations and the relation between history and sociology is as yet too much one of armed neutrality. But consciously or unconsciously the trend of history is altogether in the direction of so extending its foundations as to incorporate in them the records and the results of sociological investigation so far definitely reached. If, to many, sociology connotes a subject somewhat too undeveloped, somewhat too vague, somewhat too elusive to justify a claim to be considered an exact science, history recognizes that sociology, like history itself, is working by the scientific method, and avails itself of the extensive contributions to knowledge it has already made.

Still other considerations are presented through the study of economics. Time-old and world-wide as are the subjects with which economics deals, it has been within a comparatively recent time that an effort has been made to organize the familiar, humdrum facts of daily life connected with "getting a living" into a systematic science. Its ramifications penetrate into the most remote past, it concerns in one way or another every activity of human life, and it can not escape the knowledge that its theories and its decisions may affect a remote future. Thus the subject has had an exceptionally interesting, stimulating, and important history, far removed from

"the dismal science" it was once reputed to be. But with all of the subjects gathered to-day into the fold of economics the conventional history of a not very remote past concerned itself little. History to-day, however, has reached downwards, forwards, and upwards and has realized the all-embracing nature of economics. It has thus allied itself with it and it has, because of this alliance, shifted materially its point of view as well as changed its conclusions.

On the walls of the old history seminary room in Johns Hopkins University was long inscribed the famous dictum of Freeman's—"History is past politics, politics is present history." It was used for years by the University on the title-page of its publications in history and political science as giving the keynote to its work in these fields. But Freeman was looking backwards rather than forwards and he was describing an aristocratic history that had never penetrated very far below the surface and a political system equally aristocratic, superficial, and unintelligent. No aphorism is ever true, no general statement is ever true, and Freeman's well-turned phrase never deserved to be taken seriously or interpreted literally. And not only is no general statement ever true, but it is axiomatic that a part can never equal the whole. The political organization of a state may be compared to the bony framework or skeleton of the human body that determines the height and the breadth of the body and gives it form and shape, but is by no means identical with it. Perhaps it may truthfully be said that history to-day has both given much to the somewhat mechanical, ponderous subject of political science, as it was once interpreted, and that it has in turn received much.

This suggests, but by no means exhausts, the long list

of subjects to which history recognizes its indebtedness. Law and jurisprudence, ethics and philosophy, folklore, both primitive and modern, religion, art, aesthetics,—these are but names applied to great groups of knowledge which are a part of the foundations on which history rests. It is an error to consider that history is indebted alone to the so-called "social sciences." It is impossible to determine with precision what are to be included in this category, or to distribute human knowledge into pigeon-holes, or to arrange it in water-tight compartments. This is illustrated by biology, where zoology and botany seem so closely united in the lower forms of life that it is often difficult to determine whether an organism should be classed as belonging to the animal or to the vegetable world. At the other extreme are occasionally found persons endowed with special adaptability who apply this gift in many diverse fields with equal success in all. The tendency to-day is towards greater fluidity in all thought and the attempted repressions imposed on it from outside by the unintelligent and the ignorant may delay but they can not finally obstruct the progress of knowledge.

These are but suggestions that cannot be elaborated here of the very greatly enlarged conception of the content and scope of history. The newer history is therefore far removed from the older history in the expansion of the conventional literary material that had formed its substance, and in its entrance into fields of knowledge previously unexplored by the historian. Yet with all these changes, history remains the same, in the sense in which the individual remains the same however much his physical body has been renewed and however much his intellectual powers have been developed and enlarged through a college education, opportunity for study in

a European university, a trip around the world, or personal association with men of remarkable ability and attainments.

It may seem to minimize the importance that has been attached to the so-called new history when it is realized that it is practically impossible to point to a single great history that has been written as a result of it. The period immediately preceding it was one of great writers of history and the works of Motley, Prescott, Parkman, Macaulay, Carlyle, Guizot, were among "the six best sellers" of their day, and nothing comparable is today found in the field of history. But the period since Niebuhr has in reality been one of the most fruitful ever known,—it seems reasonable to say that there never has been a time of such tremendous activity in the field of history, even though the activity has not yet resulted in a great history. As a result of the development of history has come the charting of the field, and the listing of available material. National, regional, state, and local historical societies have been indefatigable in locating all material within their jurisdictions. Historical writing has apparently been confined to the production of monographs and great universities have become centers for the co-operative study of restricted fields. At Columbia under the leadership of the late W. A. Dunning, the period of the Reconstruction has been investigated and the resulting monographs dealing with the reconstruction of and the reconstruction in the different States have for the first time put the period on a truly scientific basis. The Harvard Historical Seminary earlier promoted an intensive scientific study of various aspects of African slavery. Still earlier H. B. Adams at Johns Hopkins gave the impetus to intensive work along other and somewhat widely distributed fields, though primarily to work

on local history and government. Other seminaries have been scarcely less fruitful. Much of this highly specialized work on very limited fields has been so thoroughly and exhaustively done that it seems probable that it will be many years before the work will have to be done over again. Historians without academic connection have taken certain fields for their own: Henry Osborn Taylor has opened the door and thrown a searchlight on the whole period of the so-called "dark ages," as others have turned the light on dark corners of the mediaeval period: William Roscoe Thayer made the field of modern historical biography his own.

Great historical reviews have been founded in many countries and these afford opportunity for the publication of highly specialized technical studies for which there can never be a commercial demand. But it is significant that much of the new history has appeared, not in historical journals or reviews, but in the technical journals representing other fields of knowledge. J. T. Shotwell's articles on "The Discovery of Time," that are the very foundation of all discussion of chronology, appeared in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method.* J. H. Robinson's paper on "The New History" was first read before the Philosophical Society in Philadelphia, and his paper on "The New Allies of History," though read before the American Historical Association, appeared in the hospitable *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method,* as did also his article on "The Conservative Spirit in the Light of History." Of the eight articles that collectively make up his volume called *The New History,* but two, and they in part only, appeared in publications devoted exclusively to history.

On the other hand, it must be noted that more than one great scholar who began in the field of history has

apparently deserted it for "fresh fields and pastures new." J. H. Robinson has found in the study of the human mind a natural development for his study of the intellectual history of Europe. J. T. Shotwell has found a natural outlet for his historical studies in editing the great co-operative series of materials pertaining to the economic history of the war. More than one historian has become an expert adviser to a foreign country, and has thus funded his specialized knowledge in practical rather than in literary form. It is not an uncommon experience for a person known to be a student of history who meets a fellow-worker after an interval of some years to say, with the manner of one from whom an apology is expected, "You probably do not know that I am no longer working in history," and to receive the reply, "I too am a deserter." Yet in truth neither one is a deserter. The harvest is not ready to be reaped, for the soil must be prepared and the seed sown before the fields are ripe. Some years ago, a great agriculturalist found a remedy for the diseases that had depleted crops in the curt direction, "Plow deeper." This has been the self-imposed task of the historian. The seed he had previously sown had often fallen on stony places where it had withered away because it had not had much soil; it had fallen by the wayside where it had been destroyed; it had fallen among thorns that had choked it. The most important step, so the historian had come to realize, necessary to insure a harvest of hundred-fold or even of thirty-fold, was to plow deeper, to prepare the soil, to sow selected seed. This is the work going on to-day in the field of history,—it is sowing time, not reaping time, the harvest must come later. There is no northwest passage to that world of knowledge of which history is a part; full and adequate preparation must be made, unknown

seas must be charted, and all be made ready for the long voyage.

If the period has not been productive of great histories, it has been fruitful in new ideas and these have probably already been sufficiently pointed out.

The new history in its double character has been developed from the history of a previous day. On its external side it has been concerned with the discovery of new literary material, with the elaboration of improved methods of work, and with a change of emphasis on its objective point. This is a contribution made by and to the new history that has often passed unnoticed, and indeed it is often overlooked that the new history has been at all interested in this phase of the subject. Nevertheless it seems true to say that this side of the shield presented by the new history is quite as important as is the other side, more often credited with being the simon-pure new history. Its work has been done quietly, without dissension in the ranks, it has seldom been either an aggressor or a defender, and while it has made no spectacular discoveries, its contributions to the cause of history have been significant. But complementary to it in every way has been the wide extension of the base of history and it seems not unreasonable to say that as each new collection of facts is organized into a new branch of science the base of history is thereby enlarged.

But every new enlargement of the field of history brings in its train its own attendant problems. In this it but runs in line with every expansion in the conveniences of daily life. The rapid increase in the use of the automobile has become an international problem as well as one demanding the attention of traffic officers wherever busy streets intersect. The convenience of the telephone

has led to its almost universal use, but this very convenience is offset by the interruptions that disturb and harass and that lead almost to drastic measures to circumvent them. The radio and the aeroplane have already led to the development of conflicting claims that threaten controversies for years to come. In a similar way, every step in advance taken by history has been shadowed by the enemies of truth. If archaeological records are shifting the basis on which history rests its conclusions, antiquities of unimpeachable genuineness are produced on demand. This in turn has given rise to a somewhat extensive literature exposing fake antiquities and attempting to forestall further efforts to produce them. If written documents are needed to clinch a conclusion only hesitatingly reached, the forger is at hand to supply them. If obscurity prevails in regard to the early lives of persons who have given signal service to the public, tradition comes to the rescue and provides a background of ancestry and achievement. The service unconsciously offered the historian seems comparable to that consciously offered social aspirants through the production of coats of arms and a lineage traced to the Norman kings.

It has been inevitable that with this enlargement of the field of history these new enemies of truth should multiply and infest the earth, but it is an error to believe that even these enemies are of recent birth. Counterfeit Roman coins circulated during the Empire. The False Capitularies and the False Decretals of the ninth century long troubled the subjects of both State and Church. Forged literature, like the poems of Ossian, has perplexed the historian, as have textual deletions, emendations, and additions made in genuine literature to gratify or to humble the pride of those concerned. Fictitious biographies have found a place in dignified works of

reference.[1] Apparently neither time nor place nor subject has been free from the complications presented to the historian by the unscrupulous ubiquitous fabricator. But while the dishonest forger, the counterfeiter, and the well-meaning but equally troublesome restorer and improver have known neither rest nor sleep, it seems probable that their activities have not as yet kept pace with the increase in the number and the variety of the records being utilized by the historian. The recognition of their existence, however, brings us back to another reason why history must be rewritten.

[1]J. H. Barnhart, "Some Fictitious Botanists," *Journal of the New York Botanical Garden,* September, 1919, 20: 171–181.

CHAPTER VII

THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

It must be self-evident that the enormous extension of the field of history in and of itself alone demands a reconstruction of written history. But if we grant this, another troublesome question arises. How far is the historian justified in interpreting the facts that he has collected? One of the well-merited criticisms of the older school of historians was its predisposition to interpret the past in terms of religion, or of ethics, or of politics, or of personal interests, not necessarily in terms of the facts collected. This tendency was disclaimed by their successors and, since action is equal to reaction, the natural result was to reject the claims of all interpretation. It is the function of the historian, the opponents of interpretation have explained, to give the facts and then to leave readers to draw their own conclusions. This, however, has sometimes seemed like a cheap and easy way of evading responsibility. Difficult as it is to collect, to test, to collate the materials of history, it is even more difficult to see below the surface and to understand their hidden meaning. Readers who are unfamiliar with the processes of historical research and interpretation cannot enter on uncharted seas without guide and compass. It is assuredly not the function of the historian to force on others his interpretation of the past, but he is at least under obligation to state what the facts have meant to him, leaving it to others to accept or to reject this interpretation according to their own best judgment. This is but another way of saying that there is to-day a new interpretation of interpretation.

This, however, is a general statement that demands further explanation, and this explanation can be best given through the analysis made of the subject by a great modern student of the past. The whole question of what the interpretation of history means, and how the interpretation of history has itself been interpreted, has been most adequately discussed by J. T. Shotwell.[1] He has given the history of interpretation through "the mythological, theological, philosophical, materialistic, and economic interpretations of history" and has shown that "none of these, stated in their extremest forms, meets the situation" and gives or can give a final explanation of the meaning of the past. "Pure theology or metaphysics distorts the history it is supposed to explain; history is not its proper business. Materialism and economics, while more promising because more earthly, can not be pressed beyond a certain point. Life itself escapes their analysis." Thus "interpretation, instead of assuming the position of a final judge of conduct or an absolute law, becomes only a suggestive stimulus for further research"; "we test history by history" and we mean " 'by the meaning of anything' but more knowledge of it." To state it in another way, "explanation is more knowledge of the same thing."

Thus it may be said that every contribution to our knowledge of the past explains the past; history "views itself as part of the very process which it attempts to understand. If it has no ecstatic glimpses of finality, it shares at least to the full the exhilaration of the scientific quest."

These principles that lie at the very basis of the question of the interpretation of history have come to be

[1]J. T. Shotwell, "The Interpretation of History," *American Historical Review*, July, 1913, 18: 692–709.

understood by historians themselves, and they afford still further insight into the reluctance of the historian to venture into the general field of interpretation as it was once understood. But more knowledge of any phase of history means a partial clarification of its hidden meaning. "When we talk of the interpretation of history, therefore," says J. T. Shotwell, "we do not mean its setting in the universe, but a knowledge of its own inner relationships." It thus seems only reasonable that the historian should at least wish to arrive at some conclusion in regard to the meaning of the new material he has himself discovered, collected, and collated; that he should wish to find an explanation of its meaning and to have "a knowledge of its own inner relationships"; but still more that he should always consider these conclusions held in solution,—with the acquisition of new additional material, new and different conclusions may be reached.

The name of Lamprecht has been held anathema to many historians because of his ambitious attempt to achieve the impossible and to classify the knowledge of the past under certain distinct categories. But it is not necessary to accept literally the interpretations of Lamprecht or to become the adherents of his detractors in order to realize that the great contribution Lamprecht made to the study of history is that he gave a new interpretation to periods of history which, to unthinking and unreasoning readers, not familiar with the past, had long been without form and void. A mass of miscellaneous unrelated facts had been spread out before them and they were repelled by them. If it was long the custom to speak of "the dark ages," it is possible that their darkness was due to the inability of posterity to see, rather than to the inherent darkness of the period itself. It was

the object of Lamprecht to provide a key that should open the door to the past and enable all who would to understand its meaning. It was, to use a homely illustration, as if Lamprecht had spread a mass of iron filings upon a vast sheet and then placed beneath it a series of magnets around which the filings automatically grouped themselves. The key with which he sought to unlock the past was his belief that every age represents a typical idea, it comes to a climax, and then reaction sets in and the age destroys itself. Thus, he explained, every age carries with it the germs of its own dissolution and its resurrection. Applying his theory to the manner of writing history, it might be said that this too partakes of the characteristics of its age. Ancient history was presented by its contemporary writers through vivid artistic pictures. During the mediaeval period, the garrulous monks and other writers wrote in endless detail what passed before their eyes, so they explained. Yet Ordericus Vitalis, writing in the eleventh century, began his history with an account of the Creation. To-day it is the scientific tendencies of thought that largely shape the presentation of historical facts. It is difficult to determine the influences that give an age one characteristic rather than another, except on the assumption that leaders like Homer, Guicciardini, and Niebuhr have set the pace and others have followed.

It is impossible to elaborate here the interpretations Lamprecht deduced from his astonishing knowledge of the past,—astonishing both in its amount, variety, and extent. An epitome of his position is given in his volume, *What is History?* and an interpretation of his interpretation by E. W. Dow.[1]

[1]E. W. Dow, "Features of the New History: Apropos of Lamprecht's 'Deutsche Geschichte,'" *American Historical Review,* April, 1898, 3: 431–448.

It has been seen that history has been largely indebted to Niebuhr for the development of historical criticism and for suggesting the enormous extension of the materials with which history has concerned itself. It has been equally indebted to Lamprecht not only for his defense of interpretataion at a time when interpretation was in ill repute, but also for providing a new constructive interpretation of the history of Germany that seemed to him applicable to the universal history of mankind.

Though we class Lamprecht among the great leaders of the new history in his recognition that interpretation has a legitimate place in the field of history, we need not feel obliged on that account to accept the specific interpretations offered by Lamprecht himself. Many of these seem strained, unnatural, crude, and not justified by the necessarily slender basis of fact from which they have been deduced. But much was accomplished by him in pointing the way to interpretation that should rest on broader, more secure foundations.

Interpretation means also an understanding of the needs of the audience for whom history is written, and history has been indebted to J. R. Green for a new conception of the audience for whom history was to be written. E. A. Freeman had looked at history in the linear dimension only,—history was a river whose source could be exactly determined, and the unity of history was his constant theme. This view of the nature of history explains his vigorous objection to the establishment at Oxford of "a distinct school of modern history as false in principle,"—the chair of which he himself held. Bishop Stubbs was, on the contrary, interested primarily in a special period and he looked at history as made up of blocks or cubes. Green, in contrast to both Freeman and Stubbs, looked at history in the round and his globe encompassed

all classes of society, and all their interrelated interests, while both Freeman and Stubbs held history at arm's length and examined it as an abstraction. Stubbs and Freeman wrote for scholars, but Green, though equally well fitted to do so, determined to consecrate his work to youth. They should know, and understand, he felt, *England*,—not simply England's monarchs, England's public and international affairs, but England as a whole. The English youth should be made to feel that they were a part of England and active participants in its present, not merely onlookers of its official public past. With this view, both Stubbs and Freeman disagreed. "You know," Stubbs wrote Green, "our ideas are at variance fundamentally," and he once signed himself "Ever your devoted foe." Green never wavered a hair's breadth from his determination to adhere to his original plan, but to both Stubbs and Freeman he seemed to be casting his pearls before swine. "How," they both in effect asked half contemptuously, "could English youth appreciate the work of a great scholar like Green,—who indeed were the youth of England for whom Green was sacrificing his talents?" If Green himself did not directly reply, except to say that in spite of all their arguments he was of the same opinion still, those for whom he had written replied in no uncertain terms. The youth of every age in many lands gave unstinted appreciation of a work written by a scholar, not for scholars, but for them. And if Green in his own time had his detractors among his fellow-workers in the field of history, what, it may be asked, did it matter? Niebuhr and Lamprecht were both objects of active hostility, as has been every other innovator. If the contribution made by Green to the new history was of a different nature from those made by them, it was none the less a distinct contribution. If there is

no common denominator by which the work of Green can be measured with their work, that, too, still is unessential. Many writers and a few historians have popularized historical writings, but Green was the first great historical scholar who deliberately, avowedly, conscientiously, and determinedly devoted his talents to the service of the many rather than of the few. Niebuhr extended and deepened the foundations of history, Lamprecht defended the claims of interpretation against hostile armies, Green broadcasted interpretation to all who listened.

Another signal contribution to the new history has been made by Frederick Jackson Turner. If Niebuhr laid a new foundation for history, if Lamprecht found a new meaning in history, if Green believed that the meaning of history could be and should be understood without reference to social classes, it has been Turner who has given a new significance to history in the perennial rebirth of life on the frontier. If history was to Freeman a river, to Stubbs a series of cubes, to Green a globe, it has been to Turner an ever-ascending spiral, constantly doubling and redoubling on itself and giving a new outlook as each new plane is reached. The frontier has seemed to many to indicate the fringe of civilization, and the protection it afforded to crime and to outlawry has been the phase most emphasized. To Kipling it was the outpost that served as the vantage point for the extension of Empire and his "Foreloper" seems to express adequately the imperialistic conception of the place and function of the frontier.

To Lord Curzon, as he unfolded his interpretation of it in the *Romanes Lecture* of 1907, the frontier has been the conventional one,—the line along which wars have been fought for new acquisitions of territory. No

natural frontiers—seas, deserts, mountains, rivers, forests, marshes, swamps—have ever been effective in protecting a weaker from a stronger enemy covetous of the possessions of others. Nor have artificial frontiers been more efficacious in keeping back an advancing foe. The ancient barriers—palisades, mounds, ramparts, walls, roads, canals, ditches—were all alike futile. The ancient and mediaeval expedients—marks, marches, buffer states, neutralized states, devastated, razed, and depopulated tracts, debatable strips, border territories, neutral zones —have all been equally unsuccessful. Modern frontiers are determined by mathematical and astronomical conditions, but arcs and tangents are of little service in protecting territorial lines. The terms used to-day to disguise desire for conquest, or apology for it—protectorates, spheres of influence, spheres of interest, hinterlands, leases, expansion, benevolent assimilation, peaceful penetration, warm waters, places in the sun,—are only a less offensive way of laying claim to territory desired but unprotected from conquest by either natural or artificial frontiers.

The frontier, as it has been understood in Europe, has thus meant "a fortified boundary line running through dense populations." To Fawcett, the prime function of the frontier "is that of protection, especially protection against surprise attack. And this remains one of the principal functions of the frontiers of the most advanced states." To imperialists, like Kipling and Lord Curzon, and to expansionists, like Sir John Robert Seeley, the very existence of the frontier has seemed an invitation to stronger powers to pass beyond it and to occupy the land on its farther side. No barriers, either natural or artificial, have been able to protect a frontier from the insatiable foe. In America, the frontier similarly long con-

noted "border warfare," but also an undefined, invisible line on the outskirts of normal, settled life, a harbor of refuge for the lawless, "the meeting point between savagery and civilization."

But a new interpretation of the frontier has come through F. J. Turner. To him it has meant not the "fortified boundary line running through dense populations"; it has not implied an expanding nation that "has met other growing peoples whom it has conquered"; it has not been a "development (that) has occurred in a limited area." These conditions were not found in America and the frontier thus took on a new meaning. Here the frontier became "a return to primitive conditions on a continually advancing frontier line, and a new development for that area"; *"a recurrence of the process of evolution in each western area reached in the process of expansion"*; a social development that "has been continually beginning over again on the frontier." The new frontier thus means, not conquest of an occupied territory, but conquest of the wilderness; not a further crystallization into social classes, but an "expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society." Hence it follows that "the frontier is the line of most rapid and effective Americanization," and that, therefore, "the advance of the frontier has meant a steady movement away from the influence of Europe, a steady growth of independence on American lines."

This conception of the frontier has thus been a radical departure from that held of the frontier in Europe. It means a state of social fluidity rather than of social stratification; it means opportunity rather than achievement; it means an outlook into the future rather than satisfaction with the present. It has ceased to be a place

of conflict between man and man and it has come to mean the conquest of natural obstacles in his path. It no longer means the advance of the outworn, but the progress of the vital. It is not destruction, but "perennial rebirth."

This departure from the traditional views held of the frontier has been as significant a contribution to history as has been that made by Niebuhr, Lamprecht, or Green. The frontier has ceased to have a limited or local application and it has taken on a universal signification. It is no longer merely a conventional term, a definite boundary line of demarcation between opposing nations, but it is a border land where different nationalities and different social classes coalesce. Every great metropolis has its sections settled mainly by persons of kindred nationalities, and thus it may have within its boundary lines more than a score of national frontiers,—not warring or planning conquests or seizures, but peaceful and mutually helpful. Often the very designation applied to these sections indicates their origin and their temporary isolation. But "Little Italy," "New Dublin," "Zion," "China Town," often survive as descriptive terms long after the occasion for applying them has passed away. On a large scale are the designations indicating that international affiliations have been formed. French Canadians, Scotch Irish, Pennsylvania Dutch, German Americans, all indicate that individual national frontiers have broken down before the stronger ties of international interests.

The old frontier was occupied by the profession of arms, but the new occupational frontier includes every industry as occupations change from fishing and hunting to agriculture, to ship building, to commerce, to mining, to lumbering, to grazing, to manufacturing, or to the

hundreds of new occupations that have been developed through division of labor. Every new occupational frontier means a new progressive recombination of industrial processes.

The new frontier is geographical and it is described not in terms of ownership, but in terms of its natural features,—the Atlantic frontier, the frontier of the Ohio Valley, of the Mississippi River, of the Rocky Mountains, of the Pacific Coast. Nature, rather than privileged classes, dominated the geographical frontier. This in turn forms a new combination and along the geographical frontier of the St. Lawrence, the French Canadians have established an occupational lumber frontier. On the geographical frontier of the Upper Mississippi the Norwegians have formed an agricultural frontier. On the Pacific Coast recent Italian immigrants occupy a fruit-growing frontier. Thus throughout the country geographical conditions, nationalities, occupations are all influencing the character of the American frontier and illustrating the advantages of the new frontier as characterized by mutual aid over the old frontier with its petty bickerings and all-destroying warfare. It is to F. J. Turner that history and historians are indebted for this new interpretation and no historian can in the future fail to be affected by it.[1]

History must therefore be rewritten because of the

[1]An interesting illustration of the universality of the idea of the frontier as an opportunity for fresh beginnings and its extension to the heart of a great city is found in William Carleton's *One Way Out.* On a very slender thread of story, it shows how a conventional city-bred family, "down and out" through force of circumstances and not by reasons of personal extravagance, crossed the frontier line separating a suburb from the city and started life afresh. The story is an effective epitome of all frontier life, whether on the material, the social, or the industrial frontier. It is a common saying that a person is nowhere so much alone as in the heart of a great city. The expansion of this idea shows how frontier life is constantly found everywhere, not alone on the physical frontier of the wilderness.

significant contributions made to it by great scholars who have broadened its scope; who have shifted the emphasis from the consideration of conspicuous individuals to the study of groups and masses; who have justified interpretation when it has been reached through an exhaustive, intelligent study of the facts, and thus given a new interpretation to interpretation itself; who have found new and important points of departure for the study of familiar conditions; and who have transformed history from a simple narration of individual or collective heroism to a study of an intricate, highly complex society.

But while these are the outstanding contributions that great leaders have made to the study of history, scarcely less important developments have been the result of "team work." New theories are in the air, new experiments are tried in working with historical material, new tests are applied to determine the value of the historical records found, and much has been accomplished through the persistent and intelligent work accomplished by the rank and file of historical students. Through something of the mysterious but none the less effective way in which the "sense of the meeting" is divined, students of history have been made aware of the changes that have come in the objective point involved in writing history, the changes in historical perspective, new definitions of the field of history, changes in points of view, and a general acceptance of the principle of historical evolution.

One of the most fertile reasons for rewriting history is the variant that is found in the constant shifting of perspective. Subjects that once occupied the foreground disappear into the background; other subjects come into high relief out of the mist and obscurity of the past; events that at the time passed unnoticed acquire importance; other events that seemed momentous shrink into

insignificance. The causes of the American Revolution seem to us far different from what they seemed to those who viewed them at short range; the Civil War sixty-five years after its outbreak takes on new aspects undreamed of by those who engaged in the conflict. It has been well said that the farther removed we are from remote antiquity the better we know it, and thus in a very real sense it is true that the newest history is the period familiarly called ancient history. Until such time as we can see the vast panorama of the past spread out before us with all men and events in true proportion history will have to be rewritten.

The shifting of perspective implies a new description of the field of history. At different times in the past history has concerned itself exclusively with the deeds of heroes and hence has been largely biographical, it has been synonymous with military history, it has recorded only the acts of statesmen and politicians, or it has dealt exclusively with ecclesiastical affairs. But year by year the field of history has broadened, more and more it has occupied itself with all that concerns mankind, until now, instead of following to its source a single thread of the past, it studies the interrelationship of all the threads and of the forces that have woven them together into a single rope. Every great upheaval in human society,—war and earthquake, pestilence and famine,—shifts the balance and while this results in a wider outlook for some, it brings to others greater concentration of interest on the special and immediate, and these changes involve a new interpretation of the past.

There is therefore a new history, with an ever-enlarging field of activities, a new history where each progressive step starts from the halting place of the previous

one,—the goal of to-day is the starting-point of the morrow. History must be continually rewritten because there is always a new history. To the end of time, as far as the human mind can see, history will need to be rewritten and in that very fact the historian finds one of its greatest interests.

CHAPTER VIII

MANY MEN OF MANY MINDS—IN ENGLAND

If, as J. T. Shotwell has expressed it, new interpretations of history mean progressive clarification, then "each new theory that forces itself upon the attention of historians brings up new data for their consideration and so widens the field of investigation." The history of recent historical writing in England seems to illustrate this statement particularly well and it may almost be considered an epitome of the history of history in general. The inquiring mind has led to research, research has led to interpretation, interpretation has clarified the conclusions previously reached, the newer heights reached have afforded a wider outlook, research again pushes back the outposts of knowledge, and progressive clarification moves upward.

In suggesting the contribution made by history in England to this "perennial rebirth" of interpretation, it must at the outset be noted that some of England's greatest historians have found their field of work in other countries than England itself, and this notwithstanding Maitland's statement that "it is fair to say that the English historian who wishes to have numerous readers in his own country had better give to that country a large share of his attention." Thomas Arnold, Carlyle, Coxe, Gibbon, Grote, Hallam, Merivale, James Mill, Thirlwall, are but a few of the very considerable number of historians who with varying degrees of success illustrate the statement. In these, and in the many parallel instances that could well be given, it seems probably true that the historian who deals with fields outside

of the country of his birth has the advantage of looking at them from a wide range of vision and therefore of seeing them in truer perspective than would be otherwise possible.

It is correspondingly true that the first interest in archaeology in England was in classical archaeology rather than in that of the British Isles. This in turn may be illustrated by the long list of distinguished English archaeologists,—A. J. Evans, E. A. Gardner, Percy Gardner, Jane Harrison, D. C. Hogarth, Mrs. Strong, A. J. B. Wace,—who have made investigators their debtors through their contributions to the records of the past. These contributions have been in the field of Greek and Roman archaeology and it seems probable that the interest in Roman archaeological records found in Great Britain has been a natural development of the interest British archaeologists have had in the excavations of Greece and ancient Rome.

A corresponding situation has been found in America where historians of the older school, like Motley and Prescott, voyaged afield to find subjects congenial to them. It is at the same time specially noteworthy that American scholars have done much to push back the frontiers of English history, and historians like G. B. Adams, C. M. Andrews, E. P. Cheyney, Charles Gross, and C. H. Haskins have contributed not only to English history but to interrelated fields, such as the relations of England and America, and England and Normandy. New fields of English history have been opened up, as was done by Charles Gross in his *Bibliography of British Municipal History*,—"Even of late Dr. Gross has been sending us our bibliographies from the other side of the Atlantic," was a half-plaintive comment of Maitland's. American historians have valued the generous appreciation of their

work by A. F. Pollard when he said that "for an elucidation of the most important problems in English Constitutional History one has to send one's pupils to books written and published under the auspices of American Universities." But the appreciation expressed has only made scholars realize the more that contributions as yet made are infinitely small in comparison with what still lies before them to be done.

The history of history has to this extent been similar both in England and in America, but the comparison halts here.

On the surface the history of history in England seems a peaceful, simple one, yet it has in reality been far otherwise. History in England has presented a wide range of problems and it is a question whether any country has offered a more fertile field for investigation at the hands of the historian. Innumerable controversies have arisen and these have been so serious that they might well have seemed at the time to be in danger of stifling all further efforts of historians. But the result has been quite the opposite. New theories have led to new investigations, new investigations to new data, new data to new interpretations, and new interpretations to new theories,—the busy round begins again! Out of every controversy new light on the past has come. However acrimonious and vehement and much to be deprecated have been the disputes among historians themselves, history in the abstract has been the gainer through the researches carried on by the disputants.

It is important to the consideration of the subject to note the character of their discussions. An early one, common to other countries as well, concerned the nature of history itself. Matthew Arnold writes of

> "The fretful foam
> Of vehement actions without scope or term called history."

Thomas Arnold says that "history is to this common life of many, what biography is to an individual." S. R. Gardiner found that "history is the record of change, of the new circumstances into which communities of men are brought, and of the new ideas called forth by those circumstances, by which circumstances are in turn moulded." Lecky's view was that "history is presenting those facts which show the permanent forces in a nation's development." If Freeman taught that "history is past politics, politics is present history," Birrell, on the contrary, considers that "facts are not the dress of history, but the true metal, and the historian is a worker in that metal. He has nothing to do with abstract truths, or with practical politics, or with forecasts of the future." Macaulay did not content himself with one definition, but has given several somewhat contradictory ones, as indeed some of his contemporaries also did. If more than one historian did not always agree with himself, it is not surprising that two could not agree, and still less is it surprising that all these varying and contradictory definitions recorded disagreements among historians in regard to the nature and function of history.

But definitions are often only dogmatic statements and result in contradiction rather than in genuine discussion, or even in controversy. Controversial material, however, has been found in abundance in the discussions between the so-called literary and the scientific historians. To the onlookers, this may have seemed a matter of comparatively small moment. They know that for the French historian the question does not exist,—he can not conceive of an historical work where the results of research are not presented with literary, artistic effect. For the German historian the question has also in reality been non-existent, but he answers in the opposite way. Pro-

vided historical material has been collected in a scientific way, the method of presentation of the results is a matter of small moment. But in England, the two schools of historians have existed,—diametrically opposed in theory, less divergent in practice. Again an onlooker can but wonder at such ire in celestial minds. It seems to him that the opponents have confused two quite distinct processes in historical work and that there can be no incompatibility between the scientific method by which research is carried on and an artistic presentation of the results of research. Investigation and research must be dominated by the scientific method,—here the historian has no option. But if he wishes to present the results of his work in literary garb, and has the gift of being able to do it, is not this well within his own province to decide? In England, however, it has been a very real question, and it at once suggests the names of Macaulay and Carlyle. But while the magnificent periods of Macaulay won him readers by the scores of thousands, they seemed to those who regarded themselves as simon-pure historians almost to justify the denial to him of any claim to be considered an historian at all. Macaulay was probably, in their opinion, a great literary artist, but an historian? No! Of late the rehabilitation of Macaulay has begun, and the importance of the recreating historical imagination is being fully recognized. There must be common agreement with the opinion of A. L. Smith, expressed in his appreciation of Frederick William Maitland, that "History can only advance, nowadays, by scientific methods, but the greatest of all these methods is to put oneself into the past and to shake off the idols of our own time; criticism, analysis, tabulation, statistics are the instruments of modern research; but when they have done their work,

it must be readjusted and interpreted by a still higher faculty, the faculty of imagination. Imagination is the only key that can unlock the past." Carlyle in turn has been called a great dramatic poet, rather than an historian. In truth it may be said that both Macaulay and Carlyle were by some quite gladly pushed from the fold of history into that of literature.

The question is, however, best illustrated by the controversy that for years was waged about the work of J. A. Froude and that has left a permanent record in language through the word "Froudacity" coined at that time, as also in the phrase "Froude's disease." His history of England covering scarcely more than half a century of the Tudors was the first exhaustive history dealing with so limited a period of English history. It was based on an exhaustive study of original sources and its claim to be considered history could scarcely be denied. It was read with enthusiasm and appreciation by college students, whose view has been presented by Frederic Harrison in a piquant essay, "The History Schools: An Oxford Dialogue," and by general readers unaccustomed to examine scrupulously the basis of historical work. But it quickly aroused hostility in two quarters. The first was *The Saturday Review,* Tory and high church in its sympathies, and therefore unsympathetic with the Parliamentarianism and Protestantism shown by Froude. "It was necessary," says H. Paul, "that the presumptuous iconoclast should be put down, and taught not to meddle with things which were sacred." The second source of hostility was found in the new school of historians who were reversing the previous process and were paying greater attention to investigation and correspondingly less to the presentation of results. The ire of Freeman in particular was roused by the inaccuracies

of Froude, and since he had for some years contributed to *The Saturday Review,* the opportunity was favorable for a joint attack on a common object of criticism. *The Saturday Review* began "a systematic campaign" against Froude, and Freeman saw in it a convenient vehicle for "smiting Froude hip and thigh." He found the occupation agreeable and pursued it for practically twenty years,—from 1864 to 1870 in *The Saturday Review* and later in the *Contemporary Review.* His wrath grew by what it fed on and he became the center of an influential circle where "belabouring Froude" seemed a test of historical orthodoxy. For the attacks on Froude were not confined to Freeman. Stubbs, for example, wrote to Freeman, from Oxford, November 18, 1877: "Goldwin Smith is here and he and Church dined last Sunday at Oriel: you may be sure Froude was served up nicely between them." With Freeman himself it seems an obsession and in season and out of season he reverts to it, as, in writing to a friend, he mentions meeting "the fellow-slayer of Froude," and further notes that the fellow-slayer "has any number of boxes of documents about Philip and Mary; all Froude-smiting. We hope he will make a big book of them." Yet though Freeman's attacks "made a stir at the time," a serious historian like G. P. Gooch finds that they "contained little substance." Letters from Freeman to Dean Hook indicate that he himself had some qualms about it. "I fancy," he writes, "that from endlessly belabouring Froude I get credit for knowing more of these times than I do. But one can belabour Froude on a very small amount of knowledge. I am profoundly ignorant of the sixteenth century." Again he writes to him, "I find I have a reputation with some people for knowing the sixteenth century, of which I am profoundly ignorant." Such virulent

attacks, however, could not fail to arouse the defenders of history as a branch of literature and also to spur on inquiries in regard to Freeman's own impeccability in research. By what the moralist would call "retributive justice," the microscopes that were trained on Freeman's own work did not leave his reputation as an historian unscathed. His condemnation of Froude inevitably led to a closer inspection of his own work with the result that his merciless attacks reacted against himself,—they "have injured his own fame more than that of his victim," is the verdict of G. P. Gooch.

Freeman's attacks on Froude were made openly and primarily on the score that he was "constitutionally inaccurate." But C. H. Walker has offered the plausible theory that as Freeman's "own volumes on the Norman Conquest began coming out (1867–1879) and failed to arouse any enthusiasm among the general public, he was not a little piqued at the continued success of Froude's work."[1] Color to this theory is given by Freeman's acknowledgment of his own ignorance of the period covered by Froude. It also seems borne out by the opinion of H. Paul that "Freeman seemed to glory in his own deficiencies, and was almost as proud of what he did not know as of what he did." While "Froude, a born man of letters, was skilful and accomplished in the employment of metaphors (,) Freeman could no more handle a metaphor than he could fish with a dry fly. He therefore . . . condemned Froude for doing what he was unable to do himself, and even wrote, in the name of *The Saturday Review,* 'We are no judges of metaphors,' though there must surely have been some one on the staff who knew something about them."

[1]The attacks of Freeman on Froude are well presented by C. H. Walker, "The 'True' Mr. Froude," *Texas Review,* July, 1923, 8: 354–368.

With the appointment of Freeman to the Regius professorship in 1884, the open attacks on Froude apparently lessened. In his second lecture, on "The Difficulties of Historical Study," Freeman went so far as to say that "the sternest seeker after truth will welcome truth more gladly if it comes in a pleasing than if it comes in a repulsive shape. How much more they to whom truth is a secondary object compared with the amusement of a moment, or even they who in their hearts really wish for truth, but who have not gone through the schooling which might enable them to discern truth from falsehood. Style then and form are not to be scorned; a narrative that is true and dull is better than one that is false and lively; but best of all is the narrative which unites accuracy of matter with vigor and eloquence of style." But he could never quite forget Froude and he goes on to say that when "the most winning style, the choicest metaphors, the neatest phrases from foreign tongues . . . are devoted to prove that a man cut off his wife's head one day and married her maid the next morning, out of sheer love for his country, they win believers for the paradox."[1]

[1]The merits of the controversy have been very thoroughly examined by Herbert Paul in *The Life of Froude,* "Froude and Freeman," Chapter V, pp. 147–198. He practically sums up the subject in saying, "mistakes have to be weighed as well as counted."

This is much the verdict of Frederic Harrison when he says, "Truth of proportion is far more essential than any accuracy of detail."—"Historical Method of Froude," in *Tennyson, Ruskin, Mill and Other Literary Estimates,* pp. 221–241.

Over against the persecution and prosecution of Froude, led by *The Saturday Review* and Freeman, must be set the opinions of historians. H. Paul notes the indebtedness to Froude acknowledged by Martin Hume, the historian of Spain, for his work in the Archives of Simancas (*Life of Froude,* pp. 197–198.)—Stubbs, in his lecture "On the present state and prospects of historical study," May 20, 1876, speaks of "Mr. Froude's great work, a book to which even those who differ in principle from the writer will not refuse the tribute of praise as a work of great industry, power and importance" (*Seventeen Lectures on the Study of Medieval and Modern History,* p. 57).—Maitland repeatedly, especially in his "Elizabethan Gleanings" (*Collected Papers,* III, 157–209) speaks

A somewhat similar controversy has been carried on between the philosophic and the scientific historian. But here again the onlooker can find no necessary antagonism among the advocates of scientific research, of literary form, and of philosophic interpretation. In this case also, the controversy in England largely centers around the work of a single individual. The name of H. T. Buckle was practically unknown when in 1857, at the age of 36, he brought out the first volume of his *History of Civilization in England,*—a work conceived more than eighteen years before, and on which from the age of nineteen he had worked on an average of nine to ten hours daily, so he wrote Theodore Parker in 1858. The volume at once aroused violent criticism, in part because the author was not himself of "the Schools." He had left boarding school at thirteen, "with a very scanty stock of knowledge"; extremely delicate health prevented him "from being, in the common sense of the word, educated, and also prevented [his] going to college"; and independent means enabled him to take his further education into his own hands. With so unortho-

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of the work of Froude with respect and even deference.—At the time of Froude's appointment to the Regius professorship, Jowett is cited as having said, "Froude is a man of genius. He has been abominably treated." Cited by H. Paul, *Life of Froude,* p. 383.

In spite of all that has been done to render justice to Froude, the tradition of his unreliability still persists. His description of Adelaide is the conventional illustration cited to prove his alleged constitutional inaccuracy. The charge was made originally by a somewhat embittered Australasian, it was incorporated by H. A. L. Fisher in an article on "Modern Historians and their Methods," and repeated with exaggerated censure by Langlois and Seignobos in their *Introduction to Historical Studies.* Ten years later, Froude's description was re-examined in the light of a mass of data and was found to be correct in all essential particulars. Fisher frankly admitted that his charges had been proved to be unfair and indefensible.—C. H. Walker, "The 'True' Mr. Froude," *Texas Review,* July, 1923, 8: 354–368.—As late as 1926, the description of Adelaide is cited as an illustration of Froude's constitutional inaccuracy. See Allen Johnson, *The Historian and Historical Evidence,* pp. 39–40.

dox a training for the career of an historian, it is not surprising that the hue and cry went up, "Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?" On this ground alone Buckle could hardly have anticipated a favorable reception of his history at the hands of the critics, but even worse things were laid at his door. He was rash enough to say that, in spite of the enormous accumulation of every description for the history of man, and although "its separate parts [had] been examined with considerable ability, hardly any one has attempted to combine them into a whole, and ascertain the way in which they are connected with each other." It indeed seemed clear to him that among historians, "a strange idea prevails, that their business is merely to relate events, which they may occasionally enliven by such moral and political reflections as seem likely to be useful. According to this scheme, any author who from indolence of thought, or from natural incapacity, is unfit to deal with the highest branches of knowledge, has only to pass some years in reading a certain number of books, and then he is qualified to be an historian." Moreover, owing to this narrow standard, "historians, taken as a body, have never recognized the necessity of such a wide and preliminary study as would enable them to grasp their subject in the whole of its natural relations."

This blanket arraignment of historians for their "natural incapacity" to do what was reasonably to be expected of them, inevitably brought down their wrath on the head of their imperturbable accuser. They closed their eyes and shut their ears to his theory of writing history, but, in the excellent phrase of J. T. Shotwell, "if Buckle had presented his scheme politely, right side up, as it were, it could hardly have had a sermon preached at it!" It was the working out of this entirely

new plan of writing history that was the third count in the indictment brought against Buckle. If the author had received no formal education, if he calmly disposed of previous and contemporaneous historians as "unfit to deal with the highest branches of knowledge," and if he now presumed to teach others, "out with him!" The result of his work,—only "a magnificent fragment" owing to his untimely death at forty, yet criticised as if complete and perfect,—was at the time to bring an entire revulsion of feeling against any and every attempt to discover and to interpret the laws of history.

But it is interesting to note certain steps in the development of historical writing as they are illustrated by the contemporaneous controversy over Buckle, and the present attitude toward what he stood for. To his own contemporaries, he was heterodox, as has been seen, in his deviation from the traditional forms of education; he was heterodox in religion,—as a child he had frequented Exeter Hall, and as a young man he returned from his travels on the Continent a freethinker; he was heterodox in politics,—he had been the son of a strong Tory, but "as he grew older, he began to read the newspapers," he resided for a time in Paris, and he became a radical; he was heterodox in his attitude toward his predecessors and fellow-workers in the field of history,—he had condemned them for their mediocrity and their ineptitude; he was heterodox in throwing aside the material used by conventional historians and in building up his own work on an entirely different foundation; he was heterodox in that he did not defer to authority, but had entire confidence in his own deductions. In an age when heterodoxy in any form was anathema, it is not surprising that heterodoxy in sextuple form placed him beyond the pale. Scientific deductions, especially from material not hith-

erto used by historians, brought entire and absolute condemnation of all attempts to interpret history.

These conditions assuredly did not prepossess contemporary historians in his favor and it seems altogether within bounds to say that no historian was ever subjected by his contemporaries to a more searching, relentless criticism than was Buckle. In his discussion of *Buckle and his Critics,* published in 1895, nearly forty years after the *History of Civilization in England* appeared, J. M. Robertson has analyzed the criticisms of no fewer than thirty-five prominent English, French, German, and American writers who examined Buckle's work and almost unanimously condemned it unreservedly. And Robertson by no means exhausted the list of historians who adversely criticised Buckle *in extenso.*

This criticism ranged from general disparagement of Buckle and all his works through the whole gamut of all the criticisms that have apparently ever been brought against any historian. Much of it seems to-day scarcely more than personal abuse of the author. Physical frailty and serious ill health, together with a relentless determination to carry out his purpose of doing "this one thing" caused him to hold himself aloof from others. His *Life* shows scarcely a trace of even casual personal acquaintance with other historians, and his published correspondence was entirely with personal friends. He acted as guide, counsellor, and friend to those seeking advice in regard to their literary work, but there is apparently not the slightest evidence that he submitted his own work, prior to publication, to the examination of others, or that he ever thought of doing so. He had even "always steadily refused to write in reviews, being determined," so he wrote Theodore Parker, "to give up my life to a larger purpose." There had, therefore, been

no friendly sympathetic anticipation of his book and the previously unknown author became "fair game."

The character of these criticisms may be illustrated by articles on Buckle bearing the name of Lord Acton.[1] Giving his own definition of history as "a generalized account of the personal actions of men united in bodies for any public purposes whatever," he shows that, judged by this definition, Buckle's work was a lamentable failure. Again, defining science as "the combination of a great mass of similar facts into the unity of a generalization, a principle, or a law, which principle or law will enable us to predict with certainty the recurrence of like events under given conditions," Lord Acton asks, "Now, then, can there be a science of history?" The answer to the question asked on the basis of the definitions assumed can only be the obvious one—there can be no science of history, and the elaboration of the answer seems unnecessary. The definition of history given by him is an extremely narrow one and presumably would not have been accepted by Buckle, while in defining science he has confused science, "a general name for human knowledge in its most definite and general shape, whatever may be the object of that knowledge," with the knowledge of nature. Criticism of any author on such a basis must fall like a house of cards. As directed

[1]"Mr. Buckle's Thesis and Method," *The Rambler,* July, 1858, n. s. 10: 27–42; "Mr. Buckle's Philosophy of History," *The Rambler,* August, 1858, n. s. 10: 88–104.

These articles are reprinted in Lord Acton's *Historical Essays & Studies,* edited by J. N. Figgis and R. V. Laurence, pp. 305–323, 324–343. But the editors in a prefatory note state that the articles on Buckle were the collaboration of Lord Acton and Richard Simpson, co-editor of the *Rambler,* and that the first article was largely Simpson's work. Abbot Gasquet calls the article Simpson's,—*Lord Acton and his Circle,* p. 17, Note. Lord Acton in writing to Simpson, May, 1858, says that he has his article on Buckle ready for August, and in writing him June 6, he says, "Your paper on Buckle is excellent, and I should do harm by preparing nonsense of my own. Nothing has been written upon his book nearly so good as your paper."

against Buckle, its spirit is seen in the statement, "We may rejoice that the true character of an infidel philosophy has been brought to light by the monstrous and absurd results to which it has led this writer, who has succeeded in extending its principles to the history of civilization only at the sacrifice of every quality which makes a history great." The basis of Lord Acton's condemnation of Buckle was at bottom apparently religious, —Buckle was a heretic whose deductions were therefore "monstrous and absurd."

With Macaulay the situation was otherwise. He writes in his journal that he had "read Buckle's book all day, and got to the end, skipping of course. A man of talent and of a good deal of reading, but paradoxical and incoherent. He is eminently an anticipator, as Bacon would have said. He wants to make a system before he has got the materials; and he has not the excuse which Aristotle had, of having an eminently systematizing mind. The book reminds me perpetually of the 'Divine Legation.' [Bishop Warburton.] I could draw the parallel out far." What Macaulay liked best in Buckle, his nephew G. O. Trevelyan explains in his *Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay,* "was that he had some of the faults of Warburton." But it was probably not Buckle's paradoxes, or his incoherence, or his lack of a systematizing mind, that explain Macaulay's patronizing attitude towards him. Trevelyan throws light on the subject in saying that "Macaulay had a very slight acquaintance with the works of some among the best writers of his own generation. He was not fond of new lights, unless they had been kindled at the ancient beacons; and he was apt to prefer a third-rate author, who had formed himself after some recognized model, to a man of high genius whose style and method were strikingly different from anything

that had gone before. In books, as in people and places, he loved that, and that only, to which he had been accustomed from boyhood upward."

But the criticisms of Buckle's work to-day would rest on an entirely different basis. His thirty-one pages of "List of authors quoted" (Edition of 1871, 3 vols.), comprising at least nine hundred titles, was an innovation at that time, but could not to-day be classed as a bibliography. An examination of the "list" shows a mass of somewhat heterogeneous material, but comparatively little that could be properly classed as source material. Moreover, all his material has been used in a somewhat uncritical manner. Buckle often differs vigorously in opinion from those whose works he has cited, but there is little evidence of his having submitted the works themselves to a rigorous, searching criticism in order to determine their authoritativeness. It must be recognized to-day that while it is impossible to accept Buckle's deductions, it is equally impossible to accept the basis of the contemporaneous criticism against him. It must also be evident to-day, as it was not and probably could not be evident to his contemporaries, that while Buckle's conclusions were ephemeral, this does not in and of itself militate against the importance of his contribution to history. Buckle widely extended the base on which history is written through incorporating in it large classes of records previously ignored by historians. What he personally concluded in regard to them mattered far less to progress in history than did his revelation of sources of history not hitherto recognized as such by historians.

These points have been suggested not in any way to indicate the character of Buckle's work, but merely to illustrate the difference in the attitude of critics of his own time and those of later years. The controversy

waged over Buckle was that of his own day and generation and it has been adequately summed up by A. H. Huth and J. M. Robertson.

Whether the historian should give a literary form to the results of his research and whether he should attempt to explain their meaning may well seem to be questions that lie wholly within the personal decision of the historian himself. But the historian is not always a free agent and his work is often affected by conditions over which he has no control. The union of Church and State in England and the establishment of Regius professorships to be filled by appointees of the Crown have given rise to a very real cause for dissatisfaction among historians themselves. They have seemed powerless to change these conditions or to straighten out the complications arising from such appointments at Oxford and Cambridge.

These appointments have sometimes been political and as such they have been received with open hostility by members of the guild. "What a horrid appointment of K. . . .!" Stubbs wrote to Freeman in 1860 when it was announced that the new Regius professor of history at Cambridge was to be Charles Kingsley,—described in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* as an "English clergyman, poet, and novelist." "I suppose," continues Stubbs, "that it is on the principle of putting the worst man in the best place, so that you have all the good ones trying to show how much better they are, and so benefiting the world." This was an effort, even if ironical, to put the best face on an equivocal situation, but it was none the less, even though unconsciously, giving support to the view that as "the good ones" are spurred on, investigation results.

It seemed to many that comparable conditions were

created in Oxford when Froude, more than thirty years later, was appointed to the Regius professorship there. The comment of an eminent historian was that "not unnaturally, lively protest was heard against the appointment. Yet Froude deserved the distinction better than three-quarters of his predecessors." This was assuredly, many thought, saying little enough. Apropos of Kingsley's appointment at Cambridge, and unconsciously anticipating Froude's appointment at Oxford, Stubbs wrote to Green, December 17, 1871, "I have made a hymn on Froude and Kingsley; thus—

> Froude informs the Scottish youth
> That parsons do not care for truth.
> The Reverend Canon Kingsley cries
> History is a pack of lies.
> What cause for judgments so malign?
> A brief reflexion solves the mystery—
> Froude believes Kingsley a divine,
> And Kingsley goes to Froude for History."

The "Hymn" probably delighted many of the inner circle of those historians who were restless under the injection of politics into the field of history.

Stubbs himself had already felt the unfortunate effects of the political influence that he so much deprecated in the appointment of Kingsley and subsequently of Froude. In 1865, there were rumors of Goldwin Smith's approaching resignation of the Regius Professorship of Modern History at Oxford and Stubbs wrote Freeman, December 23, 1865, "I should think he would hold on until he can secure a good successor and that will be you." And he added, "I am not going to stand for any more things. If I am not worth looking up, I am not ambitious enough to like to be beaten." Later, he apparently changed his mind and, after his own appointment to the chair was made, he wrote Freeman, August 4,

1866, "I had thought at first of standing, but knowing that Hook, Hardy, and Brewer considered themselves in a manner pledged to you, I thought it better not." Though he was "not among the avowed candidates," and though not specially interested in modern history, his letter to Lord Derby "shows with how undisguised a delight he accepted the offer."

He had scarcely entered on his work in Oxford before the chair of ecclesiastical history became vacant and "many expected that Stubbs, the foremost ecclesiastical historian in the land, would be appointed to fill the post." But "the Prime Minister took occasion to reward political service as well as conspicuous intellectual power, rather than special qualifications, by appointing Mr. H. L. Mansel, Waynflete Reader of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, to the Regius Professorship of Ecclesiastical History." William Bright wrote: "I do not think one can help recognizing the fact that special studies in that direction [Ecclesiastical History] are not regarded as necessary for a Professor by our honored Lord and Chancellor in his quality as patron of Regius Professorships. Nor can I think that the character of Mansel's mind is historical, nor that he will be able to take to Ecclesiastical History as a congenial subject . . . . . [Still], I think we may be thankful for Mansel's appointment. He is a *very* able man, a good Churchman, and a Conservative. If he is not quite in his right place as a Professor of Ecclesiastical History, to have him in one of the great chairs, and in a Christ Church Canonry, is no small gain to the cause of truth."

William Bright had himself been "mentioned." But he wrote to a friend: "As to the Ecclesiastical History Chair, you needn't think I have any chance, as people call it, of having the offer made to me, although my

friends here kindly wish it. I do not think, nor does Liddon, that Lord Derby will appoint any one known as a thorough High Churchman."

How thoroughly the appointments to Regius professorships were regarded as influenced by political considerations is again indicated by Bright in discussing probabilities. "There is great likelihood," he writes, "that special fitness will be practically disregarded. Governments don't care much about such specialties. The fact is no doubt vexatious to those who, like me, feel an interest in this special subject [Ecclesiastical History]. I have some fear that Government may yield to Liberal pressure, and appoint some man who is not just a heretic, or, at least, who is not known to be rationalistically inclined, but who would really serve the Liberals' turn effectually. . . . Liddon says that the Liberals here are most intolerant in their language, and bitter against the very idea of a High Church appointment; 'as for the subject, anybody can get it up, of course.' " The explanation for passing over both Stubbs and Bright was probably the one given by Bright,—both were thorough high-churchmen.

The situation resulting in Oxford from the appointment of a distinguished metaphysician like Mansel to a chair of history aroused the mirth of J. R. Green, who wrote to E. A. Freeman, January 29, 1867, "Is Oxford drunk? The Professor of Ecclesiastical History [Mansel] will this Term lecture on the Ethics of Aristotle, and the Age of Socrates. I cherish a fond hope that it may be the Christian Socrates and not the Aesculapian but I fear much. . . . Dawkins [the naturalist] is reviewing a book on Greek Art for Cook, which almost equals Mansel. My most Musical friend is just made Lecturer on Ancient History at the Queen's College in

Harley Street. 'Where *was* Marathon?' he moaned to me over White's Analysis."

The professorship of ecclesiastical history soon became vacant again and Stubbs wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury asking him for his help in obtaining the chair. But the Archbishop, while replying that he knew "of no man so eminently qualified to adorn the chair," and that he should "be very much surprised if any Oxford man [could] be found so thoroughly versed in those studies which especially fit a man for that post," stated that it was contrary to his "general rule to make direct application to the Prime Minister in matters of preferment." Stubbs was again passed over, for Disraeli appointed William Bright, who recognized the superior claims of Stubbs to the appointment, and wrote him, "When the proposal was made to me, I considered whether, if I declined it, *your* appointment could be secured. The one friend whom I consulted (I could not consult more than one) assured me that this could not be counted on." Since Bright was even more of a high churchman than was Stubbs, this appointment seems difficult to understand. Bright himself offered the somewhat lame explanation "that to fill up the chair of Modern History would have been a difficult task for the Government."

But if the religious views of Stubbs had prevented his appointment to the special chair he desired, they had not interfered, as has been seen, with his appointment in 1866 to the Regius Professorship of Modern History, —a somewhat incongruous appointment in view of his special interests in mediaeval ecclesiastical history. Freeman had been the logical appointee, as Stubbs himself had realized. As early as 1858, Freeman had been a candidate for the chair of modern history, but was not

appointed; he was also a candidate when Stubbs received the appointment. "It is remarkable," Freeman's biographer writes, "that as it was the height of his ambition to obtain a Professorship of History, and as he was certainly well qualified for some office of the kind, he was destined to be disappointed time after time when he came forward as a candidate for various chairs, both in Oxford and elsewhere, until at last, when he did become Regius Professor, [in 1884], he was comparatively indifferent to the honor." The appointment of Freeman had been long delayed, however, not from religious but from political reasons. A single phrase in regard to India in a speech on the Eastern question, late in 1876, had long been misunderstood, "in spite of the fact that the words [attributed to him] do not occur in any printed report of his speech, and in spite of his own declaration, constantly repeated, that they were never uttered." This apparently explains the long postponement of his appointment.

Similar criticism was called forth when Stubbs was in 1884 transferred from the Regius professorship of history to the bishopric of Chester.[1] Some years earlier one of the Oxford colleges had urged him to take the living of St. Mary's in Oxford and B. Jowett wrote him

[1]When Stubbs was nominated to the bishopric of Chester, the question of the appointment of his successor to the Regius Professorship of Modern History in Oxford became one of almost equal interest. A week after Stubbs had accepted the nomination, he wrote to Mandell Creighton from Oxford, February 17, 1884, "I wish . . . . . that you could have been my immediate successor here, supposing that you were willing to come. But although that, I suppose, cannot be, it is probably only delayed until a time when you will have done more of your practical work in Northumberland, and other claims have passed out of sight. My successor will be an older man than myself."—*Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton,* I, 244. The same letter is given in *Letters of William Stubbs,* p. 247.

The letter seems clearly to show that Stubbs personally preferred the appointment of an ecclesiastic to the professorship, rather than that of Freeman, a layman, even though Freeman was occupied exclusively with historical affairs and was his devoted friend and adherent.

sensibly that "when a person is very distinguished in one line he had better not take another which is liable to distract him from it. It is a misery to lead a divided life. . . . To preach well you would have to withdraw your mind from History and devote it to writing sermons. . . . You have been taken away from this to a higher sort of work which very few can do, though there are many good clergymen."

The pressure here had been that of an Oxford college and he was able to resist it. But the situation was altered when State and Church commanded, and he accepted the bishopric. "Gladstone is not to be forgiven for making Stubbs a bishop," was the caustic verdict of another eminent historian, while Dean Church wrote Stubbs, "I ask myself whether I have not done wrong in not fighting tooth and nail to keep you at Oxford and St. Paul's." Stubbs himself was conscious of the sacrifice he had been asked to make, and when he was transferred from the bishopric of Chester to that of Oxford he said, "I feel as if I had committed suicide." "He never was reconciled to the place at Cuddesdon," writes W. H. Hutton; "he thought it entailed on him and on others a great waste of time." But the appointment of the Prime Minister was equivalent to a command of the Crown, and Stubbs felt he had no option,—"as he has asked me to do the hardest [thing in the world], I must." The ultimate effect on history of these ecclesiastical appointments was suggested by F. W. Maitland in his tribute to Stubbs in 1901. He emphasized the great contribution made by Stubbs to the "practical demonstration" of the historian's science and art, which seemed to him "of incalculable benefit to the cause of history in England and far more effective than any abstract discourse on methodology could be." He then adds, "In this respect we

must look to the very greatest among the Germans to find the peers of Dr. Stubbs, and we must remember that a Mommsen's productive days are not cut short by a bishopric."

It was not alone in the eighteenth century that, in the words of Maitland, "to find a square hole for the round man was apparently the fashion of the time."

It has been seen how casually superior qualifications for university posts in history have been brushed aside by the political and the ecclesiastic mind, and how a person preeminently qualified for a research position may be requisitioned for service in Church or State. The academic mind has in turn asserted its claim to be heard over and above the historian. A fruitful source of controversy long centered around the proposed establishment of a school of modern history at Oxford, and the Classicists and the Modernists vigorously debated the question of the suitability of modern history as a subject for university study and examination. Freeman felt that "any attempt to introduce the almost infinite field of modern history as a subject of ordinary study and examination on the same level as Grecian and Roman history must be utterly fruitless," and "he strongly deprecated setting up a distinct school of modern history as false in principle." But in spite of his vigorous protest against the plan,—made through three pamphlets published in 1849 and 1850,—the examination statute was passed by the University and though subsequently revised, it was, in Freeman's opinion, not improved.

By the irony of fate, in 1857–58, Freeman was one of the examiners in the School of Law and Modern History at Oxford, and the examiners issued a circular stating what the examination would cover and recommending the use of certain books in preparation for it.

This seems to-day a reasonable procedure, but much was involved in it and much lay behind it. The Vice-Chancellor and the Proctors were the first to protest that these recommendations were "without statutable authority." This protest led Freeman to retort indignantly to the effect that the examiners had not exceeded their authority; that it was unreasonable to expect examiners to examine or students to be examined on subjects not agreed on in advance; that the examiners had found "the most deplorable ignorance [of geography] among the students" and they had thought it their duty to remedy it, since "History without Geography is simply meaningless."

The Vice-Chancellor and the Proctors having made their protest, took no further steps to enforce it. But the controversy flared up again when the members of the Protestant Alliance noted that the examiners had recommended the use of Lingard rather than of Hume for the period prior to the Reformation. This excited their alarm, as the recommendation concerning the introduction of geography had alarmed University officials, and it was necessary for the examiners to write at length to Lord Shaftesbury that his "Lordship could hardly fail to think us right in preferring the work of a really learned man and very moderate writer, though belonging to another Christian communion, to one not only full of historical errors, but written with an evident animus against the Christian religion in general." Here the whole matter seems to have rested.

But an aftermath of the controversy precipitated in Oxford by Freeman's interest in geography long persisted in the heated discussion waged over the spelling of geographical and biographical names. Apparently the change in the accepted English spelling of foreign proper

names began with Grote and Carlyle, but since these changes concerned mainly ancient Greece and continental Europe, a good-natured English public did not violently rebel. It was a different matter, however, when the Old English historical school, "the most revolutionary in its methods, and the most exacting in its demands," by example insisted on an archaic spelling of familiar English names long endeared through history and literature. Frederic Harrison was always a free lance and his pleasant, but none the less effective sarcasm questioning this plan in his article "A Pedantic Nuisance," gave comfort to its opponents, and with the decline of the school the controversy lapsed. Unhappily, its records are left on every page of Freeman's works on England and render them often almost unintelligible to the modern reader.

Similar unsatisfactory conditions in regard to the history school existed in Cambridge, much to the regret of Mandell Creighton when appointed Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History there. Professor J. R. Seeley, Regius Professor of History, and Charles Kingsley, the predecessor of Seeley, were probably, he felt, primarily men of letters rather than historians. When the history tripos was established in 1873 by J. R. Seeley, many regretted that "its aim was practical rather than scientific, that it was political and hardly more than incidentally historical, that it called few mental faculties into play, that it was no preparation for a teacher, that a student might get a first class without ever having consulted an original authority, or learnt anything of the methods of historical research." Since at the time of Creighton's appointment, J. R. Seeley was the only professor of history in the University, and "he wished to fit men to be statesmen and diplomatists," it was difficult to urge that greater consideration should be given history,

without regard to its possible "usefulness." But some months after Creighton went to Cambridge, the Board of Historical Studies arranged a compromise that enabled students to choose either political or historical subjects and the previous difficulties were happily settled.

These are but suggestions of the hampering effects on historical research in England due to the interlocking relationship of State, Church, and Education.

It is thus seen that many serious differences have arisen in England in regard to history. They have related to the definition of history; they have concerned the comparative merits of so-called literary and scientific history, as also the work of the philosophic and the scientific historians; they have pertained to the injection of politics into university appointments, and to the establishment of a School of Modern History at Oxford, together with the advisability of allowing the examiners to follow their own judgment in recommending subjects and authorities to be studied in preparation for it; they have arisen in regard to the singleness of aim on the part of historians and their unwillingness to make history "practical" or to serve any ultimate cause except the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. These controversies have been largely the result of differing personal opinions, and the questions at issue have not been susceptible of proof or disproof. But they have been extremely vocal and they have occupied the attention of historians somewhat out of proportion to the importance of the issues involved. Their discussion has probably contributed little either to research or to interpretation.

But material of this nature has not been lacking. The dispute over the question of English origins was of a character quite different from those that have been considered. It was led on one side by Freeman, who found a

Germanic origin for many English institutions, and by Seebohm, who put forward the claims of a Roman origin. This could but promote indefatigable research on the part of the embattled Germanists and Romanists with the result that the confines of knowledge of English history were widely extended. The whole question of Celtic origins and survivals seems to have been answered by Pollock and Maitland in their statement that they are unable to assign any definite share in the origin of English law to the Celtic element, and that "if in a given case we find that an institution or custom which is both Welsh and English is at the same time Scandinavian, Greek, Roman, Slavonic or Hindu, we may be reasonably assured that there is nothing more specific in the matter. Or, if there be a true case of survival, it may go back to an origin as little Celtic or even Aryan as it is Germanic."

One of its most important phases was the very definite application of the question to the origin of English law. And here again Pollock and Maitland affirm that as a result of their research they find that the English laws "have been formed in the main from a stock of Teutonic customs, with some additions of matter, and considerable additions or modifications of form received directly or indirectly from the Roman system." The whole discussion of Celtic, Roman, or Teutonic origins and survivals in England well illustrates how extremely complicated is the problem and how absolutely impossible it is to assign definite origins, to affirm the existence of purity of race, or to disentangle the various threads that have been interwoven in any national fabric. In England Celts, Romans, Germans, Danes, and Normans all brought and left their customs, institutions, languages, dialects, and also left the more

tangible material remains of their occupation in stone circles, roads and walls, monuments to their dead, architectural forms and work in metal. To attribute definite origins is difficult, but to make the attempt to do so is to enrich immeasurably our knowledge of the past.

A more abstract theoretical question has led to endless speculation and this in turn to tireless research. Was land held in common, did enclosure precede or follow community of holdings, where did the town end and the village begin,—all these variants suggest in turn widely differing opinion that can be corroborated or overthrown only through research; again research in and of itself becomes the objective point, rather than the settlement of concrete questions. And it is again to Maitland that we must turn, not for the final word on the subject, but for such enlightenment as we now have. "That land was owned by communities before it was owned by individuals," says Maitland, "is nowadays a fashionable doctrine." But he continues, "I must confess, however, to thinking that if the terms 'community' and 'ownership' be precisely used,—if ownership, the creature of private law, be distinguished from a governmental domain conferred by public law, and if ownership by a public community *(universitas, persona ficta)* be distinguished from co-ownership (*condominium,* joint tenancy or tenancy in common),—then this doctrine is as little proved and as little probable as would be an assertion that the first four rules of arithmetic are modern when compared with the differential calculus." Again research provokes questions, but does not finally answer them.

Religious dogmas are largely a matter of belief, but ecclesiastical differences may be subjects of research. A vital question at issue in the history of England con-

cerned the organization of the English church,—did it ever acknowledge the supremacy of the Roman canon law, or did it always have its own canon law and therefore always maintain an existence independent of the Church in Rome?

The question had been long in abeyance since the study of the Canon Law had been proscribed by Henry VIII. But the interest of Stubbs turned in the direction of mediaeval ecclesiastical history and, while professor of modern history, he delivered in 1882 two lectures on "The History of the Canon Law in England," and he had already been made a member of the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Courts that sat from 1881 to 1883. He contributed much to its work and in signing its Report "he gave the weight of his authority to the opinion that the Canon Law of Rome, though held to be of great authority in England during the Middle Ages, was not recognized to be binding on the Courts Christian of this country . . . If the Canon Law was not binding, then the Church of England was never in the full sense ultramontane, and the changes in the sixteenth century did not amount to a revolution."

In 1888, F. W. Maitland was elected to the Downing Chair of the Laws of England in the University of Cambridge. He had previously edited Bracton's *Note Book,* and as Reader of English Law in the University he had published remarkable articles on mediaeval English law. During his research work for the *History of English Law* it had been inevitable that Maitland should be, as he says in his Preface to *Roman Canon Law in the Church of England,* "compelled to make an incursion into a region that was unfamiliar to [him], namely that of ecclesiastical jurisprudence," and in a letter to R. L. Poole, in 1895, he writes: "I ought to have been writing

lectures about the history of the Canon Law. Instead of so doing I have been led away into a lengthy discourse on Lyndwood . . . It seems to me clear, that in Lyndwood's view the law laid down in the three great papal law-books is statute law for the English ecclesiastical courts and overrules all the provincial constitutions . . . and further that . . . there is next to nothing that can be called *English* Canon Law." He thus found himself "attributing to the Roman Canon Law an authority over the doings of the English Ecclesiastical Courts such as it is not commonly supposed to have wielded," and in various essays he states the reasons that led to these conclusions.

These conclusions were directly at variance with those embodied in Stubbs' lectures on the Canon Law in England and in the Report of the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Courts. To differ from a man whom he so much admired as he did Stubbs was most painful to Maitland and he wrote in almost feverish anxiety to R. L. Poole, "I hope and trust that you were not very serious when you said the bishop was sore. I feel for him a respect so deep, that if you told me that the republication of my essays would make him more unhappy than a sane man is whenever people dissent from him, I should be in great doubt what to do. It is not too late to destroy all or some of the sheets. I hate to bark at the heels of a great man whom I admire, but tried hard to seem as well as to be respectful."

There is no evidence apparent that the volume, made up of six essays previously published in the *English Historical Review* and the *Law Quarterly Review,* was in any way changed as a result of Maitland's aversion to causing Stubbs any unhappiness. H. A. L. Fisher felt that the book "permanently deflected the current of his-

torical opinion," and that "so far as a case can be demolished by argument, the case for the legal continuity of the Church in England was demolished by Maitland." But this was not acknowledged by Stubbs or his supporters and the only reference made to Maitland indicated in Hutton's *Letters of Stubbs* is a pleasant note acknowledging the receipt of a copy of Bracton's *Note Book* sent him by the editor, ten years before the publication of Maitland's *Roman Canon Law in the Church of England.*

These three great questions concerning the origin of English laws and customs, the enclosure of lands, and the supremacy of Roman canon law represent fairly well the type of inquiry that has led English historians and historians of England into vast realms of knowledge previously unexplored. But the immeasurable advantage that has come from this research has been, not that definite conclusions have been unanimously reached concerning any or all of these disputed points, but rather that it has opened up still greater opportunity for pushing still farther back the outposts of knowledge. Rival schools of English historians may have settled nothing, but they have achieved far more than determining these mooted points in showing how extensive is the research yet to be done.

CHAPTER IX

MANY CLAIMANTS FOR AN HONOR—IN AMERICA

If the problems of history are illustrated by an examination of the wide range of those that have arisen in the case of a single country like England, so they may also be illustrated in the single concrete case in America, as they are disclosed in the history of the origin of the American Constitution. Interest in this document has of necessity varied from generation to generation, owing in part to the increasing stability of the nation. During the early period after its adoption, the chief interest centered around the question, "Will it work?" The Federalist party answered emphatically, "Yes," but qualified the statement with the reservation that the leadership of the Federalists was necessary to its success. When the leadership passed to the Democratic Republican party and the machinery of government worked as smoothly as it had previously done, the period of testing the constitution practically closed. Interest in the constitution shifted to the discussion of the question, "What does the constitution mean?" and its interpretation occupied the foreground. At the close of the Civil War, the constitution had successfully withstood every test that could be applied to it, both on the side of the foreign policy and of the domestic policy of the nation. The interpretation given it by the great constitutional lawyers and jurists of the pre-war period had been practically accepted and therefore for the first time leisure was afforded for the consideration of the question, "What was its origin?"

The time for such consideration was fully come. Already public opinion was crystallizing along quite different lines and mutually contradictory explanations were at hand, all made with an appearance of finality such as seemed to preclude further discussion. Gladstone had proclaimed in pontifical tones that "As the British Constitution is the most subtle organism which has proceeded from progressive history, so the American Constitution is the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man."

This dictum was assuredly not the result of any profound study of the origin of the American Constitution, as Gladstone was himself the first to admit, but it is an interesting record of the acceptance by the theological mind of the "special creation" and "spontaneous generation" theories then under fire in the field of natural history. It was, however, apparently fully accepted by historians as well as by the general public. But even at the time the "special creation" theory was enunciated, it was being disposed of by Von Holst who submitted, apparently from a contemporary authority, that "the Constitution had been extorted from the grinding necessities of a reluctant people."

Another statement as to its origin may be called "the inspiration" theory. This is illustrated by a version of the situation given early in the Civil War. An anonymous writer, in discussing "Loyalty," in the *North American Review* for January, 1862, explains that "Such a government we regard as more than the expression of calm wisdom and lofty patriotism. It has its distinctly providential element. It was God's saving gift to a distracted and imperiled people. It was his creative fiat over a weltering chaos: 'Let a nation be born in a day.' "

The danger of passing judgment on origins without

full knowledge of a situation is again illustrated by a somewhat recent account of the Philadelphia Convention given by a distinguished clergyman-editor. He states: "In 1787 a little over three million of people, living along the Atlantic Coast, desired a new organic law for the republic. They selected, after due debate, representative men from the different sections of the country. These representative men met and debated the provisions for the new organic law. The debates were open and public. The debaters not only discussed the provisions of this new organic law in constitutional convention, but upon the platform and through the press presented them to the people of the various States. The American people made for themselves the Constitution under which they were to live." But it has long been a matter of common knowledge that the Philadelphia Convention sat behind closed doors, that its debates were not "open and public," but that on the contrary every precaution was taken to prevent any information concerning its deliberations from leaking out; that the debaters did not at the time present the provisions of the new organic law to the people of the various states upon the platform and through the press; and that it was not until after the Philadelphia Convention had adjourned *sine die* and the question of the ratification of the Constitution by the States was to be decided, that Hamilton, Madison, and Jay began through the press to explain the provisions of the new organic law proposed.

All these different impressionistic accounts of the origin and adoption of the constitution reflect little the actual conditions. But they are interesting records of the ease with which history is written alike by the learned and the ignorant. They are in part explained by the almost complete lack of knowledge on the part of the

general public of the work of the Philadelphia Convention, and the consequent opportunity given for allowing free rein to the imagination. "One hundred per cent Americanism" has always been popular and the belief in "a chosen people" has had a long ancestry.

The first departures from these assumed but popularly accepted versions of the origin of the constitution were at first timidly made by historians, but they rested on a more substantial foundation than inspiration. Changing views of the relation between England and her colonies began to come in and in 1884 Edward Channing wrote that "the constitutional history of Massachusetts and Virginia before their settlement is one history—the continuous history of the English people." This was assuredly giving a firmer foundation to our constitution than that of a special creation or the inspirational theory, and with the dying out of the old animosity toward England, the theory of the English origin of the American Constitution came into vogue. Douglas Campbell was probably in part correct in saying that "most American authors, and all Englishmen who have written of America, set out with the theory that the people of the United States are an English race, and that their institutions, when not original, are derived from England." His own work was written to combat this idea, but the result was not history, but a case of special pleading. The effort was made to show that the Pilgrims, after a residence of eleven years in Holland, had transferred to America, where their settlements were practically confined to New England, everything that was admirable in the institutions of Holland, while everything in America open to adverse criticism was a base residuum left from an unworthy English connection. This theory has found acceptance among those wishing to do honor to "brave little Hol-

land," but the book remains, in the words of a distinguished American historian, the late H. L. Osgood, "one of the most pretentious, but least substantial, of all the works ever written on early American history."

But discussions in regard to the origin of the English Constitution itself were already coming up. Violent controversies, as has been seen, had been waged around the questions of its indebtedness to Germanic institutions; the contributions made to it by the Romans as a result of their five hundred years of occupation of Britain; the possible, or probable, or indisputable, survivals from the Celtic tenure of the island. The Germanic origin advocated by Edward A. Freeman for a time held the field and is well stated by one of his disciples, H. B. Adams, when he says, "The Constitution of England is not written at all; it is simply a rich but sturdy growth of popular institutions, derived originally from the forests of Germany and transplanted across the sea." If this lineage of the English Constitution was accepted, it followed that all who accepted the theory of the English origin of the American Constitution naturally transferred to it the same Germanic origin, and Mr. Adams goes on to say, "What is thus maintained and acknowledged concerning our Saxon forefathers, may likewise be urged concerning the Pilgrim fathers. They were merely one branch of the great Teutonic race, a single offshoot from the tree of liberty which takes deep hold upon all the past."

This theory was in turn quickly assumed to be the final word in regard to the origin of the American Constitution. "Our institutions," says one writer, "are essentially Teutonic, and the channels through which the ancient influences have made themselves felt in the Con-

stitution are conceded to be predominantly Colonial and English." Freeman himself had presumably uttered the final word when he wrote Hannis Taylor, who had sent him a copy of his *Origin and Growth of the English Constitution,* "The conception of your book, taking American history as part of English, and English as part of general Teutonic, is indeed just what it should be."

It must be self-evident that these theories in regard to the source of the American Constitution are but hypotheses that rest on a very insecure basis. But the reasons are perhaps understandable. Our direct, contemporaneous knowledge of the transactions of the Philadelphia Convention is extremely limited, not only because of the secrecy attending its sessions, but also because of the long delay in publishing both the official and the unofficial records that had been kept. The nearly sixty years that elapsed before all the most important records and notes of the Convention were published was a period long enough to permit ignorance to indulge in vain imaginings and baseless theories. Moreover, when the contemporaneous material was published, it was not easily available, and had it been so, it seems probable that the desires of the time ran in the direction of effusive speculation rather than in that of hard consuming study. Another long period elapsed before such study was undertaken, so that it was practically more than a hundred years before the tools were at hand, and use was made of them; only thus could productive scholarship give an authoritative version of the work of the Federal Convention of 1787.

The most exhaustive study is that made by Max Farrand entitled *The Records of the Federal Convention of*

1787, published in three volumes, in 1911.[1] It takes up the work of the Convention day by day as recorded by its official secretary, William Jackson, and supplemented by the notes of the various members present. This edition of the *Records* forms the basis of the editor's work, *The Framing of the Constitution of the United States,* —"a brief presentation of what took place in the federal convention." A third work by Max Farrand, *The Fathers of the Constitution,* is a less technical, more popular account of the Convention and of its historical setting. These collectively form the most important single series of exhaustive studies made of the Federal Convention, and it is now for the first time possible to study it at first hand.[2]

This long delay in the publication of the essential records of the Convention needs explanation. The official secretary of the Convention deposited his papers with Washington, who had then turned them over to

[1]Somewhat in the nature of an introduction to the work is an elaborate article by the editor under the title, "The Records of the Federal Convention," *American Historical Review,* October, 1907, 13: 44–65.—The "Introduction" prefixed to Volume I is apparently an epitome of the earlier article.

"Unless some inconsiderate person unearths some new scrap of authentic material, these volumes will remain the complete and be the definitive edition of the Convention's Records."—A. C. McLaughlin, *American Historical Review,* July, 1911, 16: 829.

The "inconsiderate person" was quickly in evidence. Gaillard Hunt describes two papers acquired by the Library of Congress, subsequent to the publication of the *Records.* They were a part of Madison's notes but had become separated from the body of his material and had passed to the auction room. They concerned the work of George Mason in the Convention, especially his views concerning the method of electing members of the upper house.—G. Hunt in *The Nation,* August 24, 1911, 93: 162–163.

The discovery is cited as an encouraging indication that hope of finding additional material on the history of the Federal Convention need not yet be abandoned, though not as encouraging the hope that any new material will modify the conclusions reached by Mr. Farrand.

[2]Other important works must be noted, especially that of W. M. Meigs. In *The Growth of the Constitution in the Federal Convention of 1787,* he considers seriatim the discussion of every article, section, and clause as it passed through the Convention.

the Department of State, and it was not until 1818 that Congress by resolution ordered their publication. The task of editing them was entrusted to John Quincy Adams, as Secretary of State. He found it an extremely difficult one since the papers were "no better than the daily minutes from which the regular journal ought to have been, but never was, made out." But with the help of others who could supply him with important documents, he was able to rescue from "their disorderly state" the records of the secretary and "with all these papers suitably arranged, a correct and tolerably clear view of the proceedings of the Convention (might) be presented." The volume was printed in 1819,—with the mistakes inevitable when the editing had necessarily been done without compass or chart.

It is always an agreeable task to write history in "the past potential subjunctive" and in this matter it is especially easy to realize how much more dependable would be our knowledge of the Convention had its official secretary, "a Major Jackson," as described by Madison, been selected for his fitness for the post rather than through political influence;[1] had he not "burned all the loose scraps of paper which belong [ed] to the Convention; had the minutes been written out at once; and had the journal been published immediately,—as late as 1799 Madison questioned the expediency of doing it even then. As it is, it seems remarkable that even John Quincy

[1]Why anyone should wish the office "of so short duration, and merely honorary" Mason at least did not understand; so he wrote prior to the Convention, but he adds that it is "*possibly* introductory to something more substantial." What this was seems evident from J. Q. Adams' *Memoirs*. When Adams began editing the papers of the Convention, he asked Jackson if he could explain their disorderly condition. Jackson apparently had no interest in the matter, though stating that he had taken extensive minutes of the debates but had promised Washington that they should not be published during his own life, "which he supposed had been a loss to him of many thousand dollars."—For the correspondence see Max Farrand, *Records*, III, 24, 426.

Adams was able to do as well as he did. It is at least a matter for congratulation that Major Jackson did not add still greater confusion by adopting the advice of Timothy Pickering who, forty years after the adjournment of the Convention, urged him to prepare "those speeches in the General Convention which formed the Constitution of the U. States, of which you took abbreviated notes, and which yourself alone can write out at full length."

There were other regrettable delays, and these too need explanation. A long period elapsed before the publication of the notes of the debates taken by Madison, "evidently regarded by his fellow-delegates to the Convention as a semi-official reporter of their proceedings." He had been frequently urged to publish them, but before all else he was cautious, and he naturally demurred. In 1799, he had felt that it was "a problem what turn might be given to the impression on the public mind" were the official records to be published. In 1821, in a confidential letter to Thomas Ritchie he acknowledged the truth of the general belief that he had "materials for a pretty ample view of what passed in that Assembly," and that he had not intended that "they should for ever remain under the veil of secrecy," but "of the time when it might be not improper for them to see the light" he "had formed no particular determination." In general it had appeared to him "that it might be best to let the work be a posthumous one," that at least "its publication should be delayed till the Constitution should be well settled by practice, & till a knowledge of the controversial part of the proceedings of its framers could be turned to no improper account." These, with many other fine-spun reasons, seemed to him to justify the postponement of the publication, but it is his

purpose, he writes, to arrange his material and when that is done, he will be better able to decide on the question of publication. But even in 1827, he still felt that the publication of what he had preserved might be "most delicate" and that it should be deferred until "the living obstacles" should be removed,—"of the lamps still burning, none can now be far from the Socket." His own lamp burned out in 1836 and four years later his *Papers* were published.

The excessive caution of Madison had seemed to him warranted by the conditions of his time, but to-day the delay of more than fifty years in the appearance of his material seems much to be regretted. Not only had this delay given opportunity for a lessening interest in the affairs of the Convention, but Max Farrand has shown the weak spots in the report of Madison as published. Through a comparison of the official records published in 1819 with the Madison *Papers,* he makes it evident that after this record was made available, Madison corrected his own report by it, and thus was sometimes led into error. It was a time of little knowledge of textual criticism and presumably of even less general interest in it. Madison accepted the *Journal* as authoritative and thereby detracted somewhat from the value of his own more carefully kept reports; the value of the *Journal* would assuredly have been greater had the secretary of the Convention been better qualified for his position, and Madison's account would probably have had greater value had he had more confidence in his own version and less in that of the official secretary. But even so, with the publication of the Madison *Papers*—"more than half of this work was given over to his notes of the debates in the Federal Convention"—"at once all other records paled into insignificance."

There are thus available for the study of the origin of the Federal Constitution several different classes of contemporaneous material. To follow somewhat the classification of Max Farrand they are first, the official record of the Convention; second, the unofficial report of Madison; third, the notes of members, other than Madison, taken during the Convention but published subsequently; fourth, supplementary material; fifth, the documents of the Committee of Detail; sixth, the drafts of the Constitution printed for the use of the delegates when the work of the Convention was practically finished; and seventh, the work known collectively as Elliot's *Debates,*—which was not published in complete form until during the years from 1827 to 1845, but, "in spite of its imperfections, (it) is the great storehouse of American constitutional history. It is almost impossible to exaggerate its importance."

Of these classes only the third and the fourth need additional explanation. The third class,—notes of members, excluding those of Madison, who may justly be considered in a class by himself,—comprises those taken by Robert Yates, Rufus King, James McHenry, William Pierce, William Patterson, Alexander Hamilton, Charles Pinckney, and George Mason. The value of these notes considered collectively is well stated by Max Farrand when he says: "In view of the fact that the *Journal* is so imperfect and not altogether reliable, and that Madison made so many changes in his manuscript, all other records of the Convention take on a new importance. Formerly they have been regarded only in so far as they might supplement our information; now it is seen that they may be of service also in determining what the action really was in doubtful cases."

Individually, these notes of members may be fairly

well illustrated by referring to those of two of them. Robert Yates was a member from New York and, with his colleague, John Lansing, Jr., left the Convention because he felt that in view of his instructions he could not continue his attendance. His credentials definitely stated that the delegates from New York were appointed "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation." When, therefore, the Convention deliberately put aside the Articles and framed a constitution *de novo* he withdrew. This withdrawal and his pamphlet entitled *Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Convention,* published in Albany in 1821, probably explain his opposition in the State Convention of New York to the ratification of the Federal Constitution.[1] William Pierce was a delegate from Georgia. His somewhat informal notes remain; a part is in manuscript, a part was published in the *Savannah Georgian* in 1828, and a letter giving his general impressions of the Convention was printed in the *Georgia Gazette* in 1788. In the main, the *Notes* are less an account of the work of the Convention than a characterization of the appearance and the personality of the various delegates to it.

A fourth class of contemporary documents has been called by Max Farrand "supplementary material." A collection of this could not be made exhaustive, he explains, "without covering practically all of the material, printed and unprinted, on American history since 1787." But he has selected from "the more obvious and acces-

[1]An original copy of *The Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York assembled at Poughkeepsie on 17th June, 1788,* is in the Adriance Memorial Library, Poughkeepsie, New York, and a facsimile reprint was issued by Vassar Brothers Institute in 1905. From this it does not appear that Yates took part in the debates in the State Convention but he consistently voted against ratification by New York. His colleague, John Lansing, Jr., who also withdrew from the Philadelphia Convention, frequently took part in the State Convention and also voted against ratification.

sible sources" such material as has an immediate bearing on the subject since this "throws not a little light upon the work of the Convention, and in particular upon the parts taken by individual delegates, and upon opinions and personalities." The enormous amount now available fills nearly the entire third volume of the *Records* and is in itself indicative of the indebtedness of students to the keen insight and tireless activity of the editor.

Other forms of important supplementary material have been included in an elaborate series of papers by J. F. Jameson called collectively, "Studies in the History of the Federal Convention of 1787." Specially noteworthy was the skill shown in reconstructing the draft presented by Charles Pinckney,—a reconstruction confirmed by the subsequent discovery of a large part of the original text of his long-lost plan.

It is also possible to class as supplementary material the important bibliographical work of P. L. Ford. This includes an invaluable *Bibliography and Reference List of the History and Literature relating to the Adoption of the Constitution of the United States,* 1787–8. It contains one hundred and forty-one titles of works contemporary in origin, though a few were not published until some years after the formation of the Constitution. It also contains lists of histories of the Constitution; printed documentary sources; a list of seventy-six contemporaneous newspapers, published in all the thirteen states, that discussed the Constitution; lists of drafts and plans presented or proposed; a bibliography of the biographies of the members attending the Convention; lists of contemporaneous partisan pamphlets for and against the Constitution; together with a bibliography of the contests over ratification carried on in all the states, and

a list of the accounts of the celebrations held in honor of the ratification.

This elaborate bibliography and reference list of sixty-one pages ought in itself alone to settle definitely the inspirational theory of the origin of the Constitution, but the work is continued by *A List of the Members of the Federal Convention of 1787*. In this, the author was able not only to extend the list of members as it had been previously given, but also to add much valuable information in regard to their attitude towards the Constitution and its ratification. Still other important contributions to the subject were made by Mr. Ford in his *Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, Published during its Discussion by the People 1787–1788;* and a volume of *Essays on the Constitution of the United States, Published during its Discussion by the People,* 1787–1788. These essays were written by prominent citizens and appeared in the newspapers during and soon after the meeting of the Philadelphia Convention.

All of this invaluable bibliographical material gives a substantial, impressive foundation for such a study of the Constitution as must controvert all the off-hand hypotheses assumed in regard to its origin. But this is only the beginning of the material which is now available. New and carefully edited editions of the works of Franklin, Hamilton, Jay, King, Madison, Mason, G. Morris, and Washington have placed in the hands of all who wish enlightenment authoritative collections of the papers of men who took a leading part in the Convention.

Madison was apparently the guiding spirit of the Convention and it is interesting to know that as soon as he realized that the disintegration of the Articles of Confederation was inevitable, he wrote Jefferson, then

in France, and gave him carte blanche to purchase for him "whatever may throw light on the general constitution and droit publique of the several confederacies which have existed,"[1]—he has observed in a catalogue "several pieces on the Dutch, the German, and the Helvetic." Thus with the help of Jefferson and a study of catalogues, Madison brought together a remarkable collection of material on the history of federal government, "probably the most complete in the country at that time," since his library contained all the great classics on government and politics, as well as the important works of the current year and works in all languages. From this material, in preparation for the Philadelphia Convention, "he drew up a careful analysis of the constitution of the Lycian League, the Achaean League, Amphictyonic Council, Swiss Confederation, Germanic Empire, and the United Netherlands." In his very careful study of Madison's library, E. G. Bourne has shown not only the special use Madison made of this material for the Convention itself, but also how much he drew upon it in the subsequent struggle to secure the ratification of the Constitution by the States. Thus for Madison, "all his study of the history of Federal government confirmed his diagnosis of the existing evils. Permanent peace, prosperity, and development could not be obtained under any type of confederacy known to history."

The profound and exhaustive studies made by Madison alone seem effectively to dispose of the Gladstonian "special creation" theory of the origin of the Federal Constitution, as well as of the providential origin theories.

[1]E. G. Bourne, "The Use of History Made by the Framers of the Constitution," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1896*, I, 221–230.

Subsequent citations on Madison's library are from the same source.

The English, the Germanic, and the Dutch origin of the Constitution have seemed at first blush to have a more solid foundation, but these have in turn been shown to be scarcely less specious than the inspirational and special creation theories. All alike have been overthrown by the careful studies made by scholars of the document itself and of the history of the colonies before its adoption, and by the development of other branches of knowledge.

One explanation of its progressive origin may be found in the influence on all thought of the modern theory of evolution. The interest in the study of evolution in the world of nature has led to the study of developments in all other fields. Applying this to the study of the Constitution and to the conditions under which it was developed, at least three natural sources for it can be found. In the Convention and in the discussion of the ratification by the States, Madison had been unalterably opposed to the idea of a confederacy, since his study of the history of every European confederacy known had shown him that all had fallen a prey to dissension and disintegration, that their evils were obvious, and that these evils were irremediable.

But an additional reason was at hand for rejecting every plan of union based on the confederate idea. This was that in America itself the confederate idea had been in operation, in one form or another, for nearly a hundred and fifty years and that during all this period the tendency had, probably unconsciously but none the less surely and inevitably, been away from a confederacy and in the direction of "a still more perfect union." In the very beginning the colonies along the Atlantic Coast were confronted by "a situation, not a theory." This was the fact of their isolation in the new world, far removed

from the mother country, and their consequent danger from foreign foes and from the Indians. This led them to draw more closely together and to form one after another a series of brief, imperfect, sometimes only theoretical unions, that have collectively been called "early impulses to national unity."

These "impulses," however, took on very concrete forms. As early as 1643, scarcely more than twenty years after the first New England colony had been settled, four of the eight New England colonies united to form the New England Confederation that lasted in effect for twenty, and in name for forty, years. The immediate occasion for its formation was, in the words of the document itself, that "whereas by our settling, by a wise providence of God, we are further dispersed upon the sea coasts and rivers than was at first intended, so that we can not, according to our desire, with convenience communicate in one government and jurisdiction: and whereas we live encompassed with people of several nations and strange languages, which hereafter may prove injurious to us or our posterity; and for as much as the natives have formerly committed sundry insolences and outrages upon several plantations of the English, and have of late combined themselves against us, and seeing by reason of the sad distractions in England, (which they have heard of), and by which they know we are hindered both from that humble way of seeking advice, and reaping those comfortable fruits of protection, which at other times we might well expect; we therefore do conceive it our bounden duty, without delay, to enter into a present consociation amongst ourselves for mutual help and strength in all future concernments." Thus was formed the association of Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven,

known by those forming it as the United Colonies of New England. But it is significant that the union was incomplete, since the other four New England colonies were not invited to join it. Governor Winthrop of Massachusetts Bay explained that the jurisdictions of Sir Ferdinando Gorges beyond the Pascataqua "were not received nor called into the confederation, because they ran a different course from us both in their ministry and civil administration; for they had lately made Agamenticus (a poor village) a corporation, and had made a taylor their mayor, and had entertained one Hull, an excommunicated person and very contentious, for their minister." As for the Providence Plantations and Rhode Island, Governor Bradford of Plymouth had already written Governor Bellingham of Massachusetts, "Concerning the Islanders, we have no conversing with them, nor desire to have, further than necessity or humanity may require."

The New England Confederation thus took shape consisting of four small colonies, similar, though not identical, in their political and ecclesiastical organization. An analysis of the Articles that cemented this union shows very clearly that both the confederate and the national ideas were found in them, but the confederate idea occupied the foreground; it was an inorganic union with only the germs of nationality present. Every precaution was taken to prevent any colony from having any advantage over any other—the meeting place of the Commissioners was to be migratory; the chairman of the meeting was to be selected by the Commissioners, but was to be "invested with no such power or respect, as by which he shall hinder the propounding or progress of any business, or in any way cast the scales otherwise than in the preceding article is agreed"; the local government

of each colony was to be preserved; colonial boundary lines were to remain unchanged; two colonies were not to unite without the consent of the others; the colonies were to have equal representation, irrespective of size, population, or wealth, though the burdens of war, both in men and in expense were to be borne proportionately, not equally; there was to be no executive head and no judicial department, and fugitives from service and from justice were to be delivered up under carefully regulated provisions. The Confederacy was a purely defensive alliance, and scarcely even a grudging recognition was given of their mutual concerns apart from this single idea of defense. It served a temporary purpose, it inevitably languished, and it finally disintegrated with the union of Connecticut and New Haven under a common charter.

But the New England Confederation had in the very fact of its formation made a distinct contribution to the future formation of the more perfect union. Penn's Plan of Union in 1697, although a union on paper only, was a definite advance over its predecessor. It had a constructive purpose,—it was to be formed that it "may be made more useful both to the Crowne and one another's peace and safety with an universall concurrence," and one of the specific ways named for accomplishing this was "to prevent or cure injuries in point of commerce." It was to be a union of all the colonies, not of an exclusive few; it provided for the germ of an executive department in the person of the King's Commissioner, and since he would probably be the Governor of New York, New York was, for that reason as well as for its central location, suggested as the permanent meeting place.

Penn's Plan of Union was similar to the New England

Confederation in that it provided for a legislative department of one house, for equal representation of all the colonies, for annual meetings of the legislature, and for the return of fugitives from justice. It was to be a union still based on the confederate idea, but the germs of nationality were beginning to show life. The Plan existed only on paper, but it represents a definite development over the New England Confederation. It was followed by several other plans suggested both by the colonies and by England "looking toward some kind of a defensive union among the English colonies against the aggressions of the French," but the only one that was constructively worked out was the Albany Plan of 1754, largely formulated by Franklin.

The Albany Plan in turn marked a still greater development in political thought over that of its predecessors. It provided for a Grand Council to be chosen by the legislatures of the several colonies, the number from each to range from two to seven and to be determined by the proportion of the contribution made to the general treasury by each colony. The term of office was fixed at three years, sessions were to be held annually, and the members were to receive a stated per diem wage and also mileage. A genuine executive department was constituted with a President-General, appointed by the Crown, whose assent to all acts of the Grand Council was necessary and who was to execute all laws. The President-General, with the advice of the Grand Council, was to have power to make treaties with the Indians, to declare war against them, to make peace with them, and to purchase land from them; to make and to govern new settlements; to raise and equip troops; to levy taxes; and to make appropriations.

It is at once apparent that the Albany Plan provided

for a genuine union of all the colonies, with a legislative department having enlarged constructive powers, and for an independent executive also having expanding constructive powers, while the local colonial element was duly recognized and maintained. The Albany Plan records still a conflict between the principles of nationality and of confederation, but the contest was turning in favor of nationality. But unhappily, the plan, while accepted by all the members of the Albany Conference, was voted down by every colonial assembly, in some, without even being discussed. It was opposed by some because the President-General was to be appointed by the Crown and was given so much authority. The Board of Trade on its part sent it to the King without recommendation and thereby rejected it; probably it disapproved the extensive powers proposed for the legislative body of the united colonies,—Franklin himself had said that the plan was not altogether to his mind. Later, after talking it over with Governor Shirley of Massachusetts, his conclusion was that "the different and contrary reasons of dislike to my plan make me suspect that it was really the true medium; and I am still of opinion it would have been happy for both sides the water if it had been adopted." Both the colonies and England were clearly afraid to take a step in advance and thereby endanger the position already held.

The Stamp Act Congress of 1765 formulated no plan for a permanent theoretical union, but, in the very act of assembling, it achieved an actual temporary union. The tendencies towards a union of all the colonies were slowly maturing. The idea had been given actual concrete form in the New England Confederation and it had grown with every succeeding plan of union proposed. It had been fostered by a common nationality, common

traditions, political institutions, and literature; by distance from England and by the exclusion of France from the continent; and by the common dangers from the Indians and the French. But mutual jealousies and lack of a common cause held the balance even between the tendencies towards and away from permanent union,—the separation from England finally turned the scale in favor of union.

But the question then arose, Under which flag, confederacy or nationality? For there was no thought of continuing a separate independent existence on the part of the thirteen colonies. At the very time that the Continental Congress appointed a committee to report concerning the advisability of recommending independence from England, it also appointed another committee to present a plan of union to be considered if the decision for separation was made. The Articles of Confederation were the result of the deliberations of this second committee. The character of the document is indicated by its name. In spite of a very obvious advance over previous forms of union that had been carried into effect or proposed, the Articles of Confederation were destined to be the last plan as yet made in this country that embraced all the States, and that was founded on the confederate idea. The States endured them impatiently for a brief period and then discarded them for the Constitution that embodied the progressive idea of nationality.

Was the Constitution "struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man?" Assuredly not! For a century and a half, the colonies had experimented with the opposing principles of confederacy and of nationality, and the result alike of experiment, theory, and conditions had ultimately been in favor of nationality.

But experience in union had not been the only influ-

ence at work that had determined the nature of the Constitution. Out of the charters under which the colonies had been settled, the colonists had worked out their local governments that were adapted to their own special needs, even their own special whims. When the separation from England was effected, the Continental Congress recommended to the colonies that they should form state constitutions,—a simple matter since the charters were at hand and with a few verbal changes they blossomed out into ready-to-wear state constitutions. When the Federal Constitution was under consideration in the Philadelphia Convention, all the thirteen states had their own individual constitutions, comprising legislative, executive, and judicial departments. Their local legislative bodies might have one or two houses, these houses might bear any name the particular State chose to give, the members might be elected in any way agreeable to the State, and have any length of term, as well as any qualifications deemed suitable, and also be assigned such special or collective functions as seemed desirable to the citizens. The chief state executive might be a governor, a president, or a president and an executive council; he might have a term of one, two, or three years; he might be chosen by direct or indirect election; and his powers were such as the States chose to give him. In a similar way the judicial department in each state was such as the State had chosen for itself. The States had also had their own bills of rights; in eleven, freedom of religion had been guaranteed; in nine, freedom of the press; in seven, freedom of the right of petition; in five, freedom from quartering of troops; each and every personal right guaranteed had presumably grown out of some conspicuous violation of that right in the past, or from some insistent advocacy of it.

All of these provisions of the state constitutions found in 1787 had been matters of evolution,—they had grown out of the early charters granted by the Crown to the chartered companies. Since these were intermediary steps in the development of the constitution, it is necessary to consider them briefly, especially the relations between the chartered companies and the settlers who came out under their auspices.

The theory of the ownership of newly discovered or conquered territory has always been a simple one,—it belongs to the Crown to be disposed of according to his own best judgment. But the difficulties of administering remote lands by the king in person have been insuperable, and since the early years of the seventeenth century a general process of development has been followed.

The first stage has been the exaggerated reports of the wealth of the country brought back by the first discoverers and adventurers,—reports industriously circulated by friends and neighbors, reproduced in current drama and poem and finally reaching fabulous proportions.

It is but natural that the second step has been the formation of a stock company to exploit the new lands. Since the king himself has been unable to take immediate advantage of the reputed wealth laid at his feet, he has given an attentive ear to those who have asked the privilege of exploiting the new fields in his name. Thus the chartered company has been formed,—a small group of men have subscribed stock and received a general charter of incorporation from the crown. The charter has secured certain privileges to the authority granting it, while conferring still greater ones on those receiving it. Thus have been formed all the great chartered companies of the past three hundred years. Nor has this manner of developing a new country been

peculiar to any one nation. England, Holland, France, and Denmark, all chartered companies to trade with the East Indies during the seventeenth century. The English Crown chartered the London Company with a dual organization entitling it to trade in Virginia and in Plymouth; the States of Holland chartered the Dutch West India Company to trade in America; Sweden incorporated the South Company to develop its possessions on the Delaware; Spain granted the Chartered Company of Seville a monopoly of the American trade. Country after country has begun in a similar way the development of its newly acquired lands. Trade has come first, but settlements have followed hard in the wake.

The objects of the colonists sent out under the chartered companies were various,—they came for religious freedom, or for political freedom, or for personal wealth, or to escape from adverse economic or social conditions at home. But the object of the chartered company has everywhere and at all times, irrespective of time, place, or nationality, been the same,—it has been to seek wealth for itself primarily through trade, while the settlement of the territory has been a secondary consideration.

The Chartered Company, with trade as its primary object, has not concerned itself too closely with the character of the colonists settling under its protection and it has cared little about the objects that have led the colonists to seek a new home. It has sent out vagrants, debtors and criminals, as well as political refugees and religious zealots; it has encouraged gentlemen of leisure and others of no occupation, as well as men skilled in various forms of industry. Is it strange that the Chartered Company has never been successful as a colonizer?

Yet we must remember the difficulties that have beset

the Chartered Company. Its task has been a twofold one. It has had in the first place to secure as many privileges for itself as could be wrested from the Crown. These have generally concerned the right of governing the colony, freedom of trade, a definitely stated share of the mineral wealth of the colony, and similar privileges.

But the task of the Chartered Company was but half accomplished when it had secured a definite statement under the great seal of its own relation to the Crown. There remained the even harder task of arranging the inducement to be held out to prospective colonists. In some cases, as in Virginia, settlers were induced to come out through the offer of passage money to be redeemed by service. Others, as in Plymouth, were offered a part of the proceeds of the venture. The Georgia Company promised freedom from past debts. Massachusetts Bay held out the promise of freedom from the forms of religious worship established in England. The Dutch West India Company offered large tracts of land. But in every case the Company reserved for itself directly, and for the Crown indirectly, the internal and external management of the colony established under its patronage.

The colony might, as in Virginia, elect representatives to a colonial assembly, but it was the Chartered Company that gave the privilege. It might choose its own executive officers, but this favor was due to the Chartered Company. If religious freedom was assured, it was at the hand of the Company. If the "concessions and agreements" virtually gave to the colonists the absolute right of self-government, it was the result of a self-denying ordinance on the part of the body standing as an intermediary between the Crown and the colonists. Thus it was to a chartered trading company that Virginia and

New England had been granted; Maryland, the Carolinas, and Pennsylvania had served to balance her cash account with various English capitalists; New York and New Jersey had been won from her most formidable rival. Feudalism was resuscitated and given a new lease of life in the proprietary grants of Maryland and Pennsylvania; absolutism set its mark on the early royal provincial governments of Virginia and the Carolinas, while the principles of the purest democracy received sanction within limited circles in New England. The instincts of the colonists brought order out of the political chaos and made in each State something of a miniature copy of the English government. Theories yielded to the necessities of practical conditions and inherited traditions proved stronger than abstract plans.

It was assuredly to the credit of the members of the Philadelphia Convention that they did not undertake the creation of a new constitution, as the French were attempting to do at practically the same time, but that they took the material at hand and made an application of it to the enlarging conditions of the new nation. This material was, as has been seen, their own experiences in forming their own colonial governments under the provisions of the colonial charters granted them and the transformation of these colonial governments into state governments, when they acted on the advice given them by the Continental Congress; the tentative plans of union that covered nearly one hundred and fifty years prior to the meeting of the Philadelphia Convention; and their general familiarity with the English Constitution and English political procedure. These three lines of development converged in 1787 and the Federal Constitution resulted. If into that document there went the experience of European countries that had experimented

with the confederate idea as that idea had filtered to the Convention through Madison's studies made in preparation for its convening; if some acquaintance with French political theories and French political philosophy had permeated the Convention through the correspondence of Jefferson, then representing the country in France, with Madison, the guiding genius of the Convention; if a brief residence in Holland of five score Pilgrims had introduced them to political methods and customs foreign to English habits—all of these exotic conditions and theories were but as a perfume that permeated the document but in no way affected its fundamental nature, modified its stature, or changed materially its tendencies. In the reasoned words of George William Curtis, "Our Constitution is not an inspiration but an application."

CHAPTER X

EXTENSION OF THE AUDIENCE FOR WHOM HISTORY IS WRITTEN

It has been seen that history must be rewritten because the base on which it was written has been widely extended in every direction and because the methods employed have also been widely extended. It must also be rewritten for reasons that concern the presentation of the results of historical research. Colonel Higginson tells us that it has always seemed to him creditable to the brains of children that they dislike what is called the study of history. "The father," he goes on to say, "brings home to his little son, from the public library, the first volume of Hildreth's United States, and says to him, 'There, my son, is a book for you, and there are five more volumes just like it.' Then he goes back to his *Sunday Herald,* and his wife reverts to *But Yet A Woman,* or *Mr. Isaacs.*" If once there was apparently little recognition of the varying degrees of maturity in those who read history, such recognition is coming to be given. Moreover, history cannot be written on the same scale for all readers of the same maturity. Not only is it rewritten to adapt its form to the maturity or the immaturity of the reader, but the diverse objects of those who use histories must be differentiated. To the general reader, history may be a pleasing form of literature, and he resents having his attention distracted from the story of the past by the intrusion of the machinery with which it was constructed. But to the student and the investigator, the processes of construction are often of more intrinsic interest than are the results

secured through them. If the general reader is repelled by bibliographies, footnotes, charts, diagrams, graphs, genealogical tables, and appendices, the student seizes with avidity on all these evidences of mines of information that he hopes himself to investigate,—the treasures already found are of less interest than those as yet undiscovered, and he welcomes the guide-posts set up by the advance guard of explorers. The historian has come to recognize the right of each class to have its claims considered and he rewrites history to meet these reasonable variations of desire.

There has also been a long-standing controversy, as has been seen, between the two schools of the so-called literary and the scientific historians, and its ghost has not yet been definitely laid. The literary historian scorns histories so dull that they can be read "only by the author and the proof-reader," while the scientific historian professes contempt for all historians who cultivate the graces of literature. Yet there can assuredly be no incompatibility between the scientific process by which the records of history are collected, collated, and interpreted, and the presentation of these results of scientific research in artistic literary form. It is sometimes said that science is analytic and art synthetic and hence the two are mutually exclusive; it may be more true to say that they are mutually complementary, and that in history at least, the scientific investigator has but half fulfilled his task if he does not clothe his conclusions in attractive garb; the historian whose attention is concentrated on form rather than on matter has built his house before laying its foundation. But if the old controversy has not been finally settled, there has been at least a lull in the strife. History is to-day being rewritten to no inconsiderable extent because growing importance is

being attached not only to reasonable processes of investigation but also to the attractiveness in which the results are set forth.

But if it is true that history is being rewritten because the literary form of history was but recently too much ignored, it is also true that there has been an equal reaction against the perverted taste that led historians to dress their facts with distracting embellishments of thought and of expression. The various revisions of Bancroft's *History of the United States* show the elimination of irrelevant ethical judgments and a general recasting of a too emphatic phraseology. But the extreme difficulty, even the impossibility of an historian's reconstructing his own work, once the ground plan has been marked out and the foundations laid, renders it necessary for others to rewrite the history even of periods that have been most exhaustively treated by previous authors. Every history must be rewritten that leaves the impression that the frame has been deemed of greater importance than the picture. The growing spirit of honesty in business, independence in politics, tolerance in religion, love of fair play, and "the square deal," are all evidences of a general intellectual tolerance that demands the rewriting of history. Excesses of praise and of condemnation are no longer brooked, and every historian who has indulged himself in giving vent to uncalled-for censure or laudation must pay the penalty of having his work done over by those who write with caution, circumspection, and love of truth.

The manner of presenting the results of historical investigation therefore necessitates the rewriting of history, involving as it does a recognition of the varying purposes to be served in writing history, a growing appreciation of the desirability and the possibility of

giving an artistic literary form to the results of scientific investigation, an improvement in taste that demands fitness of form and harmony between the matter and the manner of historical writing, and an intellectual tolerance that condemns every form of unreasonable expression.

It may be felt at this point that the end of the discussion has been reached, since it must be understood that the historian must select authoritative material from every source available and present his conclusions in intelligible, attractive, literary form, and both in selection of material and in presentation of results never consciously deviate from absolute truth. But the matter is not so simple. It does not go without saying that the historian is restricted to the literary form alone for presenting his conclusions. The use to-day of other media besides the printed page indicates, what is often forgotten, that the historian has, as he has always had, a wide range of media from which to select an appropriate one for writing the history contemplated.

This choice was, in a simple unorganized society, an easy one. The historian was the itinerant chronicler who sang of the heroic deeds of individuals and the human voice was the first medium used in transferring from one generation to another the records of the past. It may to-day be said that it goes without saying that the choice will be the medium of the printed page, but only since the invention of printing has this choice been open at all. Different media have, both before and since, developed in infinite variety and the historian has had not only the choice of paper of every form to be used for manuscript or printing; stone and chisel, canvas and brush, shuttle and loom, clay and wheel, thread and bobbin, needle and cloth, have all been used in depicting the past. It is diffi-

cult to conceive of a medium that has not at one time or another been used for this purpose. Every new medium of expression that was introduced was the means of enlarging the audience for whom history was written. The invention of printing has in time enormously multiplied this audience, as the motion picture to-day has in its turn again extended the area over which descriptive history may be portrayed. Most significant of all the means of extending the audience is the invention of the radio that broadcasts to the world the events of the day. Thus the human voice has again become an important medium for reaching a wide audience, and with each extension of audience a somewhat different type of history is called into existence.

The printing press is to-day the most familiar means for spreading abroad written history. But it cannot be said too often, or with too great emphasis, that it must be considered a modern medium for writing history, that with its invention the audience to be reached increased, that with this extension the written history had to be adapted to a new and different type of readers, that the alert human mind is ever seeking still newer means of recounting the events of the present and of the past, and that again inevitably the audience must shift, new points of view be sought, new adaptations made.

The enormous development to-day of mural paintings in public buildings erected either by the state or by private benefactions is one of the significant developments of the time. State capitols, municipal buildings, court houses, public libraries, public schools, college and university halls all record the adaptation to present conditions of a medium as old as man himself. The earliest forms were simple records of the life of primitive man, traced on the walls of caves, rather than connected de-

scriptions of past life. They were thus comparable in a sense with the later records given by the human voice in proclaiming the achievements of an Achilles or a Hector.

But the primitive records of chalk or of voice developed into more elaborate reproductions of the past, and prior to the invention of printing various media, however unfamiliar they may be to us, have at one time or another been as effective as is the printing press to-day in writing history.

Berenson has pointed out that at the time of the Renaissance "people began to feel the need of painting as something that entered into their everyday lives almost as much as we nowadays feel the need of the newspaper; nor was this unnatural, considering that, until the invention of printing, painting was the only way, apart from direct speech, of conveying ideas to the masses." Thus, he continues, painting "was almost as cheap as printing has become since, and almost as much employed."

It was for this reason, but more especially because the Church was the great patron of art that "from the earliest times it employed mosaic and painting to enforce its dogmas and relate its legends, not merely because this was the only means of reaching people who could neither read nor write, but also because it instructed them in a way which, far from leading to critical inquiry, was peculiarly capable of being used as an indirect stimulus to moods of devotion and contrition." The Church then, in instructing the people in biblical history and the dogmas of religion, chose the various media provided by art because it was the only language read and understood by the populace. Before the invention of printing, all history written through manuscript was necessarily

read only by the learned class; all history written through an art medium was an open book to all people, for "the Church itself had educated its children to understand painting as a language."

In a similar way when at various times the State has been the patron of art, it has chosen different subjects for portrayal through art,—subjects that would redound to the glory of the State rather than of the Church or of the individual. "The Venetian State," again says Berenson, "encouraged painting as did the Church, in order to teach its own glory in a way that they [the people] could understand without being led on to critical inquiry." And "just as the State chose subjects that glorified itself and taught its own history and policy," so the Mutual Aid Societies of Venice "had pictures painted to glorify their patron saints, and to keep their deeds and example fresh." So in the Netherlands, the great corporation pieces of Franz Hals and Rembrandt attest the interest of the Dutch cities in perpetuating their municipal glory.

These are but a few illustrations to indicate that art in all its forms,—both the major and the minor arts,—has from the earliest times always been a rival of the written and the printed page in narrating the story of the past.

But again it must be made clear that whatever medium of expression the historian chooses, he has also at his command a wide range of selection in determining his manner of dealing with this material. The historian who commits the results of his work to the printed page and the historian who portrays his conclusions through some form of art may choose a literal method of narration, as illustrated in the early biblical chronicles and the mediaeval annals, or by the bas-reliefs of Trajan's col-

umn. He may, as Motley has done for the Dutch Republic, use a picturesque manner, and Ruth Putnam makes an interesting suggestion connecting the color and picturesque effects of Motley with his keen pleasure in the work of Rubens. In a letter from Motley to Holmes, written from Brussels, November 20, 1853, he expresses the joy he finds in the artist's paintings and he adds, "As for colour, his effects are as sure as those of a sun rising in a tropical landscape. . . . There are a few fine pictures of his here, and I go in sometimes of a raw foggy morning merely to warm myself in the blaze of their beauty." "It looks," Miss Putnam comments, "as though Rubens were one source of Motley's highly colored style, which impressed many of his early reviewers unfavorably." But the historian may, like Carpaccio, write his history through a great series of pageant pictures that extol the glories of the civic power. He may choose the dramatic manner, seizing upon effective incidents and throwing them into high relief. This choice is also open alike to the historian who uses the printed page and to the artist historian. William Roscoe Thayer, Macaulay, and J. R. Green have all at times effectively treated their material in the dramatic manner, as has St. Gaudens in his memorial bronze in honor of Colonel Robert G. Shaw. And the dramatic manner has long been a favorite one with the artist historian. M. Pottier in his *Douris* cites Carl Robert as saying that the Greek vases of the sixth century have the "epic" manner, while those of the group of Douris have a "dramatic" manner,—"they habitually appeal to us by synthetic groupings, which we accurately term in the language of the theatre *tableaux,* and which sum up an entire scene."

The scientific historian is interested in the systematic presentation of facts rather than in the effectiveness of

their presentation. The literary histories of Freeman and Von Ranke find their counterpart in the great corporation pieces that are the pride of The Hague and of Haarlem. No more significant illustration can be found, showing the difference in the point of view of the artist historian than is found in the work of Rembrandt when he uses the scientific method in the *Lesson in Anatomy* and the more dramatic method in the *Syndics of the Cloth Hall.*

The philosophic method of writing history has been in ill repute among historians, probably because so often attempted by those who were not conversant either with history or with philosophy. But the failure of the many is not a denial of its achievement by the few. The historian who gives the results of his work in philosophic form assumes a knowledge of the past on the part of his readers, as does Guizot in his *History of European Civilization,* and he then interprets these events in the light of cause and effect. Kaulbach, in his great series of historical frescoes in Berlin, has portrayed in six scenes the history of the world, and in the selection of leading figures and in their relation to each other he has summed up the causes and the results of great epochs in the world's history.

Symbolism as a method of conveying information may have been coeval with the coming of man! It was for centuries the means employed, especially by the mediaeval Church, for teaching its followers its dogmas and its history. Modern scholarship has in turn shown how large a part symbolism and allegory have played in the transmission to us of the accounts known collectively as the Old and the New Testament. In our own time students of literature are still discussing how far Turgenieff, as the social recorder of Modern Russia, has

symbolized in his leading characters the spirit of unrest, of helplessness, of hope, of ambition, of dependence, of vagueness, and of unreality that characterized Russia in the period preceding the World War. Other students of literature have worked out, as they believe, the symbolism of Ibsen. But the literary historian of to-day, in an age of increasing literacy, and growing political and literary freedom, is not dependent on symbolism as a necessary vehicle of communication with others. The artist historian, however, finds symbolism the most convenient means of bringing together, through the use of any artistic medium, the intangible spirit, the abstract ideas, the controlling principles, that have given life to an epoch. The painter, the sculptor, the worker in stained glass, in mosaic, in bronze, in wood, or in tapestry, have alike written their history in symbolic form. Church and State have each used one and all to convey their interpretations of the past. The frescoes of Ambrogio Lorenzetti in the city hall of Siena portrayed nearly six centuries ago in imaginative allegory the results of good and bad government in city and in town. The long struggle of Italy for independence from Austria that lasted for more than half a century is symbolized in the posture of the four lions at the base of the statue erected in Ravenna in memory of those who gave their lives to win that independence. The irreconcilable differences between the nobility, the clergy, and the third estate, are represented in the positions of the figures symbolizing the three orders in the statue at Grenoble commemorative of the beginnings of the French Revolution. The posture of the noble expresses contempt for the revolution and all that it signified; the priest with raised hand recognizes, but would avert, the coming disaster; the representative of the third estate,

with outstretched hands from which the shackles have fallen, welcomes the future with all of joy, or pain, or sorrow that it may bring.

The column has everywhere been a convenient form by which symbolism has been expressed through art. In Brussels the lofty column erected to commemorate the congress that established the present constitution of Belgium is not only symbolic in its general conception but in its details,—the four figures at the base symbolize the cherished freedom of the press, of education, of association, and of public worship that the congress had secured for Belgium. The July column in Paris symbolizes through its various medallions and figures the gains believed to have been made through the July revolution of 1830. Symbolic statues have represented the concrete idea of a nation, as the Niederwald monument symbolizes the founding of the German empire in 1871; or abstract ideas, as the Statue of Liberty in New York harbor; or the triumph of man over nature, as the pile of granite rocks on which lie the stupefied giants of the mountains symbolizes in Turin the completion of the Mt. Cenis tunnel; or a beneficent force in nature, as the symbolic representation of the River Nile; or a national or a regional type, as the Puritan statue in Springfield, Massachusetts.

State and Church, monarchs and courts, war and peace, every industry, social classes and private individuals have all had their special symbols and through them speak their own language, and this language must be understood by those who would know the teachings of State and Church.

These are necessarily somewhat isolated instances of the similar ways in which both literature and art have dealt with historical records. But art as well as literature

has been used to tell a complete story of the past and this is conspicuously seen in the cycle so familiar in modern German art. The great Charlemagne cycle in the rathhaus of Aachen gives in eight frescoes the story of the renowned emperor of the West; the city hall of Antwerp has its series drawn from the times of Margaret of Parma; Cologne keeps the history of its art and civilization through its cycle in its municipal museum; Weimar in its museum shows the story of Ulysses; while Versailles fills many galleries with the history of the achievements of France from Charlemagne to Louis XVI and Napoleon. The most ambitious of them all is found in Berlin where Kaulbach, in a series of six great frescoes, has related the history of the world as seen in the significant episodes and periods called the "Fall of Babel," the "Golden Age of Greece," "Destruction of Jerusalem," "Battle of the Huns," "Crusaders before Jerusalem," and "Age of the Reformation."

The Berlin frescoes illustrate especially well how much the new conceptions of history have influenced the writing of history through art, especially since the treatment of the Age of the Reformation may be compared with the representation of the same subject through the medium of sculpture and of bas-relief. The Luther monument at Worms, with its figures of the pre-reformers, and leaders in other fields who were identified with the Reformation movement, indicates how admirably sculpture is adapted to the biographical element in history. The numerous accompanying bas-reliefs, tablets, and medallions show how the historical setting necessary in all biography may be given through forms and materials closely allied with sculpture and stone. The monument as a whole, while centering around the heroic bronze statue of Luther, and indicating through its tablets and

reliefs the chief points in Luther's doctrines, shows very clearly that Luther had been anticipated by the forerunners of the Reformation, as by Huss in Bohemia, by Wycliffe in England, by Waldo in France, and by Savonarola in Italy and that thus the Reformation movement had its international aspects. So also the monument makes clear that the Reformation had on one side been developed from the humanistic movement, that literature, teaching, preaching, and business were all coworkers with it, that it had its political and civic side, and its lay as well as its clerical agents.

All of these points are brought out in Kaulbach's great fresco, but this also shows that as the movement spread it grew in force and gathered still other elements into itself. Sculpture in all its forms, from low relief to sculpture in the round, is specially well adapted to the biographical phases of history, while painting as a more flexible medium of expression is better adapted to depicting the history of great movements to which the biographical element is subordinated. Thus in Kaulbach the biographical element is everywhere in the background,—many individuals are represented, but not as individuals. They are everywhere so grouped as to represent the idea of co-operation, mutual aid, and reciprocal influence, and thus they collectively show the development of a great movement. The composition of the various groups both separately and collectively brings out the friendly relations among the groups and thus it also develops the idea of a great historic movement. Through the representation of the pre-reformers, the leaders of the reformation proper, and the peace-makers, the idea of the preparation for the Reformation, the work itself, its consummation, and its aftermath of disunion is clearly seen.

Considering the great forces collectively, the fresco

indicates the universality of the Reformation movement as a whole. It meant not simply a change in religious dogma, but a change that affected politics, art, literature, pure science and applied science. It was international in character and influenced England, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Scandinavia, Spain, and Switzerland. Considered as a purely religious movement, it shows every shade of belief as illustrated in the representations of the Lollards, and the Waldenses; Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli; Zasius, the Catholic; and Cranmer and Elizabeth, the Anglicans. It broke with the Church of its day in the emphasis it placed on belief rather than on works, —Luther holds an open Bible bearing the words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"; the pre-reformers hold each a Bible in his hand, the words of two of Luther's great hymns hang from the choir loft, the parchments in the center represent the Augsburg Confession of 1530, and the Augsburg Religious Peace of 1555, while the figure of Gutenberg symbolizes the dissemination of these ideas.

It is significant, too, to note that the occupations represent government, politics, business, architects, painters, sculptors, workers in metal, and color blenders; poets, dramatists, and the field of general literature and scholarship; workers in the realm of nature, like botanists, physiologists, navigators, and astronomers; soldiers and sailors; theologians and lawyers. The fresco is democratically hospitable in that it includes great monarchs, nobles of high degree, knights and commoners, gentlemen of culture, artists of repute, artisans, and adventurers,—every social class is represented on the canvas.

The spirit of investigation is there. The Church as an organization had represented the spirit of authority, but the new movement, as opposed to this, stood for investi-

gation and research. This is symbolized in Luther's open Bible, in the attitude of Petrarch, Columbus, Copernicus, Queen Elizabeth, and the group of pre-reformers. All the groups represented were not simply passing on a body of recognized truth, but they were themselves hoping through research to add something to the sum total of human knowledge. The only figures that represent ineffective knowledge are those of Balde,—looking backwards and attempting to make the dead past live again; Hans Sachs,—self-contained, self-sufficient, and with his back turned to the world, oblivious of all and everything about him; and Cardanus,—buried in study, with no outlet for his intellectual activities.

The unity inherent in the era is evident in the composition,—all lines in the fresco lead to Luther; and it is evident in its portrayal of that true church which the great German writer, Frank, maintained consisted of "all pious and good-hearted men in all the world, even among the heathen."

The period of the reformation has again been portrayed in Geneva in the statues and bas-reliefs for which a part of the old city wall of Geneva forms an appropriate background. Here the reformation period takes on still different aspects. Its central figures are Farel, Calvin, Beza, and Knox, while the secondary statues are of Coligny, William the Silent, the Great Elector, Cromwell, Bocksay, and Roger Williams,—Luther nowhere appears. The bas-reliefs in turn show the shifting of emphasis from Germany to other countries, and from the religious to secular and political aspects,—as is illustrated in the reliefs depicting John Knox preaching before the court of Mary Queen of Scots, the signing of the Edict of Nantes, the Mayflower Compact, the Union of Utrecht, and the presentation of the Declara-

tion of Rights to William and Mary. The nationalities here center about Calvin and Calvinism as found in England, France, Germany, Scotland, Transylvania, and in the new western world. Calvin in Geneva, like Luther in Germany, while he is the central figure, is but one among other reformers. And the Geneva monument, alone of the three, crosses the ocean in space and enters the future in time, and it alone subordinates theology to the fundamental questions of world-wide, international affairs. Its outlook and its spirit are symbolized in the old device of Geneva, carved conspicuously on the wall of the background—*Post Tenebras Lux.*

These illustrations indicate how it has been possible for the historian who uses art forms as his medium of expression to narrate the history of a great age and also to interpret its spirit,—an interpretation that includes the long preparation for it as well as its far-reaching effects. They have been the conceptions of a single mind and this has been apparently worked out with the utmost fidelity to the truth both in letter and in spirit.

It is also seen that the entrance of the State into the field of art as a competitor with the Church for the transmission of the story of the past has resulted in the extension of the audience that has read history. Where the Church has paid the bills, the Church has had the choice of subject and this has been adapted to the readers whom the Church has desired to influence. When the State has taken an active interest in portraying the past, a different choice of subject or a different interpretation of a familiar subject has resulted.

All the major and the minor arts were called into its service by the Church. In reading from them, however imperfectly on our part, a history of the Church as it was unconsciously written through them it is necessary

to remember that symbolism was the very warp and woof of all the teachings of the Church. All church architecture was symbolic from its foundation plan to its last veriest detail, as has been so clearly shown by Durandus[1]; symbolism prescribed the form and the decoration of the vestments worn by the clergy, as well as all their accessories, from crozier to bishop's ring; and through symbolism all the services and offices of the Church were explained. Thus if the history of the Church is to be read through its multifarious artistic forms, the language of symbolism must be understood.

In all history written through art, the choice of subject has been in large part determined by the patronage of art. If the Church has been the patron, artists have painted for the glory of the Church; if the State has paid the bills, civic and national history have been extolled; if private individuals have given the commissions, personal subjects have been chosen; if patrons have been lacking and artists have depended on their own initiative, subjects have been chosen with a view to their appeal to probable or possible purchasers. Not alone then in the Church has it been possible to reconstruct the history of religious belief and the development of ecclesiastical ceremonial,—secular history and biography may also be reconstructed, though in the same fragmentary manner as church history has been. It is possible to find the history of America worked out in realistic, dramatic, and symbolic sculpture, as also through paintings, pottery, rugs, baskets, quilts, coverlets, samplers, and all forms of domestic art. The whole field of American biography has apparently been covered through portraiture in every medium of expression.

The French Revolution from its inception to the

[1] *The Symbolism of Churches and Church Ornaments.*

death of Napoleon has been a favorite subject of artists for more than a century,—Napoleon the general, Napoleon the Emperor, Napoleon the exile, Napoleon and his last abode in the Hotel des Invalides, Napoleon in caricature, Napoleon and the French Revolution in symbol and satire,—all these suggest the wide range of opportunity improved by friend and foe to blazon admiration and hatred before the world. The many different scenes in the life of Napoleon that have been represented in art clearly indicate that praise and blame have shown no preference for either art or literature as a vehicle of expression.

It may seem that this discussion of history that has both consciously and unconsciously been written through art is foreign to the question, "Why is history rewritten?" But not so! The new history in literature has at every turn been complemented by the new history that has been written through art. Literature and art have kept pace with each other in experimenting with different ways of working out different methods of treating the original records from which all true history must be written. Literature and art have each its own advantages and disadvantages as a method of expression but the ulterior object of each is the same.

This is seen in the changing, expanding interests of men. In Europe, these interests were long confined to the institutions of Church and State and both literature and art found in them, and through them, the field for their endeavors. But men have enlarged their interests and they are now concerned with education, business, industry, commerce, agriculture as partially or practically completely organized institutions. Exploration and discovery are less occupied with new worlds on the superficial surface of the earth than they are with cities buried

beneath the surface of both earth and ocean. From these new interests new branches of knowledge have been correspondingly developed, enlarged, and perfected, and history both in literature and art must in its turn adapt itself to them. Geography and geology, anthropography and anthropology, ethnography and ethnology, archaeography and archaeology have all opened out new fields of knowledge, and history takes cognizance of them. Even daily life takes on new dignity as sentiment in regard to it is disappearing and as emotion is being controlled. History finds its field to-day in the normal healthy activities of human life, not in the exclusive relationships of the favored few. Even more than that, it has found a different objective point. History was once asked the question, "How was it?" and it reported garrulously the small details of the doings of kings and courts. The question then put to history was, "How did it come to be as it is?" This, too, history has attempted to answer. But even this question has not been final. To-day the question is, "What does it all mean?" But history does not attempt to answer the question,—it only carries on with greater persistence and energy than ever before its research into the impenetrable past.

At this point, many historians writing through literature have demurred. It is the function of history, they have replied, to narrate and perhaps to explain, but not to interpret, although they have often been better than their word and have interpreted the past in the very act of denying the possibility and the desirability of doing so. History has made its way slowly in effecting a change in its objective point. If we say that the historians who have written through art have more quickly accepted the change, the statement must be made with reservations. No general statement is ever true, and in

this particular case no data are available from which this conclusion could be deduced. The statement must pass as an expression of personal opinion rather than as a scientifically demonstrable conclusion.

In justification of the conclusion, however, it may be pointed out that the Church used the early art to interpret religious truth through symbolism. This was necessarily simple and self-explanatory. The symbolism of the Middle Ages was largely theological as regards the subjects with which it dealt, and the term "arid" has been aptly applied to it.

But the symbolism of history as represented in art to-day is sometimes extremely complicated and is understandable only after much study and explanation. The remarkable mosaic of Burne-Jones, *The New Jerusalem,* in the American Church in Rome is of supreme interest to artists from the point of view of decoration. But it is also of equal interest to the student of history through its symbolic interpretation of the subject by a great artist endowed with creative imagination. The new symbolism of the new history does not teach dogma as did the symbolism of the older history, but it gives its interpretation of the meaning of life to those ever questioning it. It has been said of Millet that he invoked the help of old traditions of the soil and in depicting toil "he links it to the earth whence it and man sprang together." So Meunier "puts in a transforming light toil that has been held brutalized," and gives new setting to the dramatic intensity of industrial labor. Both Millet and Meunier represent the pleasure that comes to the worker through agriculture and mechanical industry, and depict "an element old as life itself—man laboring and overcoming." "Each strove," it has been said, "to reflect human toil, and to convey a conception of the

dignity of primitive labor." In a similar way, the drawings of the Panama Canal made by Joseph Pennell "represent epic cantos in man's conquest of nature, more heroic and eventful than any in agriculture. Labor, in them, is as clear an evidence of the great primary struggle, and more grimly separable from relieving natural surroundings. It as closely grapples with the raw material of life, while it has a greater admixture of skill and brains." Thus the spirit behind the new representations points out that behind them all is "the healthy impulse to follow life in its ramifications" and it also "points the larger lesson that to cut off, in the division of mankind's pursuits, any considerable body from artistic idealization, is suicidal narrowness."[1]

It has been said that G. F. Watts gave up history for symbolism, but it seems more true to say that he changed his subject from concrete to abstract history and his style from the dramatic to the symbolic. "As early as 1848," says F. J. Mather, "he entertained the scheme of forming a gallery of portraits of his great contemporaries—a purpose inflexibly maintained for more than fifty years." And in this year of revolution, "he planned a comprehensive scheme of decoration to be called 'The House of Life' . . . in which forces, ideals, and abstractions assume human form,"—a scheme which he elaborated in great detail. Had it been possible to carry out this plan, the result might have been to realize his ambition and 'to do for modern thought what Michel Angelo did for theological thought.' " What was this but a plan to write the history of human thought, through the medium of painting, in the symbolic manner? When he gave up what is usually called historical

[1]These points have been suggested by an editorial, "Industrial Labor in Art," *The Evening Post,* January 8, 1914.

composition and found that it was his task "to ascertain the essential ideals of a holy life and to find human forms that might fitly impersonate these ideals," it seems again true to say that Watts did not change his purpose fundamentally but that he changed its direction. He no longer painted human action, but human thought; he did not find his theme in Caractacus and in Alfred, but he planned "a pageant of the progress of civilization, through the ages, to the preaching of Peter the Hermit"; his interests passed from the finite in time and space to the universal. He thus naturally changed also his manner of treating his theme, and in developing his symbolism he discarded the old and created a new symbolism that adequately represented "the elemental human values of his time."[1]

The symbolism of the new history written through art has also been effective in showing the relation between great leaders in the past and future world movements, of which they were themselves necessarily unconscious. William Penn's *Holy Experiment* as portrayed by Violet Oakley in the Pennsylvania State Capitol at Harrisburg was the prophetic realization of the World Court and the League of Nations so earnestly sought to-day.

Quite as significant as the development of symbolism in historical writing has been the change in the relation to history of the subsidiary art of illustration. At first the illustration was purely fanciful and it was used to bait the text. Columbus on the high seas, Drake as he caught his first glimpse of the Pacific, and similar scenes were supposed to lend interest to narrations that writers knew not how to tell except in an uninteresting way. Later the illustration came to be what its name implies,

[1]See F. J. Mather, "Watts and his Art," *Estimates in Art*, pp. 209–237.

a real complement to the text, reinforcing the narration with authoritative accounts written through art forms. To-day the illustration is used as evidence, it is the reproduction through art of original sources that may be the only basis of conclusions drawn, and it is subjected to the same tests for authenticity and authoritativeness as are other primary sources. No more interesting illustration of this and similar changes is found than in J. L. Motley's great work on the history of the Netherlands. Not only are no illustrations used, but even documents that are essential for a thorough understanding of the period are omitted. The text of the great Union of Utrecht is paraphrased, though sections of the document itself need not have occupied more space and their use would have averted the confusion inevitable in the paraphrase. The author relies entirely on his own brilliant portrayal of the past to arouse and hold an interest in the heroic struggles of the Dutch to free themselves from foreign domination.

In striking contrast to this form of writing history is Ruth Putnam's *William the Silent,* covering in elaborate biographical form a large part of the period treated by Motley. Not only footnotes, annotated bibliography, and appendices successfully meet at every turn the challenge, "How do you know?" but a wealth of illustrations drawn from contemporary prints, engravings, etchings, medals, paintings, and maps, gives as nothing else could do a vivid realization of how the great contest was regarded in its own time. An allegorical representation of the coming of the Prince of Orange, from an engraving of 1572, gives an invaluable insight into the place held by him in the confidence and affection of the people; it is also an interesting record of the contemporary familiarity with classical literature and mythology

and its ready adaptation to their own conditions. Motley, forty years earlier, it may be assumed, would not have dreamed of using this invaluable class of records, especially in the printed results of his work. Yet nothing so unmistakably shows the spirit and temper of a people as do authoritative graphic representations of every form. Their almost universal use to-day gives an important explanation of the reason for rewriting history.

It remains to consider briefly the advantages and the limitations of art forms in the presentation of the results of historical research. Some of them are common to both art and literature. Both are subject to the temptation to deviate somewhat from the strict truth in the effort to plead a cause, to make a story interesting, to achieve a momentary popularity. Those writers who yield to the temptation can assuredly not be classed as historians, though there is still misapprehension on that score. Sir John Robert Seeley has said that he was often told by those questioning how history should be taught, "Oh, you must before all things make it interesting!" "Make history interesting indeed!" he replied. "I cannot make history more interesting than it is, except by falsifying it. And therefore when I meet a person who does not find history interesting, it does not occur to me to alter history,—I try to alter *him*." It is possible that the artist historian more often yields to the temptation, though unconscious that it is a temptation, than does the historian who writes through literature. Art has clearly defined standards to which artists are definitely held. Artists must familiarize themselves with the technique of art as a mode of expression, though they may not always be experts in the technique of historical research. The unity demanded by artistic composition, the lights and shades secured through color, the use of line and

form to secure artistic effects,—all may from the point of view of the artist seem to him to justify the deviation from strict truth. He may indeed defend himself on the score that he has conformed to strict artistic truth, though not absolutely to historic truth. The historian who writes through literature sometimes states that he has made these deviations and offers a similar defense, though with less justification. The moving picture and the historical novel both have an historical motif, but it is probably seldom that either picture or novel can be classified as art or as history.

These differences between the history written by the historian who writes through literature and the historian who writes through art have a natural explanation. The historian who uses the literary form has perfected his technique on the side of research,—the truth must be found at all costs and he may feel that it is immaterial how this is ultimately expressed. On the side of expression he is less restricted by convention than is the artist, his standards are less rigid, and they are perhaps not so high. The artist, on the other hand, excels in the technique of expression rather than of research,—it is by this that his fellow-workers estimate his success or failure. "He cannot draw," "he does not understand color," "his composition is confused," "his perspective is off," are the criticisms of an artist's work most often heard where artists congregate and pass judgment on the work of fellow-artists. If drawing, color, composition, perspective are satisfactory, the artist is a success. With the literary historian, the reverse is true. Any attempt at careful expression, any obvious thought of form has often been deprecated by his fellow-historians. The rhetorical periods of one historian, the use

of the apostrophe, or of the present instead of the past tense, or the choice of an imaginative expression have all been looked at askance in the belief that they indicated defective workmanship. But it seems probable that these differences are disappearing and that the literary historian and the artist historian are approaching each other in mutual appreciation of their characteristic advantages.

It must also be noted that art as well as literature must guard against imposture and false representations. Palimpsest monumental brasses as well as palimpsest manuscripts may obliterate records much desired; forged antiquities as well as forged manuscripts may enmesh those who work with the records of the past. Counterfeit coins, incorrect attributions of works of art, and the questioned authenticity of printed material may vex every historian whatever his medium of expression. Art may find it necessary to use so-called anachronisms in order to convey a truth; one artist in portraying a battle scene represents smoke, although smokeless powder is used, because it is difficult for the human mind to conceive of a battle without smoke; another artist in a stained glass window in Gouda represents cannon being used, although cannon had not been invented at the time of the scene depicted. Anachronisms, so-called, are repeatedly found that in reality may be representations untrue or incorrect in themselves, but necessary to convey a familiar truth.

Within the field of art itself, different media have their own special adaptations or lack of them. Mosaics are unsuited to pictorial effects, sculpture is ill adapted to scenes demanding warmth and color, bas-reliefs may tell a story more effectively than high relief, needlework

fails in giving perspective, stained glass is better suited to large subjects than to those demanding detail,—these are but suggestions of the limitations of special fields of art.

In all these variations in adaptability, art as a medium for writing history is but the counterpart of literature. The epic poem, the dramatic poem, the essay, the novel, narration, and description have all alike been used in literature and adapted to the different subjects with which history deals. Combinations of art and literature, as found in the opera, the pageant, the panorama, the tableau, the moving picture, have been used and have sometimes been able to overcome the disadvantages attendant on hybrid forms. Different purposes to be attained through history call for different media, and for different forms of expression. The extension of the audience for which history is written has demanded an ever-widening differentiation in means of presentation, and both art and literature have kept pace with the demand. Mural paintings in state capitols have reached a different audience from that reached by the Cathedral, and different subjects have been demanded. Both art and literature in their early forms of writing history, through their mutually complementary efforts, increased the audience of history, increasing audiences necessitated the invention and the control of new media, and thus history through whatever medium it has been written has pressed ever onward and downward in its course.

Both the "How" and the "Why" also concern the present. One group demands a representation of what is taking place in localities remote in space, and another group with equal insistence demands to be told how the present has come to be as it is. The "How?" and the

"Why?" inevitably tend to coalesce through the efforts of the historian to enlarge his audience and to meet the need he has created. But the time when coalescence will be effected is comparable to the time demanded for squaring the circle!

CHAPTER XI

WHY IS HISTORY REWRITTEN?

THE answer to the question "Why is history rewritten?" has been, it is hoped, suggested in part by the considerations already presented. But certain phases of the answer must be still further emphasized.

The subject is not a simple one. It has been confused by obscurity of thought that has exchanged the relations of cause and effect; that has injected extraneous questions into the discussion; that has substituted speculation for evidence; and that has assumed theses not yet proved. It has been confused by those "who feel the pain of a new idea"; by those who have been unwilling to examine the history of history; by those who have vociferously protested that their own guiding star has been the pursuit of truth, yet "have methinks protested too much"; by those who have allowed their own animosities to color their judgment of the work of their fellow historians; and by those who have still further mistaken personal vituperation for historical criticism. It has been confused by those who have ostentatiously denied the value of history; by those who have asserted that the sole function of history is to promote the interests of various good causes; and by those who have proclaimed that the utmost history can hope to accomplish is to act as handmaiden to other subjects in the realm of knowledge. It has been confused by those who have interchanged the use of the microscope and the telescope; by those who have given meticulous attention to accuracy of detail and have overlooked the equally great importance of

accuracy of proportion; by those who have forgotten that the errors of historians "must be weighed as well as counted"; and by those whose anxiety to prove a point has obscured their own sense of the eternal fitness of relationships. It has been confused by those who have forgotten that "brave men lived before Agamemnon"; by those over-eager to advance as new their own ideas that may have long been part of the common thought; and by those who, irrespective of age, or reputation, or position, are both ignorant and dogmatic, as well as by those, who, also irrespective of age, or reputation, or position, are both wise and tolerant. History shares with all other branches of knowledge in the finite limitations of those whose lives are spent in its pursuit as well as of those who have scarcely "a bowing acquaintance" with any part of the field of history. This in general may explain why as yet no definite answer has been given to the question raised.

The subject has also been confused by two somewhat contradictory influences. The first of these has been the effort, perhaps unconscious, to stake out the field of human knowledge into separate claims and to set up a preemption notice warning off all trespassers. The result has been well stated by F. J. Teggart when he says, "It must be admitted, I think, that the manner in which studies like anthropology, history, and geography, art, literature, and religion, philology, politics, and economics have been carried on in separate compartments has not been conducive in the highest degree to the advancement of knowledge." Even in an age when "efficiency" is the mainspring in education as well as in "big business," it is impossible to file or to pigeon-hole knowledge. More and more the interrelationship of all branches of knowledge is being tacitly recognized,

though not always openly acknowledged. A significant contribution in this direction has been made by the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, Massachusetts. Founded in 1921 "for the purpose of impartially exploring the facts underlying international events and promoting among adults the serious study of foreign affairs with a view to creating a more sympathetic understanding of the problems and policies of our own and other nations," it has ranged the whole wide world in its efforts to achieve this aim. The causes of past international misunderstandings have been sought not simply in the conventional official bulletins and reports of governments, but in all the underlying conditions that may have led to hazardous rivalries, conflicts, and hatreds. Year by year its programmes have more and more exemplified Maitland's phrase that history is ever enlarging, widening, deepening. Its most recent sessions have included conferences on the history and policy of the British labor movement; on agriculture and population increase; on the rôle of chemistry in the world's future affairs; on mineral resources as a new environmental factor in world affairs; on mineral resources in their political relations; on the conflict of laws and international trade; on international finance in the commercial policies of nations; on the common wealth of nations; on population and related problems; on international problems arising from the diversity of legal systems; on the Mediterranean area; and on public opinion in world affairs. The leaders of these conferences have been economists, geographers, geologists, biologists, chemists, linguists, social scientists, editors, journalists, lawyers, and financiers, as well as historians and political scientists. They have represented various professions and activities, as well as nearly a score of countries on both hemi-

spheres. Through these conferences, a discernible breach has already been made in the high walls that have so long separated the artificial divisions of knowledge, and they have made more familiar the idea of its basic unity.

On the other hand, confusion has come through the assumption that knowledge is an amoeba that can be divided into many parts, all similar to each other and each similar to the original whole. But while it must be said that knowledge has protean forms, it must also be remembered that it is an organism,—each organic separate part has its own organic relationship to all the component parts. Thus while natural science and history make use of the same general principles, there are, as H. B. George has pointed out, some inherent differences in the methods of research carried on in the two fields. In natural science it is almost always possible to verify the results obtained, while in history, since human actions are not repeated, this verification is practically impossible; natural science can aim at certainty, while history, at least in theory, cannot go beyond probability. Thus he finds that natural science and history differ as to the nature of the evidence with which they deal, as to their method of treating it, as to the results at which they aim, and as to the amount of certainty which they may expect to attain.[1]

F. W. Maitland has in turn shown in his inaugural lecture as Downing Professor of the Laws of England the difference between law and history in explaining why

[1]H. B. George, *Historical Evidence,* pp. 202–203, 21–28.
The book seems the most complete yet published in the field with which it deals. It grew out of a realization that while there were elaborate books on historical method in various languages, there was none that summed up shortly "the different sources of historical information, and the principles that should guide the inquirer in estimating their evidential value, first as enabling him to ascertain the facts, and secondly as guiding him in making the influences reasonably deducible from these facts."—It abundantly fulfils its purpose.

the history of English law is not written. It is in large part, he finds, because "we are tempted to mix up two different logics, the logic of authority, and the logic of evidence. What the lawyer wants is authority and the newer the better; what the historian wants is evidence and the older the better. . . . The lawyer must be orthodox, otherwise he is no lawyer; an orthodox history seems to me a contradiction in terms."

Even within the field of history itself there have been somewhat similar sources of confusion, since history has been regarded simply as history, lacking the infinite variety, the imperceptible shadings and gradations, the possibilities of classification found in many other fields. But the historian himself recognizes these distinctions, as well as the limitations of his own individual work as compared with that of others, and he is in hearty agreement with A. L. Smith in thinking that "The history of ideas is not only the loftiest and most difficult kind of history, but it is that which must more and more inspire and elevate the history of the political or narrative kind, and give it a *raison d'être,* a purpose and a clue."

These considerations may again in general explain why as yet no definite answer has been given to the question raised.

But it must also be said, fully realizing the danger of entering the field of prophecy, that a final answer to the question presumably never will or never can be given. The progress of history, it must never be forgotten, has not been by a straight line, but, as has already been said, it has been along an ever-ascending spiral and the end is not in sight. With each new height reached, still newer and loftier peaks, as yet unscaled, rise in the distance. It is possible to say, "To-day, with the evidence in hand, the reasons why history is rewritten are thus and so."

But it is impossible to say what changes in condition may arise to-morrow, what new "leads" may be discovered, what new light may pierce the present total darkness, what new aspects the question may assume.

It was less than fifty years ago that William Stubbs, in his capacity as Regius Professor of Modern History in Oxford University, spoke of the study of ancient history as mainly the study of classical history. "And in classical History," he continues, "splendid as our materials are, they have been in our hands for ages. Every bone of the great skeleton has long been put into its place: criticism upon it is becoming more and more every year the rearrangement of the critical material collected long ago, or the reconstruction of the History with all the charm which novel treatment, without novel material, can supply. . . . As a rule, we may say the study of ancient classical History lies within a confined area, every manuscript, every inscription, every coin, and every map of which has long been known, into which rash speculation never ventures without having cause for bitter repentance, and in which anything like a new discovery, such as the recent finds at Troy and Mycenae, is so very new, that when it does come to pass no one knows what to make of it. The very definiteness of all connected with this study makes it, for educational purposes, an incomparable discipline. As a study of knowledge for its own sake, as a field of discovery and profitable speculation, as a department in which the sum of human knowledge is likely to be largely increased, I confess I think it promises perhaps less than the study of later History. As a ground for fresh and remunerative exploration, I am sure it is still less promising."

This was the reasoned judgment, fifty years ago, of the most distinguished historian of his time. Yet ancient

history is no longer "mainly the study of classical History"; the bones in the great skeleton are not yet all in place; new material is constantly being discovered that demands a reconstruction of classical history; the historian as well as the archaeologist does know what to make of recent finds; education is no longer universally regarded as looking for subjects suitable as discipline; and ancient history is probably more than ever before regarded as a promising field for increasing the sum of human knowledge through fresh and remunerative exploration.

History must be rewritten because of the almost slavish bondage of historians to conventions, arbitrary divisions into ancient, mediaeval, and modern history, as well as the lesser subdivisions of reigns, periods, and administrations. Stubbs, in his various Oxford lectures, undertook to show the superior advantages of mediaeval history as a field for study over the field of ancient or of modern history. As compared with ancient history, he found the study of modern history "like the study of life compared with that of death, the view of the living body compared with that of the skeleton. The student of Ancient History has his advantages; he can speculate on his skeleton, he can penetrate more deeply into the framework of ancient society, so far as his materials allow him; . . . he is little troubled by the fear of new facts, or new developments making their appearance suddenly to put to flight his calculations; he has all the existing materials for his investigation before him, or within easy reach; he has for the geographical area of his work a portion of the earth and its peoples that has had, since the roll of its own historians was closed, little to do with the active work of the world. . . . But the principles he works out and the results of his criticism

are alike things that can give the world no new knowledge, or exercise no direct influence on real life."

All this, so Green thought, was open to grave criticism. "Stubbs's great error, it seems to me," he wrote Freeman, February 12, [1867], "is concerning the distinction between Ancient and Modern History. He did not say where the latter began, whether (with you) at the Call of Abraham, or (with Burrows) at the Flood. Anyhow, unless he adopts Burrows's definition, I am certain the distinction is fraught with infinite mischief. I am not likely to be prejudiced in favor of the age of Pericles; but is it true that that Age is dead to us, and the Age of Dunstan living. In the sense of 'social and political institutions' I take it it is dead; but if we take the deeper facts of the world's life, with one single exception, it is more living than the later age."

As Regius Professor of Modern History, Stubbs probably felt under obligation to enlarge somewhat on the opportunities afforded by the modern field, but it was only by comparing it with the mediaeval field. He was himself essentially a mediaevalist and at bottom he found serious limitations in the exclusive pursuit of either ancient or modern, or of both periods. If "Ancient History exercises the critical faculty in a comparatively narrow and exhausted field," if "mere modern politics furnish training only, and that incomplete training, for the advocate and partisan," it followed that "the intermediate region is that in which real personal interest may be strongly engaged without much temptation to passionate controversy, and in which therefore the judgment may be best trained for its own perfect development, and for the uses of practical politics when the time for practical controversy and advocacy comes." These advantages he explains at length, though it must be said that it is almost

entirely from ethical grounds that he deduces his conclusion in regard to the superiority of mediaeval history over the ancient and the modern periods as a training ground for historical students.

The ethical importance of the mediaeval period is not the conception held to-day of its value, nor was it that held by his predecessors. Henry Hallam had published in 1818, when about forty years of age, his *View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages*. It ran through a number of editions, but there is no apparent evidence that, as late certainly as the edition published in 1848, he changed his views concerning the varying values of the period of which he wrote. "Many considerable portions of time," he writes, "especially before the twelfth century, may justly be deemed so barren of events worthy of remembrance, that a single sentence or paragraph is often sufficient to give the character of entire generations, and of long dynasties of obscure kings."

The Preface of Hallam is significant, illustrating as it does the wide divergence of the views held of history a hundred and more years ago from those held to-day. History then was deemed a branch of literature to be read and remembered; it was judged to be a finished product rather than a vital organism; it was a survey such as could "interest a philosophical inquirer"; and historians thought it possible to assign definite, fixed values to various facts and periods, labeling this "important" and that "unimportant." These conceptions of history are assuredly at variance with that held by scholars to-day, as illustrated by J. H. Robinson who writes casually of "the trifling period that separates us from Plato and Aristotle."

Nothing more clearly illustrates than do these views of eminent historians of their time the radical changes

that are taking place in the views of historians in regard to their own subject. "Whatever individuals may do," says H. B. George, "history as a whole is continuous, like time and space, and real dividing lines cannot be drawn." This view must be accepted since "every addition to our knowledge tells that there is more beyond." It thus follows inevitably, as C. H. Firth explains in his Inaugural Lecture, that "the outline of the past seems to change as it grows more remote." Investigation leads to new interpretations, new interpretations lead to more extended investigation and thus history pursues its ever-ascending spiral. Maitland's study of law and his study of history led to the investigation of Canon Law, this led him to an examination of William Lyndwood's *Provinciale,* and this led in turn to "a book which has permanently deflected the current of historical opinion."

This brings us to the consideration of the new history and its meaning. The exponents of the new history have been reproached for writing so much about it and with writing so little of it, and there is some apparent justification for the reproach. The term does indeed seem a specious one since all history has ever been renewed day by day. There have been no special creations either in history or in the methods of writing history. The new history of to-day is but the natural development of the new history of yesterday as that was in turn developed from the history that was new uncounted eons in the past. Pasteur in his controversies with those who supported the theory of spontaneous generation was unconsciously anticipating the position of historians who to-day find it impossible to discover the line of demarcation separating ancient history from mediaeval, mediaeval from modern, the new history from the history that in its time has always been new. It must never be

forgotten that, in the words of G. M. Trevelyan, "Every true history must, by its human and vital presentation of events, force us to remember that the past was once real as the present and uncertain as the future." Extension of the base on which history is written, extension of the method of work through which history is written, extension of the audience for whom history is written, may seem to result in a new history. But if history is being extended in every direction and is thereby becoming the new history, the new history itself must be constantly taking on new aspects. While thought is cumulative, history is always contemporaneous, and therefore again is always new. Different influences may now at one time and now at another have pushed backward different lines of research at an uneven pace; one immediate effect of the World War was to quicken interest in the efforts to maintain peace that had been made during the past two thousand years. The contributions of distinguished scholars made in the direction of preparing the way for future workers will inevitably accelerate the work of others in the same fields; the work of great editors like B. F. Stevens turns the attention of scholars to the possibilities of editing manuscripts not easily available for their use. An analysis of the material used by Rollins for his *Ancient History* directs attention to the wide range of material on which J. H. Robinson based his *History of Western Europe,* and the important part taken by analysis in all constructive work is recognized. The synthesis made by Mrs. B. H. Hill, in her *Rome under the Kings,* of the contents of archaeological museums and their bearing on the history of early Rome encourages others to turn from sources of questionable authoritativeness to the search for material that may be assembled from the four corners of the globe and combined into an or-

derly representation of the past. The very complexity of history as well as its organic character makes it impossible for it to develop *pari passu* in all of its multifarious forms. When an impetus in one direction has led to its development at a faster pace than in others, the result may be heralded as "the new history," but it is new only in the sense that each recurring sun brings in a new day that differs little from other days. If, in the fine phrase of Charles Oman, "Every trained specialist owes 'his stone to the cairn,' " every stone changes the aspect of the cairn, but the cairn is still a cairn,—the addition has not altered its nature, it has not thereby become a rough hewn block, or a finished statue.

History whether designated as new or old necessarily takes on somewhat of the coloring of the historian himself. If Freeman proclaimed that history was past politics and politics present history, it was in part because he had little apparent interest in the work of contemporary historians outside the narrow circle of his intimate friends, and there is little evidence of interest in the work of his predecessors. If, as was fitting and expected, he paid homage in his inaugural address to his predecessors in the chair he held, his mind did not wander far from Oxford nor did it cross the channel and find the same unity in the aims and the work of all historians that he found in history itself.

It is indeed much to be regretted that historians have devoted so much time and energy to pointing out the defects of their predecessors, forgetting that their own work has grown out of that of their forerunners and has been developed from it. They have also sometimes forgotten that, in the words of John Robinson in his farewell address to the Pilgrims when leaving Leyden, they themselves must in turn become "even as stepping stones

unto others in the performance of so great a work." Not the least weighty of the reasons that compel the rewriting of history is this censorious, even vindictive, spirit that has tainted the work of some historians who have made important contributions to knowledge.

It must also be realized that in all historical work two mutually repellent principles have been present,—the principle of authority and the principle of research. It was authority that long guided the hand of many historians, however unconscious of it they themselves may have been. The inquiring mind was present, but it halted this side of the research that it was at the time felt might endanger the supremacy of Church or State. It was authority as represented in the Church that explains the tone of finality that characterized Stubbs' decisions in regard to the past, present, and future of the period once called ancient history. To-day it is recognized that it is the newest field of history, not indeed with reference to the actual time when events took place, but newest in relation to the material placed at the service of the historian and newest with reference to the methods developed for dealing with it. It has been difficult for even the greatest of historians who have had ecclesiastical connections to emancipate themselves wholly from the guiding spirit of authority. Happily the scales are to-day turning on the side of untrammeled research, that consciously and unconsciously recognizes no allegiance except that due to truth.

It is at this point that natural science and history meet. The astronomer with his telescope explores the relation of the earth to other parts of the planetary system, the geologist with his world-wide observation is concerned with the history of the earth itself, the biologist with his microscope peers into the secret workings of plant

and animal life. The historian attempts to reconstruct the past from a multiplicity of records covering the earth in time and space. The historian of man and the historian of nature have alike been impeded in their search for truth by the spirit of authority that upholds the existing order and the traditional versions of its origin.

History must be rewritten, as has been seen, because the audience for whom history is written has been widely extended. Not so many years have passed since history was regarded as a subject reserved exclusively for investigation and research by the elect, and it was written solely for scholars. Every historian who adapted his work to reach a larger circle of readers was condemned by his fellow historians as a "popularizer," as lowering his personal dignity and the dignity of the subject, and as "casting his pearls before swine." This condemnation of the historian who sought to reach outwards, downwards, and upwards to a different intellectual stratum was shared by the pictorial artist and by the literary artist of repute whose services were secured for the cause of commercial advertising. To-day well-known artists and well-known writers fearlessly sign their names to material that appears in the advertising pages or columns of the periodical press. History provides a large proportion of the material used by the commercial artist and writer, and the historian writes for all sorts and conditions of men, and this without reproach from other workers in the same field. The extension of democracy alike in art, in literature, and in history has been most significant.

The excursions into new fields were at first timidly made and they were by writers who were not known as historians. Comic histories of half a dozen countries came from the sanctum of *Punch;* histories in words of

one syllable, parodies of histories, a *Child's History* by Dickens, and other efforts to make history amusing or to satirize the somewhat pompous histories of literal-minded historians were the precursors of other works of a different type. Historians came to recognize the legitimate interest in history on the part of many classes whose needs had never been considered, and the wide extension of the audience for whom history is written has followed naturally the extension of the base on which it is written and the extension and the perfection of method with which it is written.

At this point, too, the historian of man and the historian of nature have met on common ground. Division of labor has entered into every field of research. In natural science, Darwin was an explorer through observation of the infinitely small, Lyall was an observer of world-wide changes, Hooker a classifier, and Huxley a popularizer—all alike contributed their stone to the cairn. It is as impossible to measure the work of great historians who may be critical editors of manuscripts, keepers of archives, discoverers of new material, or writers with a literary gift as it is to measure the diverse achievements of natural scientists by any common denominator.

History must be rewritten because historians are learning to distinguish between different forms of the imagination and to appreciate the value of some of its phases in all historical production. The term imagination has often connoted literary imagination,—that form that has given rise to the highest types of literature found in poetry and romance. It is self-evident that this variety of imagination must bring discredit on every work of history where it is used,—poetry soars aloft while history penetrates below the surface. The occasional attempt

to use literary imagination in historical literature has led to the hasty condemnation of every form of the imagination. At times even the use of the historical imagination has been condemned. The great narrative histories, like those of Macaulay and Motley, have succeeded, through the use of the historical imagination, in re-animating men and making them again actors in the theater of life. It is in large part to this form of imagination that the historical novel owes its success. But histories written with the aid of the historical imagination have been after all but histories written "in the flat." They must be rewritten "in the round" through the use of the critical imagination. It is this imagination that makes alive not simply men but abstractions, it is this imagination that enables the historian to understand allusions and suggestions, to look below the surface and to see the records of history in everything about him, to see in the marriage ceremony, in funeral customs, in the oath of office, in *viva voce* voting, in all institutions and customs, the records of what men have probably done since the world began. The attempt to write history with the aid of the literary imagination has produced a hybrid that has been neither literature nor history, as is illustrated in the work called *Flowers of History;* the use of the historical imagination has given us a panorama of the past, but while the pictures drawn have been vivid and even truthful they have been but pictures and have lacked the reality of life itself. History must be rewritten through the aid of the critical, constructive imagination if the past is to live again.

History must be rewritten because of the enormous change made in daily as well as in public life. The world has shrunk through the application of new motive powers to all forms of transportation; through the invention

of new ways of communicating thought; through the constantly increasing acceleration of all forms of physical and mental activity. As the material world has contracted, the relation of man to the world in which he lives has correspondingly and proportionately expanded.

This is but saying in another way that history must be rewritten because the historian has found that his study of the past, if approached without preconceived ideas, leads him along lines that parallel those followed by natural science. If the geologist and the biologist have found through the study of diverse groups of facts in the world of nature that the changes in the structure of the earth itself and in the adaptation of plant and animal life to their environment have been due to evolution and have resulted in evolution, the historian through the study of facts dealing with human life has reached the same conclusion. The group of sciences that deal with nature and the group of sciences that deal with man are but complementary aspects of the field of knowledge. In the case of history the principle of evolution has influenced both the selection of material and the manner of presenting the material selected. If at one time the only thought of the historian was to choose such records as through combination would produce a brilliant picture; if at another time his selection was of those that would establish a preconceived thesis; if at still other times he has been interested in the search for new material sometimes regardless of its value; he is now absorbed in the pursuit of only such records as will enable him to write the history of the past from the nearest approach to absolute truth. To the historian of to-day, it matters not at all whether the records of the past will form a

vivid picture, whether they prove or disprove the righteousness of the cause of his favorite political or religious parties, whether no eye but his own has seen the new material discovered,—all that he asks is that the records used shall be indisputably true. The writing of history has itself had a history and this fact in itself attests the necessity of continuing to rewrite history in the future. Thus the history that was once but a simple narrative of past events, has become a study of the causes of these events, while to-day it asks how the past came to be as it was. Every historian collects and arranges his material, writes and rewrites the history of the past with reference to the question of origin, growth, and development. Thus at every point, in the object and in the method of his work, the historian joins hands with his colleague, the worker in the field of natural science. It is difficult to see, as has been pointed out with great lucidity by W. R. Thayer, how this principle of evolution can ever be superseded. With its discovery the writing of history seems placed on an immovable foundation and all things seem possible.

A variant of the question has lately been giving historians concern and they are asking why history is not to-day read with the keen interest that made Gibbon, Macaulay, Bancroft, Motley, Parkman, and Prescott the six best sellers of their time. It seems reasonable to reply that it is because history is no longer regarded as a branch of literature; that historians have become obsessed by the importance of collecting and testing their material and have had too little regard for the form it is ultimately to take; that they do not write well because they do not realize the importance of writing as well as they can; that they select as it were with infinite pains

and at great expense the most desirable material for a new suit of clothes and then order it made by an amateur tailor.

There is doubtless much truth in these explanations, but is it not also necessary to realize the fundamental changes that are taking place in human society? In domestic architecture the library, the parlor, and the drawing room are being telescoped into the living room, as the individual house is giving way to the apartment or the bungalow; the automobile takes the family far afield; new scenes in the present viewed with the physical eye seem more alluring than does the reconstruction of an earlier day through the printed page, however glowing it has been made by the historian's pen; the audible voice of the radio is more persuasive than the silent voice of the book; social conditions are everywhere changing with almost unprecedented rapidity. The family no longer gathers around the center table while the father reads aloud the majestic pages of Gibbon, the well-rounded periods of Macaulay, the animated descriptions given by Motley of the bravery and resourcefulness that saved Antwerp, Leyden, and Haarlem from a hated foe, or the ethical deductions of Bancroft concerning a chosen people in the new world. All these and other social changes may explain why history is not read with the same zest as it was fifty years ago, quite as much as does the well-recognized fact that history is to-day too often written in a dull manner.

It is frequently said that historians now write for fellow-historians, not for the general reader. There is also much truth in this statement and there is much to justify such writing. The absolute, though perhaps not the relative, number of persons working in the field of history has apparently increased beyond all that could

have once been anticipated. The historian naturally wishes to have his work passed on by his fellow-craftsmen and it seems almost inevitable that more and more he should be concerned with the processes involved in writing history rather than with the form given the final result. As his audience of fellow-workers increases, he gives less and less thought to the shadowy public that may or may not be interested in his work. No exhortation however fervent will presumably change his opinion concerning the relative importance of the two potential audiences or his determination to be judged by his peers.

And if the historian is sometimes chided because he too no longer reads history, it must be said in his defense that his own interests are changing. The active, positive, creative process he finds far more interesting than the passive, negative one of absorbing and assimilating the results of the work of others. The more eager, the more inquiring his own mind becomes, the more earnestly he presses forward, looking neither backward nor to the right nor to the left, towards the attainment of a definite goal.

It may be said that if the historian does not care to read personally the histories written by others, and that if he cares little whether his own works have wide circulation beyond the members of the guild, there can be no pressing demand for the rewriting of history. But this is assuredly a *non sequitur*. Many times indeed does an inward urge compel the historian to write again the history of a period or of a subject that has often been written, and he can only say in Luther's spirit, "Ich kann nicht anders." There may be no justification for the confidence that when the truth is found it will be of universal interest,—the question may reasonably be raised whether

the general public really desires the truth or not, but the historian himself has no choice.

For it must be remembered that things of the mind have not always followed the course of material affairs. It has been a matter of grave concern when men have been kept in physical slavery,—their helpless condition has aroused the sympathies of all who have not had financial interests at stake, even at times the sympathies of those who have had such interest. Men who have been subject to political tyranny have from time to time thrown off the shackles and have become freemen. The chains of ecclesiastical thralldom have at times been broken. But history has not recorded any general uprising against intellectual tyranny, and there has as yet been no concerted effort to emancipate the human mind. Habits of thought change more slowly than does the environment in which men live, and the historian who presents a new interpretation, a new classification, a new series of previously unknown facts may find himself in a chilling atmosphere of doubt and unbelief.

Why is history rewritten? Because each new day, to the votary of history, brings a new adventure, a new voyage of discovery, a new invention, a new creation,—a lens of greater magnifying power that will enable him to understand the complex organism of "the infinitely small," or to penetrate still further into the as yet impenetrable darkness of the most remote past. The new day may enable him to readjust his vision, to see the past in truer perspective, to clear away the mists that have obscured the white light of truth. Hope springs eternal that the historian may yet achieve the impossible and attain unto perfectibility. Why has this not yet come to pass? Because, in the words of Lord Bryce, "for the highest kind of historical work four gifts are needed;

unwearied diligence in investigation, a penetrating judgment which can fasten on the more essential points, an imagination which can vivify the past, and that power over language which we call Style. So the greatest historians have been those who combined a wide sweep of vision with a thorough mastery of details, and who have known how to set forth both the details and the principles in a way which makes them enrich the reader's thought, touch his emotions, and live in his memory."

Lord Bryce presumably used advisedly the term "greatest historians." For the humblest as well as the most hopeful of historians knows in his heart of hearts that while there may be, as there always has been, a class that can be justly termed greatest historians, there has never been *a* greatest historian. No one historian has as yet been equally endowed with all the gifts enumerated by Lord Bryce, who, in the opinion of many, approached more nearly to it than has any other writer of history. Should such an historian ultimately appear, it would be the end of historical writing, since the finished product has ceased to be a living organism and can have no vital future. Happily, as far as students of history can foresee, history will always have to be rewritten.

NOTE

THE accompanying chart is intended to suggest that the historian is constantly pressing downward and backward in his effort to secure the ultimate sources for his work, and that he finds the records of history in everything about him. This was stated authoritatively in 1913 by Lord Bryce in his address as President of the International Congress of Historical Studies when he said: "We have now come to regard history as a record of every form of human effort and achievement, concerned not any more definitely with political events and institutions than with all other factors that have moulded man and all the other expressions his creative activity has found."

The chart was worked out from the first edition of James Harvey Robinson's *History of Western Europe* published in 1903. The fifth revised edition of the same work is published in 1926, and this very revision is in itself an illustration of the necessity of rewriting history. The fact that the chart for the first edition may be used for the latest edition indicates that the general principles that compel the rewriting of history apparently do not at present materially change. The extension of the records now used is not of new classes that are added but of new illustrations of divisions already familiar. But a chart showing the sources used by Grote for his *History of Greece,* or by Hallam for his *History of the Middle Ages* would illustrate how fundamentally the conception of history has changed since these earlier works were written. A comparison of such charts would clearly indicate that it is necessary to rewrite history

because the base on which history is written has been widely extended, that the method by which history is written has been greatly perfected, and that the audience for which history is written has been increasingly enlarged.

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